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The development of perceptual priors 




Bayesian inference has come to be regarded as the best, statistically optimal, 
way to deal with the sensory uncertainty inherent in our natural environment. One 
way to cope with such uncertainty is to incorporate our pre-existing knowledge about 
the world. However, we know very little about the circumstances in which human 
observers integrate sensory information with prior knowledge in a way that is close to 
optimal. We understand even less about how the developing brain adapts to the 
environmental statistics, learns to use them efficiently, and what factors may underlie 
the development of this critical perceptual skill. We addressed these questions 
though a series of psychophysical experiments, in which adults and 6- to 11-year-old 
children estimated the location of unseen targets based on a noisy sensory cue and 
a prior distribution that can be learned over the course of the experiment.  
In Chapter 2, we showed that adult observers weighted sensory and prior 
information by their reliabilities but were far from optimal and struggled to generalise 
to untrained reliabilities in complex situations. The findings of Chapter 3 showed that 
6- to 8-year-olds also weighted priors in proportion to their reliability, but they were 
slow to tune their behaviour to the statistics over time and remained furthest from 
optimal. Six- to -eight-year-olds’ performance reached adult-like levels when the 
priors were explicitly shown. Conversely, when the decision rule was made more 
complex, 6- to 8-year-olds’ abilities to distinguish between the priors broke down and 
adults’ performance became more child-like. These findings prompted us to 
investigate whether individual differences, specifically in working memory, may 
predict performance in adults. The distance from optimal was not predicted by 
working memory capacity, beyond general cognitive abilities.  
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Together, these studies offer fresh insights into the capacity and limitations 
both adults and 6-11-year-old children have in learning and efficiently using novel 


























The development of perceptual priors 
 
Reneta Krasimirova Kiryakova, BSc (Hons), MA. 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Psychology 
 

























Table of Contents 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................ 7 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................. 9 
Declaration ................................................................................................................... 10 
Publication Note .......................................................................................................... 10 
Statement of Copyright .............................................................................................. 10 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... 11 
Chapter 1 ...................................................................................................................... 12 
General Introduction ................................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Thesis Aims .............................................................................................................. 13 
1.2 Perception Can be Understood as a Process of Bayesian Inference .............. 13 
1.3 Cue Combination ..................................................................................................... 17 
1.3.1 Bayesian Predictions ............................................................................................................. 18 
1.3.2 Do Adults Do What the Bayesian Theory Says in Cue Combination Tasks? .......... 19 
1.3.3 Sub-optimal Cue Combination? .......................................................................................... 20 
1.3.4 No Cue Combination .............................................................................................................. 21 
1.3.5 At What Age Does This Ability to Combine Cues Develop? ........................................ 22 
1.3.6 Why Does Optimal Cue Combination Occur So Late? .................................................. 23 
1.4 Biases Towards Previous Stimuli ......................................................................... 27 
1.4.1 Central tendency and serial dependence ......................................................................... 27 
1.5 Priors .......................................................................................................................... 30 
1.5.1 Structural Priors ...................................................................................................................... 30 
1.5.2 Contextual Priors .................................................................................................................... 33 
1.6 The Caveat ................................................................................................................ 44 
1.6.1 Filling the Gaps ........................................................................................................................ 45 
1.7 Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 45 
1.8 Experimental Chapters ............................................................................................ 46 
Chapter 2 ...................................................................................................................... 48 
Bayesian transfer in a complex spatial localization task ..................................... 48 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 48 
2.2 Experiment 1: Testing Transfer to a New Level of Likelihood Variance ......... 52 
2.2.1 Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 53 
2.2.2 Results and Discussion for Experiment 1 ........................................................................ 58 
2.3 Experiment 2: Additional instructions about prior variance ............................. 64 
2.3.1 Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 64 
2.3.2 Results and Discussion for Experiment 2 ........................................................................ 64 
2.4. Experiment 3: All likelihoods from the beginning .............................................. 69 
2.4.1 Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 69 
2.4.2 Results and Discussion of Experiment 3 .......................................................................... 69 
2.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................ 76 
 5 
2.6 Moving from Limits on Using Information Efficiently in Adulthood to 
Childhood .............................................................................................................................. 84 
Chapter 3 ...................................................................................................................... 85 
Development of efficient adaptation to novel task statistics ............................... 85 
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 85 
3.2 Experiment 1 ............................................................................................................. 87 
3.2.1 Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 88 
3.2.2 Results ....................................................................................................................................... 93 
3.2.3 Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 98 
3.3. Experiment 2 ............................................................................................................. 99 
3.3.1 Methods ................................................................................................................................... 100 
3.3.2 Results ..................................................................................................................................... 101 
3.3.3 Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 105 
3.4 Experiment 3 ........................................................................................................... 106 
3.4.1 Methods ................................................................................................................................... 106 
3.4.2 Results ..................................................................................................................................... 107 
3.5 General Discussion ............................................................................................... 111 
3.6 From Experimental Manipulations to Individual Differences .......................... 113 
Chapter 4 .................................................................................................................... 115 
Individual differences in working memory capacity do not predict efficient 
adaptation to novel statistics .................................................................................. 115 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 115 
4.2 Materials and methods .......................................................................................... 117 
4.2.1 Participants ............................................................................................................................. 117 
4.2.2 Measures ................................................................................................................................. 118 
4.2.3 General Procedure ................................................................................................................ 120 
4.2.4 Data Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 120 
4.3 Results ..................................................................................................................... 120 
4.4. Discussion .............................................................................................................. 128 
Chapter 5 .................................................................................................................... 133 
General Discussion ................................................................................................... 133 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 133 
5.2 Summary of main findings ................................................................................... 133 
5.2.1 Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................................. 133 
5.2.2 Chapter 3 ................................................................................................................................. 134 
5.2.3 Chapter 4 ................................................................................................................................. 135 
5.3 Contributions to the literature .............................................................................. 135 
5.3.1 Limited by complexity .......................................................................................................... 136 
5.3.2 Adult-like integration of evidence from various sources after 8 years, but earlier if 
you know more about the underlying structure .......................................................................... 137 
5.3.3 Limited resources ................................................................................................................. 139 
5.3.4 Neural explanations .............................................................................................................. 141 
5.4 Implications ............................................................................................................. 143 
 6 
5.4.1 Shared underpinnings with cue combination ................................................................ 143 
5.5 Future Directions and Limitations ....................................................................... 143 
5.5.1 The importance of testing beyond 11 years ................................................................... 143 
5.5.2 The importance of using computational models .......................................................... 144 
5.5.3 Neural mechanisms that might underlie attenuated priors and the importance of 
eye-tracking methods ......................................................................................................................... 146 
5.5.4 Individual differences ........................................................................................................... 147 
5.6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 148 
Appendices ................................................................................................................ 149 
6.1 Appendix A – Instructions for Experiments 1 and 2 (Chapter 2) .................... 149 
6.2 Appendix B – Control Experiment: Likelihood-only task (Chapter 2) ........... 150 
6.3 Appendix C (Chapter 2) ......................................................................................... 153 





































Figure 1.1. Perceptual illusions       14 
Figure 1.2. Example of integration of prior expectations and  
sensory evidence         15 
 
Chapter 2 
Bayesian transfer in a complex spatial localization task 
Figure 2.1. Illustration of the task       55 
Figure 2.2. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information  
in Experiment 1         59 
Figure 2.3. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information  
in Experiment 2         64 
Figure 2.4. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information  
in Experiment 3.         69 
Figure 2.5. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information  
in Experiment 1  
with predicted weights for Bayesian and internal noise models.  72 
Figure 2.6. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information  
in Experiment 1          74 
with predicted weights for Bayesian and overall noise models.  
Figure 2.7. Average Mean Squared Error (MSE) for the  
external noise, internal noise and overall noise models.   75 
 
Chapter 3 
Development of efficient adaptation to novel task statistics 
Figure 3.1. An example of an experimental trial sequence   89 
Figure 3.2. Mean weight placed on the cue during Experiment 1  93 
Figure 3.3. Experimental design       100 
Figure 3.4. The weight given to the cue in Experiment 1 and  
Experiment 2 for each bin, prior variance and age group   101 
Figure 3.5. Cue weights for Experiment 1 and Experiment 3  




Individual differences in working memory capacity do not predict efficient 
adaptation to novel statistics 
Figure 4.1. Mean weight placed on the cue     120 
Figure 4.2. Histograms showing the distribution of scores for  
the Corsi blocks test, backwards digit span and vocabulary   122 
Figure 4.3. Histograms showing the distribution of absolute  
distance-to-optimal indices for the narrow and wide priors   123 
Figure 4.4. Correlations between distance-to-optimal scores (narrow prior)  
and Corsi blocks test, backwards digit span and vocabulary   126 
 8 
Figure 4.5. Correlations between distance-to-optimal scores (wide prior)  
and Corsi blocks test, backwards digit span and vocabulary   127 
 
Appendices 
Figure 6.8. Variable error for each likelihood condition in the  
likelihood-only task.         150 
Figure 6.9. Mean weight on the likelihood in Experiment with  
Optimal values, computed using measured likelihood variances  
in the control experiment.        151 
Figure 6.10. Mean number of points earned in block 5 for  
participants who took part in Experiment 2 or Experiment 3  
and the control task, with optimal values accounting  

























List of Tables 
 
Chapter 2 
Bayesian transfer in a complex spatial localization task 
Table 2.1. Repeated Measures ANOVA for the low and medium  
likelihood variances in Experiment 1      60 
Table 2.2. Repeated Measures ANOVA for all  
likelihood variances in Experiment 1      62 
Table 2.3. Repeated Measures ANOVA for the low and medium 
likelihood variances in Experiment 2      65 
Table 2.4. Repeated Measures ANOVA for all  
likelihood variances in Experiment 2      66 
Table 2.5. Repeated Measures ANOVA for all  
likelihood variances in Experiment 3      70 
 
Chapter 3 
Development of efficient adaptation to novel task statistics 
Table 3.1. One-sample t-tests on difference from optimal for  
each age group and prior in Experiment 1     97 
Table 3.2. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses)  
of absolute distance-from-optimal scores in Experiments 1  
and 2 for each age group and prior      103 
Table 3.3. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses)  
of absolute distance-from-optimal scores in Experiments 1  
and 3 for each age group and prior      109 
 
Chapter 4 
Individual differences in working memory capacity do not predict efficient 
adaptation to novel statistics 
Table 4.1. Means, standard deviations (in parentheses) and range  
for distance-from-optimal scores for narrow and wide prior and  
predictor measures (vocabulary, Backwards digit span, Corsi blocks) 124 
Table 4.2. Unstandardized regression coefficients (β), standard errors (SE),  
adjusted R2 and p values from the hierarchical regression  
predicting distance to optimal scores using vocabulary knowledge,  












I, Reneta Kiryakova, confirm that, unless stated otherwise, all the work presented in 
this thesis is my own. This work was supported by a research grant from the North 





The entirety of Chapter 2 has been published:  
Kiryakova, R. K., Aston, S., Beierholm, U. R., & Nardini, M. (2020). Bayesian 
transfer in a complex spatial localization task. Journal of vision, 20(6), 17-17. 
 
The entirety of Chapter 2 has been submitted for publication at Developmental 
Science: 
Kiryakova, R. K., Aston, S., Beierholm, U. R., & Nardini, M. (submitted). 
Development of efficient adaptation to novel task statistics 
 
 
Statement of Copyright 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it 











Here we are.  
First and foremost, I would like to say a big thanks to my supervisors Professor 
Marko Nardini and Dr Ulrik Beierholm. Marko for his endless enthusiasm, curiosity, 
and forward thinking; there was always another question to ask, more that we could 
probe to get further insight. Ulrik for his calming presence, uplifting and encouraging 
attitude, and whose comments and questions, though deceptively simple, sparked 
much thought. You both passed along knowledge of relevant resources, shared 
experiences, views, and feedback and put a great deal of time into me and my 
experiments – and for that I am really grateful. I am enormously grateful to Dr Stacey 
Aston, whose support went beyond hands-on help with the code and analysis that 
went into the experiments in Chapter 2 and help with interpretation of everything that 
came after – I learned from you what you do not get explicitly taught, e.g., good 
coding practices, the importance of taking part in outreach initiatives. You are one of 
the most genuinely supportive and sincere people I know, and you have been an 
inspiration. Thank you to Dr James Negen who never failed to remind me that my 
work is valued and important. I am extremely grateful to Rachel Graham, Molly 
Reeve, Esther Yip and Ellie Nixon for help with collecting the data for Chapter 4. 
The research in this thesis was only made possible by the funding I received from 
the ESRC and North East Doctoral Training Centre (ES/J500082/1), friends and 
officemates who ran my pilot experiments, and the children and families who took 
time out of their evenings and weekends to take part in my experiments.  
Thank you to my family whose faith in me never wavered. Lastly, and perhaps most 
importantly, I would like to thank Tom – knowing that I have a constant source of 











In order to make good, effective decisions in an uncertain, ever changing 
environment, we need to more optimally use all the information we have available to 
us. There are two crucial ways in which evidence can be optimally used: by 
integrating (1) information across different sensory cues, or (2) a sensory cue with 
prior knowledge about the statistical structure of previous events. Cue combination 
and how it develops has recently attracted more attention, but we know very little 
about how we learn to integrate prior and sensory information, what the limits of this 
learning are, how this learning changes over the course of childhood and what 
factors may underlie this ability. Is adults’ ability to generalise learned priors to 
untrained cue reliabilities limited by task complexity? Are children slower to learn and 
use novel priors than adults? Could we improve children’s ability to learn and use 
priors by relaxing working memory demands? Could we make their learning worse 
by adding more levels of sensory uncertainty? Can individual differences in working 
memory capacity explain some of the individual variation in prior integration abilities 
in adults? We address these questions in this thesis.  
This introduction begins with an outline of the aims of the thesis. We then 
provide an overview of the Bayesian framework that is used to address the questions 
outlined above in this thesis. Next, we outline what is known about cue combination 
in order to serve as a benchmark for the second component of optimal inference: 
integration of prior knowledge and sensory information. We first describe how adults 
use multiple cues to improve perception in ambiguous situations and following this, 
outline the developmental course of cue combination. After, we summarise research 
on biases in visual perception in adults and children, before switching my focus to 
‘priors’. In discussing priors, we discuss two distinct types of priors: structural and 
contextual priors, first in adults, and then in children. At the end of this section, we 
highlight the gaps in our knowledge that will be addressed in this thesis. We then 
introduce the limiting evidence of individual differences in the detection of statistical 
regularities and working memory capacity, creating a knowledge gap between the 
two – we then outline how this gap is addressed in this thesis. Finally, we summarise 
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my findings and describe how they contribute to the literature more broadly. We then 
discuss the practical implications of this work, its limitations and future directions 
before summarising the key conclusions from this thesis.  
 
1.1 Thesis Aims 
 The aim of the work described in this thesis was to determine whether adults 
can perform Bayesian inference in more complex situations, what factors influence 
adults’ abilities to efficiently combine prior and sensory information and how 
children’s abilities to learn and use novel perceptual priors efficiently change as 
children get older, gain experience and undergo changes in cognitive functions. We 
approached this question by asking adults and children, aged between 6 and 11 
years to learn novel prior distributions, and to integrate them with sensory input to 
more accurately estimate the location of unseen objects. 
 
1.2 Perception Can be Understood as a Process of Bayesian Inference 
We can trace the beginnings of Bayesian theory all the way back to 
Helmholtz’s work on “unconscious inference”; that the brain deals with the inherently 
ambiguous information from our senses by incorporating prior knowledge of the 
environment (Geisler & Kersten, 2002; Helmholtz, 1925; Kersten et al., 2004). 
Several well-known visual illusions nicely illustrate this (Gregory, 1997; Weiss et al., 
2002). For example, when we see the four ‘Pac-Man’ shapes in Figure 1.1a, we 
perceive an illusory square. We must have inferred, based on previous experiences, 
that by far the most likely reason for such a percept is that there are four black 
circles with a white square on top. Also, the larger context can help us make sense 
of smaller details. For example, the same character can be perceived as the letter ‘B’ 
or the number ‘13’, depending on whether you are focusing on the letters presented 
horizontally (‘A’ and ‘C’) or the numbers presented vertically (‘12’ and ‘14’; Figure 
1.1b). Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT) proposes a normative framework for 
optimally interpreting such ambiguous retinal images (Kersten et al., 2004; Knill & 






Figure 1.1. Perceptual illusions. a. A Kanizsa square: is that four ‘Pac-Man’ figures or 
four black circles with a white square overlaid on top? b. Surfaces that are brighter at 
the top are generally seen as convex and the others as concave, consistent with an 
assumption of light from above. c. Is the character in the centre the letter ‘B’ or the 
number ‘13’? d. Knowing that you are looking for a leopard makes the leopard 
features in the first image stand out more.  
 
BDT has two key components: first, the hypothesis about the world. In its 
simplest form, this component can take the form of a prior distribution (Yuille & 
Kersten, 2006), but is more generally represented by a generative model (Clark, 
2013). We will only be using the term ‘prior’ distributions in the following. The second 
component is the data received from the senses. These data, too, are known by 
different names, such as likelihood (Yuille & Kersten, 2006) or sensory information 
(Clark, 2013). Both terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
When perception is described as a form of Bayesian inference, the prior and 
the likelihood are probability distributions which, together, influence what we 
perceive. Imagine playing tennis and doing your best to figure out where your 
opponent is likely to serve the ball (Figure 1.2). When playing an opponent for the 
first time, the ‘prior’ is a flat probability distribution: your opponent is equally likely to 
direct their serve either to the middle or to the side of the court. Suppose, over time, 
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you observe more and more balls landing in the same vicinity (following a normal 
distribution with some random noise; red, Figure 1.2). Knowledge of your opponent’s 
previous landing positions could then be used to predict the trajectory of the ball, 
even before it is hit. Combining this prior with the noisy information from your eyes 
(blue, Figure 1.2) via Bayes’ rule gives a posterior probability (orange, Figure 1.2) 
that the ball is going to land in a position 𝑥:  
 
𝑃(𝑥|𝑜) = 𝑐𝑃(𝑜|𝑥)𝑃(𝑥) (1) 
 
where 𝑃(𝑜|𝑥) describes the uncertainty in the sensory information (the likelihood), or 
the probability of different observations given the true world state, 𝑥; 𝑃(𝑥) represents 





Figure 1.2. Example of integration of prior expectations and sensory evidence. a. 
When playing tennis, people can benefit from combining what they know from before 
(prior, red) with new sensory information (likelihood, blue). In doing so, they can 




A similar approach could be used to understand the perception of visual 
illusions – disambiguation of the central character (as a ‘B’ or ‘13’) in Figure 1.1c is 
an example. The sensory information provided by the character in the middle – its 
shape – matches the number ‘13’ and the letter ‘B’ equally well. Thus, without prior 
information, you would be equally likely to see this as either ‘B’ or ‘13’. Having priors 
can heavily alter what you perceive. When reading the letters horizontally, we might 
expect to see the letter ‘B’. This prior would then shift the resulting posterior 
distribution towards the letter ‘B’. If reading the numbers vertically, however, our prior 
would be for the number ‘13’.  
As argued by Geisler and Kersten (2002), using Bayesian methods brings 
many advantages. Bayesian methods can be used to provide a normative way to 
measure whether people are close to optimal in perceptual tasks (Geisler & Kersten, 
2002). One can then consider the ecological constraints (e.g., limited time, capacity 
limitations in attention and memory), under which the task must be performed, and 
thus gain deeper understanding of the factors that could stop people reaching 
optimal levels. Furthermore, ideal observer predictions are critical in providing 
benchmarks against which to compare human performance (Gardner, 2019; Heng et 
al., 2020; Qamar et al., 2013).  
Secondly, the Bayesian approach tells us how to combine multiple information 
sources when the reliability of each source varies (Geisler & Kersten, 2002). The 
reliability of the different sources can change; we should therefore adapt the way we 
weight each information source based on how reliable they are. In the tennis 
analogy, as uncertainty increases, when playing in fog or at dusk, the Bayesian ideal 
observer should shift more weight to the prior probability distribution (in this case, the 
most likely ball landing position), relative to the visual input.     
We wish to emphasize that because the Bayesian framework generates 
testable predictions, it is often useful even in the absence of evidence for an 
integration strategy (Stine et al., 2020). In cases where there is a mismatch between 
Bayesian predictions and actual performance, one can then consider potential 
alternative strategies that observers could be adopting. This is done by manipulating 
the different components of the model. Doing this might reveal differences between 
not using a piece of information (e.g., the prior) at all and mis-weighting it that would 
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have otherwise gone undetected. As this example illustrates, there are various ways 
in which people can fail to use the (Bayes-)optimal strategy and understanding what 
those ways are is useful to infer and understand some of the (perhaps non-
integration) strategies observers may deploy during everyday perception and action 
(Stine et al., 2020).  
Despite its apparent flexibility, the Bayesian account has been criticised on 
several grounds: one of the most important is that the computations underlying the 
behaviours we observe are not clear (Jones & Love, 2011). With reference to the 
three levels of analysis (i.e., computational, algorithmic and implementation) 
proposed by Marr, the Bayesian approach speaks to the computational level as it 
focuses on normative principles (Marr, 1982). Process models, on the other hand, 
aim to uncover the mechanisms that underlie the decision process (Luce, 1995); 
these speak to Marr’s algorithmic level (Marr, 1982). However, many standard 
Bayesian models also address ‘how questions’ at the algorithmic level. Many 
hypotheses proposed to account for suboptimal decisions focus on algorithmic 
level features such as capacity limitations (in working memory, for example), 
imprecisions, or the inability to employ complex decision rules (Rahnev & Denison, 
2018). Thus, understanding suboptimal decision behaviour requires that we account 
for process-level considerations. In the present thesis, we begin with a normative 
account of how decisions generalise to other contexts (Chapter 2) but as we 
examine sources of suboptimality in human probabilistic inference, we also address 
process-level considerations, such as working memory and task complexity 
(Chapters 3 and 4).  
 
1.3 Cue Combination 
 There are two components of optimal Bayesian inference: (1) cue 
combination, i.e., collating multiple sensory cues, and (2) integration of current 
sensory input with prior knowledge about the statistical structure of previous events. I 
begin by discussing the former.  
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1.3.1 Bayesian Predictions 
 Before asking whether human observers can do what the Bayesian theory 
says, we need to set out the predictions of optimal Bayesian integration – we do so 
here. In a typical cue combination task, there are two cues 𝑐! and 𝑐", both of which 
provide information about the same stimulus, 𝑠. For example, 𝑠 could be the location 
of a stimulus, 𝑐! could be a visual cue for the location, and 𝑐" could be an auditory 
cue. If we assume that these cues are independent and that they are Gaussian with 
variances 𝜎!" and 𝜎"", respectively, then the location of the stimulus as estimated by 
the visual and auditory cues together can be computed as follows: 
 
𝑠# = 𝑤!𝑠! +𝑤"𝑠"	 (1) 
 
where 𝑤! is the weight assigned to the visual estimate, 𝑐!, 𝑤" is the weight 
assigned to the auditory estimate, 𝑐". The combined estimate 𝑠# is considered 
optimal because the variance of the estimate given both cues together is lower than 
that of the individual cues (see Equation 2), thus offering maximum precision – this 
is, in fact, the criteria to judge whether optimal cue integration is achieved. This is 
because it can rule out alternative explanations, such as switching between the 
sensory signals – we know this because if observers switched between cues, 
performance would be worse than the best of the two cues (Alais & Burr, 2019). The 
reduction in combined variance (and consequent gain in precision) is maximal when 







Going back to Equation 1, cue weights depend on their relative reliabilities 
(i.e., the inverse of variance), as shown in Equation 3 below. For clarity, only the 














 By varying the variance of one or both sensory signals, therefore, we could 
determine the degree to which each is being relied on. For example, if the visual cue 
𝑐! is a less reliable source of information, observers should place less relative weight 
on it, compared to the auditory cue 𝑐". The down-weighting of cues that are less 
reliable is also what the ‘ideal observer’ model would predict.  
 Note that within this framework, combining sensory cues is mathematically 
equivalent to combining a prior and a sensory cue – this is done by straightforward 
replacement of one of the cues with the prior. The equations in this section, 
therefore, hold when combining a prior and sensory cue and analogous conclusions 
can be derived. For that reason, Equation 3 is used to compute the weight that the 
ideal observer should assign to the sensory cue in all experiments reported in this 
thesis.  
 
1.3.2 Do Adults Do What the Bayesian Theory Says in Cue Combination 
Tasks? 
As discussed in Section 1.3.1, Bayesian accounts make two predictions: (1) 
observers would be able to form a more reliable (i.e., less variable) percept of the 
environment when they have two sources of information to rely on, rather than only 
one, and (2) when the reliability of the different sources of information is varied, the 
resulting percept would be shifted towards the more reliable of the two sources 
(Clark & Yuille, 1990). Human behaviour generally matches these predictions in 
many cue combination tasks. For example, Ernst and Banks (2002) had four 
participants estimate the height of bars by looking at them or touching them. They 
first measured discrimination performance for the individual cues – visual and haptic 
- separately. Presenting both cues simultaneously, they found that subjects weighted 
by reliability, with less weight assigned to the visual signal when a large amount of 
noise was added to it. However, as was argued by Arnold et al. (2019), of the four 
levels of visual reliability, only one produced a bimodal performance that was clearly 
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distinguishable from that achieved by the better of the cues (Ernst & Banks, 2002). 
Another study had participants localise visual and auditory stimuli – brief ‘blobs’ of 
light or ‘clicks’ of sound – in space, and found that subjects weighted the sensory 
signals according to their sensory reliabilities (Alais & Burr, 2004). This ability – to 
combine cues optimally - has now been reported for a wide range of tasks and 
combinations of cues, such as motion and texture cues to judge depth (Jacobs, 
1999), and visual and proprioceptive cues to judge hand position (van Beers et al., 
1999). Overall, these findings have been taken as evidence that the brain does take 
into account information about the relative reliabilities of cues when making 
perceptual decisions. Also, this ability is not only a ‘cross-modal’ one (Hillis et al., 
2004; Jacobs & Fine, 1999; Louw et al., 2007, Landy & Kojima, 2001), as within the 
visual modality alone, adult humans make optimal use of stereo and texture 
information to estimate slant (Knill & Saunders, 2003).  
 
1.3.3 Sub-optimal Cue Combination? 
We reiterate that the Bayesian model predicts that (1) the discrimination 
threshold when both cues are available should be lower than that of either cue alone, 
and (2) that the discrimination threshold when both cues are available should not be 
higher than optimal predictions (Clark & Yuille, 1990). While some studies find that 
observers’ behaviour matches these predictions (e.g., Ernst & Banks, 2002; Fetsch 
et al., 2009; see Section 1.3.2), others do not (Battaglia et al., 2003; Drugowitsch et 
al., 2014; Meijer et al., 2019). The latter set of studies generally show discrimination 
thresholds with both cues available (combined cue condition) to be significantly 
higher than optimal. For example, Meijer et al. (2019) found that although subjects’ 
discrimination thresholds for the combined condition were lower than the better of 
the unimodal conditions, they were significantly higher than those predicted for 
optimal cue combination (Battaglia et al., 2003, 2011), suggesting that while 
observers can benefit from combining cues, they do not achieve the optimal gain. 
Several studies have shown that deviations from optimal behaviour are not specific 
to audio-visual localisation (Battaglia et al., 2003), but extend to many other tasks 
and combinations of cues (Bentvelzen et al., 2009; Burr et al., 2009; Butler et al., 
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2010; Fetsch et al., 2009; Maiworm & Röder, 2011; Prsa et al., 2012; Rosas et al., 
2005).  
As argued by Jones (2016), one reason why people may mis-weight cues, 
leading to suboptimal behaviour, may be that they are biased towards a given sense 
and that makes them weight it more than they should (i.e., than is optimal) (Fetsch et 
al., 2009; Maiworm & Röder, 2011). In our lifetime, we learn that vision could help 
more precisely localise sounds or estimate how far an object is than other senses – it 
therefore seems possible that in a task with auditory and visual stimuli presented at 
the same time, localisation is systematically biased in the direction of the visual 
stimulus because experience has taught observers that vision is typically the more 
reliable sense for spatial localisation (Battaglia et al., 2003; Meijer et al., 2019; 
Talsma et al., 2010). Another possibility is that observers wrongly estimated how 
reliable the cues were (Jones, 2016; Knill & Saunders, 2003). Even if there is some 
knowledge of one cue being more (or less) reliable than the other, these cues cannot 
be weighted in an appropriate (statistically optimal way) if the observer does not 
know exactly how reliable each cue is (Drugowitsch et al., 2014). This means that if 
the reliabilities are estimated wrongly, the observer could still compute the posterior, 
but it would be different from the true one (Ma, 2019). This is known as ‘model 
mismatch’: the reliabilities that the observer uses are not the same as the imposed 
cue reliabilities (Beck et al., 2012; Ma, 2019). If there is model mismatch, then 
observers are using a Bayesian strategy, but are not doing so optimally (Ma, 2012, 
2019). 
1.3.4 No Cue Combination 
Findings of performance with combined cues being no better than that with 
either cue alone have also been reported (Chen & Tyler, 2015; Drugowitsch et al., 
2014; Landy & Kojima, 2001; Oruç et al., 2003). For example, using a visual/ 
vestibular heading discrimination task, Drugowitsch et al. (2014) not only found that 
the threshold for the combined, multisensory condition was not significantly lower 
than either the visual-only or vestibular-only thresholds (clearly violating prediction 1; 
see Section 1.3.3), but also that the combined threshold was significantly greater 
than that predicted by the optimal model (violating prediction 2; Section 1.3.3). This 
level of suboptimality goes further than that described in Section 1.3.3 (which 
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revealed that sometimes cues are integrated but not weighted according to their 
reliabilities) because it shows that in some cases, cues are not integrated at all 
(Rahnev & Denison, 2018). 
 
1.3.5 At What Age Does This Ability to Combine Cues Develop? 
The vast majority of developmental research on cue combination has found 
abilities to combine cues optimally to emerge only after 8 years of age (Gori et al., 
2008, 2012; Nardini et al., 2010). For example, Gori et al. (2008) asked children 
between the ages of 5 and 10 years to make size and orientation judgments based 
on vision only, haptic only and both visual and haptic information; 5-year-olds relied 
only on one sense (haptic for judging size, vision for judging orientation), but by 8-10 
years, children were able to combine visual and haptic information in a statistically 
optimal way. A similar result was found in another study by the same authors (Gori et 
al., 2012): in younger children (< 12 years), vision dominated audition in bisection 
tasks; only adults combined information across the senses in an optimal manner. 
Nardini et al. (2010) also found that children older than 12 years integrated disparity 
and texture information optimally to reduce their uncertainty in judging surface slant 
but younger children did not. The narrative that emerges would seem to be of 
optimal cue combination in children, older than 8-10 years, and a dominant sensory 
modality at younger ages.  
 This conclusion was confirmed by Nardini et al. (2008), who examined the 
ability of adults, 4-5 year-olds and 7-8-year-olds to return an object to where it was 
originally placed by relying only on visual landmarks, only on self-motion cues or 
both together, and found no sign of integration in children younger than 8 years of 
age. As was pointed out, the experiment was not designed to test for optimality, but 
we still feel that the results support previous findings: adults combine multiple cues 
efficiently, but children younger than 8 years do not, instead relying on a single 
sense (Ernst, 2008). Similarly, Dekker et al. (2015) could not test whether subjects 
combined evidence optimally, but found a lack of adult-like (reliability-weighted) 
integration of stereo and texture information when judging surface slant in children 
younger than 10 years. It is, however, worth noting that not all studies investigating 
sensory integration during development have found delayed development of cue 
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combination ability in younger children (< 12 years) relative to adults. For example, 
Jovanovic and Drewing (2014) found similar multisensory integration abilities in 6-
year-old children and adults. Additionally, Adams (2016) showed that the ability of 
children to optimally combine emerged around 10 years of age, but some basic 
integration abilities, such as weighting sensory signals by their reliability, seem to 
already exist by the age of 4. Other studies have shown younger children to be more 
capable of combining cues than adults. For example, Petrini et al. (2016) tested 10-
11-year-olds and adults in a path reproduction task and found that children near-
optimally combined information across visual and self-motion cues, resulting in lower 
variable error; adults’ behaviour, on the other hand, was indicative of cue 
competition.  
The key conclusion that all the studies agree on is that optimal cue 
combination only occurs in children older than 8 years (though see Negen et al., 
2019; Rohlf et al., 2020). But the studies disagree in two crucial ways. Firstly, there 
was no consensus of what happens before optimal cue combination ‘comes online’, 
with some studies finding sensory dominance (Gori et al., 2008; Nardini et al., 2010) 
and others finding evidence of reliability weighting in children as young as 4 years 
(Adams, 2016). Secondly, there was disagreement between the studies on the exact 
age at which optimal cue combination does occur, with the age at which subjects 
optimally integrate multiple cues changing according to task demands and cue 
combinations (e.g., Dekker et al., 2015; Gori et al., 2008, 2012; Nardini et al., 2013; 
Petrini et al., 2014). For example, Petrini et al. (2014) reported a lack of audio-haptic 
integration even by 12 years. By contrast, in a later study by the same authors 
(Petrini et al., 2016), children were shown to combine visual and self-motion cues 
when navigating as early as 10 years, and thus earlier than suggested by Petrini et 
al. (2014). This suggests that combining information optimally across different 
sensory cues, but also different tasks may show different time courses.  
 
1.3.6 Why Does Optimal Cue Combination Occur So Late?   
 
1.3.6.1 Need for Experience. A potential reason, and quite an obvious one, 
is that somewhere between 8 and 10 years of experience with pairs of cues is 
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needed before these cues can be combined optimally. However, Negen et al. (2018) 
conclusively ruled out this possibility by showing that after two hours of training, 
adults not only learned a new auditory cue but also combined it optimally with a 
visual cue. This is evidenced by the fact that subjects had lower variable error with 
both cues together compared to the best of the two cues. Thus, cue combination 
abilities seem to emerge as we get older, regardless the amount of experience we 
have.  
 
1.3.6.2 Need for calibration. An alternative explanation and one that has 
become increasingly influential in recent years is that children’s senses are still 
calibrating – as would be expected for a growing body – meaning that senses cannot 
be integrated (Gori, 2015; Gori et al., 2008). When we have grown up, our body 
stops growing and remains roughly the same size for the rest of our lives. However, 
our body grows rapidly between birth and adulthood (Ernst, 2008). As young children 
grow up, their arms and legs stretch, for example, and this inevitably brings along a 
difference in proprioceptive signals about limb positions and movement. At the same 
time, inter-pupillary distance - that effective binocular vision depends on – increases. 
The sensory system, therefore, needs to be continuously updated to account for 
changes in body size during childhood (Ernst, 2008). Since mismatches between the 
senses hint at the need for recalibration, it may be more beneficial for the developing 
brain to keep the sensory cues separate and use conflict between them to decide 
whether to integrate or re-calibrate them (Ernst, 2008). Indeed, calibration has long 
been presumed to be a precursor of combining cues optimally (Gori et al., 2008 but 
see Rohlf et al., 2020). 
However, a recent study has challenged this idea, showing that cross-modal 
recalibration emerges later than the ability to combine cues (Rohlf et al., 2020). Five- 
to- eleven-year-olds and adults localised sounds from one of six speakers, uniformly 
spaced along a semi-circle. The source of the sound was indicated by naming the 
animal which was closest to the sound. In multisensory trials, a visual distractor cue 
appeared to the side of the speaker the sound came from. The ventriloquist effect 
(indicating audio-visual integration), that is the shift of sound locations towards the 
visual distractor, was found even in 5-year-old children. By contrast, recalibration to 
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the audio-visual spatial discrepancies was found to first emerge around the age of 8 
years. Rohlf et al.'s (2020) results provide strong evidence against the long-believed 
hypothesis that cross-modal recalibration is a prerequisite for multisensory 
integration.  
 
1.3.6.3 ‘Causal inference’ problem. By comparing different computational 
models, Rohlf and colleagues (2020) were also able to show that the ventriloquist 
effect in both children and adults was best explained by a causal inference model, 
i.e., that takes into consideration uncertainty about whether the cues are from the 
same object (so should be integrated using reliability weighting) or different objects 
(so should be kept separate). Interestingly, Rohlf et al. (2020) found that the model 
parameters varied with age, with younger children having lower prior expectations of 
common source. These findings are particularly important when considering that 
without knowing if the two cues are from the same stimulus, they can neither be 
integrated nor re-calibrated (Ernst, 2008; Kording et al., 2007). So, it could be that 5-
year-olds may be unsure of the underlying causal structure and are still learning to 
assign different sensory cues to the same object (Dekker & Lisi, 2020), rather than 
that they lack the capability to combine cues optimally.   
Why might younger children be uncertain about whether sensory cues are 
from the same or different objects? It may be because bias may be too high to make 
cue combination viable. This hypothesis was supported by Negen et al. (2019) who 
showed that artificially correcting young children’s biases by providing feedback on 
single cue trials allowed them to combine cues. Together, these results show that 
what develops in childhood may not be the basic mechanism allowing children to 
integrate cues, but other factors, such as whether the cues originated from the same 
source (Dekker & Lisi, 2020).  
 
1.3.6.4 Need to Lean Cue Reliabilities. To combine cues optimally, we need 
to know how reliable each cue is. A fourth potential reason for the late maturation of 
optimal cue combination, therefore, is that young children need to learn the reliability 
of each sensory cue. How are the reliabilities of the sensory cues learned? One 
might imagine that they are learned through life-long experience of interacting with 
 26 
the environment. However, this is an unlikely explanation because the amount of 
variance in each sense and the number of environmental scenarios is infinite. 
Another way to learn cue reliabilities from experience is based on the correlation 
between pairs of cues (Jacobs, 2002). It is thought that within each perceptual 
domain, there is a ‘primary’ cue (e.g., vision for orientation, haptics for size and so 
on) that cannot be learned or modified. All other cues are ‘benchmarked’ against this 
cue, such that if their estimates match those given by the primary cue, they too are 
considered reliable. It is therefore possible that younger children may still be learning 
to recognise a given sense as a trustworthy ‘benchmark’. 
 
1.3.6.5 Neural Maturation. Lastly, it could also be that the neural 
mechanisms that support the reliability-weighted integration of cues are immature 
(Rahnev & Denison, 2018). Recent evidence has implicated divisive normalisation, 
whereby the activity of one neuron is modulated by neighbouring neurons (Carandini 
& Heeger, 2013), in the more precise computing of reliability-weighted averages 
(Ohshiro et al., 2011). Thus, one potential explanation for the later onset of reliability-
based cue weighting could be that this normalisation is reduced in younger ages (< 8 
years). To the best of my knowledge, no study has ever tested this hypothesis in 
young children. Still, it is known that symptoms of autism are linked to an increased 
ratio of neural excitation to inhibition, which would result in reduced divisive 
normalisation (Rosenberg et al., 2015; Rubenstein & Merzenich, 2003 but see also 
Van de Cruys et al., 2018). At the same time, impaired ability to integrate 
multisensory information in autism has also been reported (Baum et al., 2015). It is 
thus possible that low-level multisensory weighting processes, such as those that 
depend on divisive normalisation, are immature during early development. Current 
models also suggest that cue integration might depend not only on low-level 
processes (e.g., balance of excitation vs. inhibition) but also on massive 
developmental changes in the cortical structure. For example, it could be that 
pathways from modality-specific brain regions to supramodal network of regions 
dedicated to integrating sensory signals are still developing, resulting in immaturities 




1.4 Biases Towards Previous Stimuli 
As we saw in Section 1.3, observers integrate evidence near-optimally across 
different sensory cues. Information about previous stimuli has also been found to be 
integrated, leading to more precise estimates (Fritsche et al., 2020). In fact, such 
biases or adaptation towards previous stimuli have been suggested to reflect Bayes-
like processes of incorporating information from the past to aid perceptual decisions 
(van Bergen & Jehee, 2019; Kalm & Norris, 2017). We will briefly summarise the 
research evidence for two types of biases below: central tendency and serial 
dependence.  
 
1.4.1 Central tendency and serial dependence 
Central tendency is where perceptual estimates gravitate to the mean of 
recently seen stimuli (Hollingworth, 1910). For example, when estimating uncertain 
time intervals, subjects biased their timing estimates towards the interval duration on 
previous trials (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010, 2015). Cicchini et al. (2014) also showed 
that when mapping numbers onto space, observers adapted their responses in 
response to previous trials. Central tendency has been reported for a wide range of 
stimulus types and tasks, such as estimates of line length (Ashourian & 
Loewenstein, 2011; Duffy et al., 2010; Huttenlocher et al., 2000), sweetness (Riskey 
et al., 1979), facial expressions (Corbin et al., 2017; Roberson et al., 2007), hue 
(Olkkonen et al., 2014; Olkkonen & Allred, 2014) and time intervals (Jamieson, 1977; 
Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Ryan, 2011). It has been proposed that such biases 
towards stimuli encountered in the past may arise from an optimal strategy of 
incorporating prior information (bias) into perceptual decisions (Cicchini et al., 2018; 
Kalm & Norris, 2017; van Bergen & Jehee, 2019). Such a strategy is optimal when 
the environment is stable because it is expected that new sensory input will be 
similar to previous input – we can exploit information we have just learned to 
maximise the efficient processing of new sensory inputs. This is also what the 
Bayesian theory says we should do – when sensory evidence is uncertain and 
difficult to judge, we should integrate it with a prior prediction about the current 
stimulus based on what we know from previous trials. A few studies on colour 
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perception show that people do this (Olkkonen et al., 2014); in a series of 
experiments, observers were presented with a ‘reference’ stimulus and, after a 
delay, a ‘test’ stimulus, and asked which appeared more ‘bluer’/ ‘yellower’. In their 
first experiment, Olkkonen et al. (2014) showed that estimates of hue were biased 
towards the mean of stimuli presented during the experiment. In a second 
experiment, Olkkonen et al. (2014) varied the delay between the reference and test 
stimuli, and showed that increased delay from reference to test increased the noise 
in the sensory signals. With increased noise, reliance on prior knowledge (about 
distributions of hues) also became higher. Across all experiments, Olkkonen et al. 
(2014) demonstrated that hue estimates were systematically biased towards the 
average hue, and that bias were larger when sensory uncertainty was higher. This 
bias has been previously implied to result from integrating prior information with 
noisy sensory information (Olkkonen & Allred, 2014 but see also Ashourian & 
Loewenstein, 2011; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010). Crucially, the finding of increased 
bias with increasing sensory uncertainty confirms the theoretical predictions of the 
Bayesian model.  
Recent work has exposed another history bias – where choices in the current 
trial are influenced simply by the preceding trial; although note that studies report a 
dependence on stimuli further back in the stimulus sequence; for example, up to 
three trials back (Fischer & Whitney, 2014). This type of bias is treated separately in 
the literature from the central tendency bias (a bias towards the stimulus one trial 
back compared to a bias towards the mean of all stimuli within a series) and has 
been termed serial dependence (van Bergen & Jehee, 2019; Fischer & Whitney, 
2014). As Aston and colleagues (2021) point out, serial dependence has been 
reported for a wide range of visual features, such as orientation (Cicchini et al., 2017; 
Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Fritsche et al., 2017), numerosity (Cicchini et al., 2014; 
Corbett et al., 2011; Fornaciai & Park, 2018), spatial location (Bliss et al., 2017; 
Manassi et al., 2018; Papadimitriou et al., 2015), identity of faces (Liberman et al., 
2014), gender of faces (Taubert, Alais, et al., 2016) and attractiveness (Kondo et al., 
2012; Taubert, Van Der Burg, et al., 2016; Xia et al., 2016).  
The distinction between central tendency bias and serial dependence seems 
unclear. Mattar et al. (2016) sought to disentangle central tendency from serial 
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dependence biases by exploring their respective timescales. The two effects had 
different time scales: serial dependence operated over a shorter timescale and 
central tendency over a longer timescale. The temporal pattern of these effects was 
well captured by a single mechanism which utilized a weighted mixture of previous 
stimuli, where the relative contributions of previous stimuli was determined by an 
exponential integration time constant: when the constant was high, stimuli were 
combined over a relatively long period of time (i.e., central tendency), and when the 
constant was low, the response on the current trial was very similar to the response 
on the immediately preceding trial (i.e., serial dependence). This suggests that the 
distinction between these two types of bias may be linked to them having different 
time constants. It has been proposed that such a mixture mechanism accounts for 
the fact that in our natural environment, statistical patterns do not form only between 
events which occur one after the other, but also those that happen over a much 
longer period (Fritsche et al., 2020). Such a mixture account, therefore, has the 
advantage of not only accounting for effect of the most recently experienced stimuli, 
but of capturing dependencies beyond what we had just seen (Fritsche et al., 2020; 
Kalm & Norris, 2018). 
Why do observers use what they had learned on previous trials as a prior for 
their decisions? Urai et al. (2019) argued that this may seem unexpected at first 
glance, given that in most experiments, stimuli and outcomes are uncorrelated 
across trials (Abrahamyan et al., 2016). However, events and scenes in the natural 
environment are rarely independent from one another (Yu & Cohen, 2009). Thus, it 
was argued that people may wrongly assume that this is also true in laboratory 
experiments (Yu & Cohen, 2009). In support of this idea, people have been shown to 
take into account the expected rate of change of statistics (stable vs. unpredictable) 
and adjust their biases accordingly (Braun et al., 2018; Glaze et al., 2015; Kim et al., 
2017), revealing that people have certain prior expectations about environmental 
stability. Together, these observations may explain the greater weighting given to 
past vs. new observations that is typically observed (Cicchini et al., 2014). However, 
it is important to point out that while assuming that consecutive stimuli are 
statistically related may be incorrect in serial dependence tasks, incorporating prior 
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information from recent decisions is, in fact, a rational heuristic strategy in most 
everyday situations. 
 
1.4.2.2 Central Tendency in the Developed Brain. We know that trial history 
alters the way in which adults interpret incoming sensory signals (Cicchini et al., 
2012, 2014, 2017, 2018). Surprisingly, we know very little about the age at which 
such biases develop in childhood. Indeed, only two studies, to our knowledge, have 
examined the development of central tendency biases. In a line reproduction study, 
Sciutti et al. (2014) showed that just as adults, 7-, 8-, 10, 11- and 13-year-olds 
reproduced the same length as longer or shorter when previous line lengths were 
longer or shorter, respectively. Children showed substantially lower spatial resolution 
than adults but weighted prior knowledge about the mean with sensory signals in a 
constant manner across development. Similarly, Karaminis et al. (2016) asked 6-14-
year-old children and adults to estimate the duration of time intervals and found that 
children as young as 6 biased their estimates towards the mean interval duration on 
previous trials. From these studies, one can only conclude that by the age of 6-7 
years, children can implicitly learn the statistics of a stimulus set (across a range of 
domains) and incorporate these statistics into their decisions (Adams, 2016). 
 
1.5 Priors  
The studies reviewed in the previous section show that outcomes / stimuli on 
one trial can impact subsequent trials, leading to serial dependence and central 
tendency biases. This happens even though successive trials should be treated as 
independent (Lak et al., 2018; Mendonça et al., 2020). Next, we will examine studies 
where consecutive trials are derived from the same distribution (hereafter referred to 
as a prior). Priors can be structural, that is statistical regularities in the natural 
environment that humans learn over their lifetime (e.g., that light comes from above, 
Adams et al., 2004), or contextual – learnt over the course of an experimental 
session.  
 
1.5.1 Structural Priors 
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1.5.1.1 Structural Priors in the Adult Brain. There are many regularities in 
our natural environment (Dong & Atick, 1995; Schwartz et al., 2007; Simoncelli & 
Olshausen, 2001); for instance, in natural visual scenes, objects tend to be static or 
move slowly (Sotiropoulos et al., 2011; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; Weiss et al., 
2002; Welchman et al., 2008). Studies have shown that people tend to 
underestimate the speed of moving objects (Blakemore & Snowden, 1999; Pretto et 
al., 2012; Snowden et al., 1998; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; Stone & Thompson, 
1992; Thompson, 1982; Weiss et al., 2002; Welchman et al., 2008) and moving 
sounds (Senna et al., 2015). This is exactly what we would expect of an ideal 
observer (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; Weiss et al., 2002) because in the natural 
environment, speed estimates are generally noisy and objects tend to move slowly, 
resulting in a prior for slower speeds (Pretto et al., 2012). 
Bayesian methods can explain speed underestimation (Stocker & Simoncelli, 
2006) and assumptions of light coming from above (Gerardin et al., 2007; Langer & 
Bulthoff, 2001; Mamassian & Landy, 2001; Sun & Perona, 1997). Moreover, as we 
show in this paragraph, both priors can change with training, suggesting that 
although people learn such biases over the course of their lifetime, short periods of 
training can make them malleable (Adams et al., 2004, 2010; Champion & Adams, 
2007). After humans were exposed to 1.5 hrs of tactile training, they perceived the 
light direction as shifted by approximately 10° from the baseline prior. In a separate 
experiment, Adams et al. (2010) confirmed that receiving either haptic or visual 
feedback forced observers to re-interpret a shaded stimulus. Moreover, this 
recalibration of individuals’ light priors lasted for several days, suggesting that the 
light-from-above prior can be modified, at least temporarily (Adams et al., 
2010). Also, human adults have been shown capable of learning multiple priors 
related to different illuminations after only a few hours of visual-tactile training 
(Kerrigan & Adams, 2013). Furthermore, Morgenstern et al. (2011) found that the 
light from above prior could be overridden by other cues. Even the prior for slow 
speeds could be flexibly overridden: participants ceased to expect grating stimuli to 
move slowly after spending multiple sessions looking at gratings moving at a faster 
speed (Sotiropoulos et al., 2011). Overall, these findings suggest that people tend to 
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use the statistical regularities in their natural environments, but that the extent to 
which they use these regularities can depend on the context.  
 
1.5.1.2 The Development of Structural Priors. Studies examining whether 
children use regularities in the natural environment – in particular, the light-from-
above prior - in the same way as adults have found mixed results. Croydon et al. 
(2017) found that adults and 7-14-year-old children use a light-from-above prior to a 
similar degree. Moreover, how the light-from-above prior was used did not change 
between 7 and 14 years of age, suggesting that this prior is already present in 
children younger than 7 years. Pickard-Jones et al. (2020) also found no differences 
in the light source direction that 5-, 7-, 9- and 11-year-olds assumed. Moreover, in 
these children, the assumed light direction was widely consistent with estimates 
obtained in adult participants (Andrews et al., 2013), suggesting the direction of the 
prior does not change with age. However, they excluded any child participants who 
did not show sensitivity to stimulus orientation (15 out of 19 5-year-olds and 8 out of 
18 7-year-olds) from the analyses and were thus only able to demonstrate that the 
light-from-above prior was similar to adults in those children who were sensitive to 
the stimulus orientation. Other studies reported increased use of the light-from-above 
prior in older children and adults, compared to younger ages (Stone & Pascalis, 
2010; Thomas et al., 2010). Stone and Pascalis (2010) tested children between the 
age of 4 and 10 years in a shape discrimination task and reported increased 
tendency to interpret stimuli as if light comes from above with increasing age. 
Moreover, Thomas et al. (2010) demonstrated that children between 4 and 12 years 
and adults tended to favour the convex over the concave shape for a shaded polo 
stimulus, and assume that it is lit from above. However, when there was a mismatch 
between shape and lighting direction, convexity was more commonly assumed 
amongst younger ages (< 6 years) and light-from-above by older groups. These 
findings suggest that both convexity and light-from-above priors develop in the first 
few years of life but the way these priors are weighted changes as the child 
develops: convexity biases dominate in younger ages; by contrast, illumination 
biases (e.g., light-from-above) are the dominant ones in late childhood and 
adulthood.  
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The age-dependent increases in the use of the light-from-above that were 
observed by Stone and Pascalis (2010) and Thomas et al. (2010) seem to suggest a 
developmental trajectory over a longer period of time, from age 7 to 12 years of age. 
An alternative explanation is that the ability to use the prior develops at different 
ages, which, at group level, looks like age-related changes (Pickard-Jones et al., 
2020). This raises the obvious question of why some children develop this ability 
earlier than others. People apply what they have learned from past experiences; it is, 
therefore, possible that if past experiences vary between individuals, the specific age 
at which different individuals may begin to use these experiences may also differ. 
The role of experience may be difficult to decouple from brain development and 
maturation by only using natural stimuli because as people get older, along with 
more mature neural networks, they also acquire more experience. As we discuss in 
the next section, using novel stimuli, - that everybody, regardless of age, has the 
same amount of experience with - is necessary to provide a stronger test of the 
effects of prior experiences.  
 
1.5.2 Contextual Priors 
 Having reviewed the evidence for structural priors – that is, natural long-term 
statistics – in both the adult and the developing brain, we shall now consider the 
evidence for shorter-lived novel statistics (also referred to as contextual priors), e.g., 
distributions of hidden targets. This is important to consider because in the natural 
world, there are both long-term statistics that do not change a great deal, such as 
light direction or speed of moving objects, and short-term ones that may be more 
context specific, e.g., distributions of return shots learned with one tennis player 
(Körding & Wolpert, 2004) might not generalise to another. 
 
1.5.2.1 Contextual Priors in the Adult Brain. It has been suggested (Acerbi 
et al., 2012; Körding & Wolpert, 2004) that the acquisition of novel perceptual priors 
partially depends on the complexity of the prior distribution, with more resources 
(e.g., time, memory storage) needed to handle more complex distributions (Acerbi et 
al., 2012; Körding & Wolpert, 2004). As such, we will first discuss studies that use 
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simple prior distributions before we move on to studies with complex prior 
distributions.  
 
1.5.2.1.1 Simple Distributions. There is evidence that when the prior is a 
simple Gaussian, adult observers learn prior uncertainty over time and combine this 
knowledge with current sensory inputs as predicted by an ideal observer. Körding 
and Wolpert (2004) analysed the performance of human adults as they reached to a 
target. Midway through the movement, a visual cue indicating the current position of 
the finger was flashed very briefly (~100ms). This cue was a cloud of dots with 
varying amounts of noise added to it to vary its reliability. The cue was offset to the 
right side of the finger’s true position by a distance, chosen randomly from a normal 
distribution with a mean of 1cm and SD of 0.5 cm; participants were oblivious to the 
offset. The endpoint of the movement was shown at the end, but only of those trials 
in which no external noise was added. After 1,000 learning trials, on trials where the 
cue was not present, participants corrected for the mean offset of the cursor by 
pointing in the opposite direction to the offset by 1cm. When the cue was present, 
participants pointed between the feedback and the mean offset, weighted by their 
reliability in a statistically optimal way. It is worth mentioning that the authors did not 
independently and directly measure sensory uncertainty and so they could not 
determine how optimal participants were in this study. Even so, Körding and Wolpert 
(2004) were the first to show that human adults combine current and prior 
information in a way that is close to ideal.  
Körding and Wolpert's (2004) work has since been extended by Tassinari, 
Hudson, and Landy (2006). They conducted a separate experiment to independently 
record observers’ motor and sensory noise. The study found that subjects’ behaviour 
was in qualitative agreement with a Bayesian observer model but their performance, 
on average, fell short of ideal due to sensory noise in estimating the centroid of the 
stimulus and motor variability during reaching.  
 
1.5.2.1.2 Complex Distributions. Körding and Wolpert (2004) conducted a 
separate experiment using the same reaching task as before (see Section 1.5.2.1.1) 
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but this time with a bimodal distribution. To enable participants to better learn the 
bimodal shape of the distribution, the authors gave feedback on all trials, did not add 
extra noise to the visual cue and doubled the total number of trials, such that there 
were now 2,000 training trials and 2,000 test trials. Using computational modelling, 
the authors inferred observers’ estimated sensory uncertainty and the separation 
between the two Gaussian distributions. The distance between the two distributions 
was estimated to be 4.8cm (across all subjects), close to the true value of 4cm, 
indicating that subjects accurately inferred the bimodal shape of the distribution. 
However, learning occurred on the order of thousands of trials and large individual 
differences remained. This suggests that observers learnt the bimodal distribution, 
but at the cost of using more resources, becoming slower and more variable.  
 More recently, Chalk et al. (2010) had participants estimate the direction of 
motion of coherently moving dots, and found that they began to expect the dots to 
move in the direction(s) they had most frequently seen, as shown by a bias towards 
reporting those directions. When the dots were moving in the most frequent 
directions, participants spotted this faster and more accurately that other, more 
infrequent motion directions. On trials where there were no dots, expectations about 
the most likely motion direction led to participants still reporting seeing dots (i.e., 
hallucinations) and that these dots moved in the most frequently presented 
directions. These data can be well explained by a Bayesian model that combines a 
noisy estimate of the current direction of the dot cloud with a prior about the most 
likely motion direction (Chalk et al., 2010; Karvelis et al., 2018). This observation was 
confirmed when the Bayesian model outperformed all other models the authors 
tested. Together with Körding & Wolpert's (2004) work, this study supports the idea 
that humans can learn and compute with bimodal prior distributions. 
 Using the visual motion estimation task established in the previous study 
(Chalk et al., 2010), Gekas et al. (2013) examined whether participants could learn 
two prior distributions simultaneously, with different colours differentiating between 
the distributions. In one experiment, they used uniform and bimodal distributions, 
and in a second experiment, they used bimodal and trimodal distributions. When the 
underlying distributions were uniform and bimodal, the distributions were aggregated 
and applied equally across all conditions; colour had negligible effects on 
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distinguishing between the distributions. When one distribution was bimodal and the 
other trimodal, observers’ biases were compatible with learning some features of the 
underlying distributions, although they again failed to use this knowledge in the 
correct settings (Gekas et al., 2013). However, adults demonstrated intact ability to 
learn two distinct distributions at once in a distance reproduction experiment where 
the distributions were identified by symbolic cues (Petzschner et al., 2012). A major 
difference between the two studies is the fact that to distinguish between the 
distributions, Petzschner et al. (2012) used symbolic cues in the form of written 
instructions indicating whether the distance to be reproduced would be ‘short’ or 
‘long’; the cue distinguishing the distributions was explicit as opposed to implicit 
(colour) in Gekas et al. (2013). Arguably, even though people have been found to 
learn relationships between arbitrary paired cues over multiple sessions (Ernst, 
2007), there is only weak evidence of colour as an effective cue for categorisation 
(Howard et al., 2013; Seydell, 2010). There have been a few exceptions to this; for 
example, where the stimuli correlate naturally with colour, as in the case of lighting 
(Kerrigan & Adams, 2013).  
On the other hand, Bejjanki et al. (2016) showed that human participants can 
learn two prior distributions at once, with the distinct distributions identified by 
different stimulus locations and colours. Subjects had to locate an invisible ‘bucket’, 
which sometimes appeared on the right, and sometimes on the left side of the 
screen. On each trial, subjects would see some locations people have guessed the 
bucket to be in the past; these guessed locations appeared as either all green or 
white dots, depending on the distribution from which the bucket’s true location was 
drawn. This study shows that participants could learn the two distinct distributions, 
suggesting that they can use colour information to differentiate between the 
distributions. Perhaps more importantly, Bejjanki et al. (2016) and Petzschner et al. 
(2012) used distributions of the same type (e.g., uniform distributions with different 
means, Petzschner et al., 2012), as opposed to complex multimodal distributions, 
such as a mixture of bimodal and uniform distributions as done by Gekas et al. 
(2013). It is therefore possible that using a mixture of distributions of different types 
might have been the limiting factor in some studies (e.g., Gekas et al., 2013).  
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Adult observers can also learn different prior distributions when presented 
sequentially. For instance, Vilares et al. (2012) changed the variance of the prior 
between blocks of trials and found that subjects’ relative weights differed significantly 
between the prior conditions. A similar result was found in a study by Berniker et al. 
(2010): subjects relied more strongly on the current sensory input in the block with 
the wider prior variance. A caveat is that the strongest effects were observed when 
switching from a narrow to wide prior variance than the other way around. An 
enhanced sensitivity for narrower priors when experienced first has been reported by 
other studies, as well. For example, Miyazaki et al. (2005) demonstrated that 
subjects adjust their behaviour faster for narrow-to-wide changes than wide-to-
narrow changes. Kording et al. (2004) also found that subjects decreased their 
reliance on the prior when its variance switched from narrow to wide; subjects did not 
change their weighting of the prior when it switched from wide to narrow. As was 
argued by Trommershauser et al. (2011), one possible reason for the slower 
adaptation to wide-to-narrow changes than the other way around is that when the 
change is from narrow to wide, observers experience a sudden surge of ‘surprising’ 
observations (i.e., unexpected under the narrow prior distribution). In contrast, when 
the change is from wide to narrow, observers have to notice that the stimuli are no 
longer appearing at the edges of the distribution; a process that may take a long time 
(Trommershauser et al., 2011). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that learning and efficient use of prior 
information is heavily influenced by the complexity of the distribution (as was agued 
by Acerbi et al., 2014b): whilst the statistics of a normal distribution can be picked up 
after only ~200 trials (Berniker et al., 2010), adapting to a prior that has a bimodal 
distribution may take longer, requiring no less than thousands of trials (Körding & 
Wolpert, 2004). However, in none of these studies has it been possible to tease 
apart whether it is the learning of the prior or the efficient, statistical optimal use of 
priors that has been affected by complexity. In the next section, we mention briefly 
studies that have sought to tease these two apart.   
 
1.5.2.1.3 Suboptimalities in the Learning or Use of Priors? Suboptimalities 
in perceptual decision-making are well documented; however, it is not known 
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whether these suboptimalities arise due to difficulties in learning and representing 
the prior distribution or learning how to use it efficiently. For example, Acerbi et al. 
(2014b) eliminated the need to learn the prior by explicitly showing it on every trial 
and found that performance did not vary as a function of how complex the 
distribution was, with near identical performance across bimodal and simple 
Gaussian priors. The authors noted previous studies which contrast these data, 
showing that as compared with unimodal priors, evidence of efficient use of bimodal 
priors only begins to show when participants had performed thousands of trials 
(Körding & Wolpert, 2004) or when the data are pooled together (Chalk et al., 2010). 
Comparison between these studies led the authors to conclude that differences in 
behaviour with simple vs. complex distributions reported previously are likely driven 
by difficulty in learning more complex distributions, and not using them efficiently 
(Acerbi et al., 2014b).  
 This interpretation contrasts results by Bejjanki et al. (2016). They tested 
whether observers would be biased in the direction of the prior when no sensory 
information was available (i.e., on prior-only trials). Specifically, a ‘green’ or ‘white’ 
rectangle was rapidly flashed, indicating the side of the screen the ‘bucket’ was 
located. There was no significant difference between observers’ estimates and the 
‘true’ prior means, suggesting that observers had learned the means of the 
underlying distributions. Also, the two priors were weighted differently throughout the 
experiment, suggesting that their variances were also tracked and taken into 
account. This suggests that the suboptimalities are likely to have arisen because of a 
failure to use the prior and sensory information efficiently, not because adult 
observers struggle with learning the statistics of distributions. However, these data 
cannot conclusively demonstrate this because the estimated prior variances were 
not measured directly. Future research is needed to determine the exact source of 
suboptimalities that have been previously observed. 
 
1.5.2.2 Contextual Priors in the Developing Brain. 
 
1.5.2.2.1 Infants Extract Statistical Regularities in Their Environments. 
Infants can implicitly learn statistical regularities, and notice when these regularities 
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had broken down, not only in their natural environments but also within experimental 
tasks themselves in the first year of life (Bulf et al., 2011; Fiser & Aslin, 2002; 
Kirkham et al., 2002, 2007; Tummeltshammer et al., 2017; Tummeltshammer & 
Kirkham, 2013; Wu et al., 2011). Saffran et al. (1996) presented a stream of syllables 
to 8-month-old infants and found that the 8-month-olds learned the transitional 
probabilities between syllables within minutes of exposure. Learning was measured 
through looking times where infants showed longer looking times to the novel 
syllable orderings compared to the familiar syllable orderings. Saffran et al.'s (1996) 
work has been interpreted as revealing a mechanism by which infants use 
conditional probabilities to segment spoken speech into syllables and words (Rohlf et 
al., 2017). Similarly, infants can learn statistical regularities in tone sequences 
around the same age (Saffran et al., 1999) and in visual patterns at 9 months (Fiser 
& Aslin, 2002). For example, Fiser and Aslin (2002) showed that 9-month-old infants 
who were presented with multi-element visual scenes preferred to look at the 
element pairs which appeared together more frequently than those who did not. 
Kirkham et al. (2002) presented 2-, 5- and 8-month-olds with repeated sequences of 
visual stimuli which followed a statistically predictable pattern. After, the infants were 
shown these same sequences but this time mixed with novel sequences which 
consisted of the same stimuli. Kirkham et al. (2002) found that infants in every age 
group looked longer at the novel sequences. This result suggests that infants can 
learn statistical regularities as early as 2 months of age.  
  
1.5.2.2.2 Are Children as Good as Adults at Learning Statistical 
Regularities? Several studies have demonstrated that children are better at learning 
statistical relationships implicitly compared to adults (Janacsek & Nemeth, 2013; 
Nemeth et al., 2013). One example is the study of Jost et al. (2011), who sought to 
identify the neural correlates of statistical learning in 6- to 8-year-olds, 9- to 12-year-
olds and adults: learning-related ERPs peaked earlier in children than adults, 
suggesting that children learned the statistical structure faster (Rohlf et al., 2020). 
Note however that not all studies have found that children are better at extracting 
statistical relationships than adults. For example, experiments by Saffran and 
colleagues (1996, 1999) found that 8-month-old infants are as good as, but no better 
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than, adults in learning the statistical regularities embedded in auditory sequences. 
Better learning in older children and adults has also been reported (Kirkham et al., 
2007; Maybery et al., 1995). Using a visual triplet learning task, Arciuli and Simpson 
(2011) showed that extracting statistical regularities improved between 5 and 12 
years of age, and even further in young adults. This might be explained by the fact 
that learning stimulus triplets is more costly in terms of working memory and other 
cognitive resources than learning the conditional probability of two stimuli as used in 
many other studies (e.g., Emberson et al., 2015; Kouider et al., 2015). This 
interpretation is supported by studies showing that working memory, and executive 
functions more generally, develop over the course of childhood (Zelazo et al., 2008). 
As was pointed out by Rohlf et al. (2020), it is thus possible that greater cognitive 
costs (e.g., higher working memory demands) might have been the limiting factor in 
the study by Arciuli and Simpson (2011). Although the evidence is mixed, it seems 
as though more complex and a higher number of regularities (which draw more 
heavily on still-developing executive functions, Gur et al., 2012; Zelazo et al., 2008) 
seem to be better learned the older the children become.  
 
1.5.2.2.3 Can Children Use Statistical Regularities to Improve 
Perception? Only a small number of studies have examined at what age children 
learn to incorporate prior knowledge optimally. Six-to-eight-year-olds, presented with 
noisy sensory information about the target stimulus (cloud of four dots at one of three 
levels of uncertainty) and explicit knowledge about previous stimuli (the prior), 
weighted the sensory information by its reliability but not the prior when estimating 
the location of a target (Chambers et al., 2018). Older children (> 9 years), on the 
other hand, weighted both sources of information (sensory information and prior) 
according to their reliabilities. These results were interpreted as showing that the 
basic mechanism allowing children to optimally integrate evidence from various 
sources does not develop before 9-10 years of age (Chambers et al., 2018).  
An alternative explanation is that children’s abilities to optimally combine are 
fundamentally limited by ‘resource constraints’, such as insufficient working memory 
capacity or cognitive control (Bejjanki et al., 2019; Bejjanki & Aslin, 2020; Lieder & 
Griffiths, 2019). This hypothesis was supported by Bejjanki et al. (2019) who 
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investigated whether optimal integration of prior knowledge is influenced by task 
demands; when using a simple (Gaussian) prior they found adult-like rate of learning 
and use of prior information while with a bimodal prior they did not: instead, 6-7-year-
old children systematically placed more weight on sensory signals than was optimal, 
even after a thousand trials. Working memory (and other executive functions, such 
as inhibitory control and flexibly switching) may be a factor here. Learning the mean 
and variance of a single distribution unlikely touches the limits of working memory – 
learning the statistics of two underlying distributions at the same time might. This 
idea – that children’s ability to track and optimally use information about the statistics 
of the environment depends on the complexity of the environment, with greater 
complexity drawing more on cognitive resources – is consistent with resource 
rational accounts (Bejjanki & Aslin, 2020; Lieder & Griffiths, 2019). These accounts 
propose that there is an upper limit on the total amount of resource that can be 
invested; if this upper limit is much higher in adults, compared to younger children, 
then limitations in executive functions might be the constraining factor, and not that 
children are limited in, or ultimately lacking the ability to optimally combine.  
 
1.5.2.2.3.1 Executive Function Continues to Develop. Executive functions 
are high-level cognitive processes, such as memory, sustaining attention and 
suppressing impulses (Diamond, 2013). We know that executive functions are linked 
to higher IQ (Arffa, 2007) and educational attainment (Best et al., 2011), and that 
they improve considerably between early childhood and mid-twenties (Best & Miller, 
2010; Gur et al., 2012). Some of the strongest evidence in support of this comes 
from studies reporting increases in connectivity among fronto-parietal regions (Baum 
et al., 2017; Gu et al., 2015; Hagmann et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2015; Power et al., 
2010), known to be important for executive function (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; 
Mansouri et al., 2017; Niendam et al., 2012; Satterthwaite et al., 2013). Altogether, 
multiple lines of evidence suggest that executive functions develop over the course 
of childhood and adolescence. If we assume that learning and using prior knowledge 
in a statistically optimal manner depends, in part, on the recruitment of executive 
functions, this could explain why children do not become adult-like in their abilities to 
optimally combine until later in childhood or adolescence. There are two executive 
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functions– working memory and the ability to store multiple ‘rules and switch 
between them – that we believe are important for understanding how we learn and 
efficiently use novel statistics, in particular. In the following paragraphs, we explain 
what role working memory and cognitive flexibility might play in the ability to combine 
optimally.  
 
1.5.2.2.3.1.1 The Importance of Remembering. Working memory is of 
special interest because it plays a central role in our ability to uncover statistical 
regularities in our environment (Baddeley, 2003, 2007; Bianco et al., 2020). As 
Bianco et al. (2020) argues, the detection of such regularities relies upon our 
memory storing individual experiences for long enough to allow us to figure out how 
they fit together. Working memory, therefore, is likely to play a crucial rule in 
accumulating information from the past, which in fact, is what we know as the prior. 
One could imagine that given that working memory continues to develop across 
adolescence and into early adulthood (Alloway et al., 2006; Crone et al., 2006; 
Gathercole et al., 2004; Luna et al., 2004, 2015; Thomason, Moriah et al., 2009), 
younger children would have a hard time remembering all past events, needed to 
infer the correct underlying regularities. Given these ties between prior learning and 
working memory and the late maturation of prefrontal regions, we might predict that 
adult-like integration of prior information is, at least in part, influenced by cognitive, 
and more specifically, working memory development.  
 
1.5.2.2.3.1.2 The Importance of Remembering and Handling Multiple 
‘Rules’. Secondly, it is possible that the ability to store and alternate between 
multiple ‘rules’ may play a role in learning to weight sensory and prior information 
according to their reliabilities, even if it is not required to support learning of the prior. 
Bejjanki et al.'s (2019) finding that 6-7-year-old children were adult-like in how they 
weighted sensory information when only sensory uncertainty varied, but now when 
both prior and sensory uncertainty varied (increased task complexity) supports this 
assertion. Similarly, it has been shown that 4-year-olds could store information and 
suppress an unwanted response at the time when task ‘rules’ remained stable 
(Davidson et al., 2006) but could not flexibly switch between task rules in similar 
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ways to adults as late as 13 years of age (see also Luciana & Nelson, 1998). Such 
results indicate that the ability to store and flexibly switch between rules might play a 
role in learning to weight by reliability, especially in children, when this ability is still 
developing.  
 
1.5.2.2.4 Filling the Gaps. Very few studies have explored the development 
of prior and sensory information (Bejjanki et al., 2019; Chambers et al., 2018), so we 
know very little about the age-related changes in learning and efficient use of novel 
statistics throughout childhood, or the factors that may underlie the development of 
these abilities. Because another aspect of efficient information integration, 
multisensory cue combination, also does not develop until the age of around 9 years 
(e.g., Gori et al., 2008; Nardini et al., 2008), one could imagine that they share a 
common, central problem with representing, or computing with probabilities. Another 
possibility – which is specific to learning and use of novel statistics – is that children 
are slower to accumulate noisy sensory information over time. This slowness could 
be explained by the fact that the processes of evidence accumulation and reliability-
weighting depend, at least in part, on executive functions (e.g., working memory) 
which are still very much in development (Best & Miller, 2010; Gur et al., 2012). Yet, 
this hypothesis has not yet been tested. To fill this gap, in Chapter 3, we tracked the 
detailed time course of adaptation to novel statistical regularities (Experiment 1) and 
probed two potential sources of slower tuning of children’s behaviour to task 
statistics: i) limited working memory for storing the prior (Experiment 2) and ii) limited 
executive function abilities for learning and implementing multiple weighting rules 
simultaneously (Experiment 3). 
 
1.5.2.3 Individual Differences. Healthy adult observers show considerable 
individual differences in how well they can detect and efficiently use statistical 
regularities in their environments (Frost et al., 2015; Misyak et al., 2010; Siegelman 
& Frost, 2015). As we discussed in Section 1.5.2.2.3.1.1 above, working memory is 
critical to our ability to store recent experiences in memory for long enough to detect 
any underlying patterns. We know that working memory capacity varies greatly 
between individuals (Kane et al., 2007). It has been shown that it is advantageous to 
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have a higher working memory capacity when making decisions under uncertainty 
(Bagneux et al., 2013; Cui et al., 2015), as well as retaining and implementing a new 
decision or rule (Duncan et al., 2012; Pereg & Meiran, 2019).  
 
1.5.2.3.1 Filling the Gaps. As elaborated above, there are inter-individual 
differences in the ability to detect statistical patterns. One source of this variance 
could be individual differences in working memory capacity. Yet, this hypothesis has 
not yet been tested. To fill this gap, in Chapter 4, we asked whether working memory 
capacity, in particular visuospatial working memory capacity, could uniquely explain 
a proportion of the variance in how close to optimal adults are.  
 
1.6 The Caveat 
As many researchers have pointed out (Ma, 2012; Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; 
Maloney & Mamassian, 2009), a key limitation of psychophysical studies is that there 
is no definite evidence that observers are in fact performing Bayesian inference, 
rather than a simpler heuristic, such as reinforcement learning, which approximates 
it. Laquitaine and Gardner (2018) showed that a Switching observer that alternates 
between prior mean and sensory evidence can capture experimental data from a 
motion direction estimation task better than a Bayes-optimal observer, despite the 
mean and standard deviation of estimates matching well with optimal predictions. 
Norton et al. (2019) also found that their data was better accounted for by an 
exponential averaging model with a bias towards equal priors, which was, 
nonetheless, indistinguishable from a flexible variant of the Bayesian model with a 
bias towards equal probability. These studies suggest that just because a Bayesian 
model can explain broad qualitative features of the data, it does not mean that 
subjects perform Bayesian inference. It is important to keep this caveat in mind when 
interpreting our and others’ findings. One way to check whether observers perform 
some form of Bayesian inference is to look at whether subjects can instantly transfer 
probabilistic information from one context to the other (Beierholm et al., 2009a; 
Maloney & Mamassian, 2009). It has previously been shown that likelihood variance 
learning can immediately transfer to a new prior (Sato & Kording, 2014) and that 
priors whose distribution changed on each trial could be immediately computed with 
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(Acerbi et al., 2014a). However, some studies found no evidence of transfer (Frost et 
al., 2015; Hewitson et al., 2018; Yin et al., 2019) and others suggested that the 
ability to transfer differs depending on whether the observer is transferring 
information about the mean or the variance of the distribution (Fernandes et al., 
2014; Feulner et al., 2020).  
 
1.6.1 Filling the Gaps 
In Section 1.6, we showed that although there are many studies on transfer, 
we know very little about the exact circumstances in which observers are able to 
generalise what they learn in one situation to new situations. For example, it may be 
that generalisation becomes more difficult as the complexity of the environment 
increases. Thus, across several experiments in Chapter 2, observers localised a 
hidden target from visual signals (likelihood) and previous target locations (prior). 
Crucially, we manipulated the variance of the likelihood and the prior. Another 
important aspect of the experiments reported in Chapter 2 was the interleaved (as 
opposed to block-based) design for changes in these parameters, which had several 
consequences. For example, it is likely that compared to some previous studies of 
transfer (e.g., Sato & Kording, 2014), our task was substantially more difficult since 
the prior and likelihood variances changed unpredictably trial to trial (see also 
Bejjanki et al., 2016). This also prevented subjects from using a template-match 
strategy. Crucially, we introduced a new level of likelihood variance in the last two of 
the five experimental blocks, which allowed us to test the prediction of transfer: that 
the change in weights in response to the new likelihood variance would be 
immediate. The key research question of the experiments in Chapter 2 was: did adult 
observers immediately change their weight on the sensory cue, or did they need 
more time to adapt to the new variance?  
 
1.7 Conclusions 
The work in this thesis aims to better understand how people learn and make 
efficient, statistically optimal use of novel statistical distributions. In Chapter 2, we 
examined one potential limitation to using statistics in an optimal, that is Bayesian, 
way in adults – environmental complexity. In Chapter 3, we traced the time course of 
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adaptation to such statistics in children and adults and probed some factors that may 
have affected age differences in the extent and rate of this adaptation. Lastly, in 
Chapter 4, we delved into individual differences in working memory in adults and 
asked whether these predict the extent to which different individuals efficiently 
weighted sensory and prior information. Altogether, these studies speak to questions 
about the limits and the development of abilities to use novel environmental statistics 
in an efficient, statistically optimal manner.  
 
1.8 Experimental Chapters  
 
Chapter 2: Bayesian transfer in a complex spatial localization task 
Whether the brain performs some form of Bayesian inference (Chater et al., 
2006; Dayan et al., 1995), or just approximates it, is open for debate. There are a 
number of different ways to rule out simple heuristics (e.g., reinforcement learning) 
but probably the simplest one is to test whether observers generalise previously 
learned information to novel situations (‘Bayesian transfer’; Maloney & Mamassian, 
2009). Across three experiments in Chapter 2, therefore, we apply the ‘Bayesian 
transfer’ approach to investigate whether observers combine information from past 
and current signals in a Bayesian manner in a complex task, or whether they 
implement a heuristic version of the optimal strategy by forming a look-up table. We 
were also interested in whether their strategy might change if (1) they were given 
more information about the underlying statistics (Experiment 2), (2) we increased the 
exposure time to the different prior and likelihood combinations (Experiment 3). We 
investigated this in adult participants only. 
 
Chapter 3: Development of efficient adaptation to novel task statistics 
Research exploring whether and at what age children learn to integrate prior 
knowledge is limited, as is our understanding of either overall age changes in 
learning and efficient use of novel statistics in childhood, or the factors that might 
underlie development of these abilities. Moreover, most previous studies averaged 
performance over the experiment as a whole (Bejjanki et al., 2019; Chambers et al., 
2018). We therefore do not know what the time course of adapting to novel, 
changing task statistics over time is, and whether it differs between adults and 
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children. Studying the time course is important because it can show whether children 
are generally incapable of using prior statistics efficiently, or whether it takes them 
longer to learn how to make efficient use of such statistics. Therefore, in Chapter 3, 
we traced for the first time the time course of how children and adults adapt. In two 
follow-up experiments we probe two potential sources of slower tuning of children’s 
behaviour to task statistics: i) limited working memory for storing the prior 
(Experiment 2) and ii) limited executive function abilities for learning and 
implementing multiple weighting rules simultaneously (Experiment 3). We 
investigated this in adults and children aged between 6 and 11 years. 
 
Chapter 4: Individual differences in working memory capacity and prior 
weighting 
 We know that there is considerable individual variation in the ability to detect 
and extract statistical regularities even in healthy adults (Frost et al., 2015; Misyak et 
al., 2010; Siegelman & Frost, 2015). The storage capacity of working memory, which 
is also known to differ between individuals (Kane et al., 2007), will likely play a key 
role in the acquisition of statistical regularities. Therefore, in Chapter 4, we sought to 
test whether working memory capacity can predict inter-individual variation in prior 











Bayesian transfer in a complex spatial localization task 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Imagine that you are trying to give your cat a bath, but as soon as it sees the 
bathtub, it gets scared and runs away to the garden (Kording et al., 2007; Vilares & 
Kording, 2011). So, you are walking around your garden, trying to figure out where 
your cat has hidden, and you hear a “meow” (auditory cue). This perceptual cue is 
useful but not perfectly reliable and will not allow you to pinpoint exactly the cat’s 
position. However, from previous experience, you may have learnt that your cat often 
hides in the bushes, furthest from the pond (priors). The uncertainty in the two pieces 
of information that you have (the auditory cue and the prior information) allow them 
to be expressed as probability distributions over location and the optimal strategy for 
estimating the cat’s location is to integrate the sensory and prior information 
according to the rules of Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT). Recent studies show that 
people behave as if they deal with uncertainty in this way, for example, when 
estimating the position of a hidden target (Berniker et al., 2010; Körding & Wolpert, 
2004; Tassinari et al., 2006; Vilares et al., 2012), direction of motion (Chalk et al., 
2010), speed (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; Weiss et al., 2002), or the duration of a 
time interval (Acerbi et al., 2012; Ahrens & Sahani, 2011; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; 
Miyazaki et al., 2005). In all of these studies, human observers integrated knowledge 
of the statistical structure of the experiment (acquired from feedback in previous 
trials) with sensory information, taking a weighted average according to their relative 
reliabilities in order to maximise his or her score on the task (Ma, 2012). However, 
other studies report sub-optimal behaviour, finding that even though observers take 
into account the uncertainty of the current and prior information, the weights do not 
match those of an ideal Bayesian observer (Bowers & Davis, 2012; Jones & Love, 
2011; Rahnev & Denison, 2018). The fact that human performance ranges from 
close-to-optimal to largely suboptimal suggests that Bayesian models may describe 
behaviour well in some cases, but not in others. Understanding when BDT can and 
cannot provide an accurate model of human behaviour is an important step towards 
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understanding the computations and approximations used by the brain to support 
adaptive behaviour.  
One factor that may influence how close performance is to BDT (“optimal”) 
predictions is task complexity. For example, Bejjanki, Knill, and Aslin (2016) asked 
observers to estimate the position of an unknown target (a bucket at a fairground), 
whose true location was randomly drawn from one of two Gaussian distributions, 
with different means and variances (priors). On each trial, eight dots were drawn 
from a Gaussian distribution centered on the true location with either a low, medium 
or high variance to form a dot cloud that served as a noisy cue to target location 
(likelihoods). To successfully estimate the position of the target, subjects could use 
both the likelihood, obtained from the displayed dots, and the prior, obtained from the 
distribution of previous target positions that they could learn from the trial-by-trial 
feedback. The study found that subjects adjusted their responses according to the 
reliability of sensory and prior information, giving more weight to the centroid of the 
dot cloud (likelihood) when the variance of the prior was high and the variance of the 
likelihood was low; a signature of probabilistic inference (Ma, 2012). More generally, 
these results are also in agreement with previously described work, which used a 
single prior change (e.g., Berniker et al., 2010; Vilares et al., 2012). However, unlike 
in the studies using only a single prior change, the weight placed on the likelihood 
differed from that of the ideal-Bayes observer whenever the likelihood uncertainty 
was medium or high. The magnitude of the difference varied with both likelihood and 
prior uncertainty. As the likelihood became more uncertain, the difference from 
optimal increased, participants placing more weight on the likelihood than optimal. In 
addition, the difference from optimal was greater in the narrow prior condition. In a 
follow-up experiment, participants experienced one prior distribution only, with 
double the amount of trials used in the original study, finding that subjects’ weights 
on the likelihoods approach optimal with increasing task exposure, suggesting more 
time is required to accurately learn the variances of the prior distributions and that 
learning is disrupted when trying to learn two distributions simultaneously (Bejjanki et 
al., 2016).  
Even in cases when likelihood-weighting might match the prediction of an 
ideal-Bayes observer, Maloney and Mamassian (2009) noted that such “optimal” or 
“near-optimal” performance alone is not enough to show that the brain is following 
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Bayesian principles. Maloney and Mamassian (2009) showed that a reinforcement-
learning model that learns a mapping from stimulus to response (learning a separate 
look-up table for each prior and likelihood pairing in the types of tasks discussed 
here) will also appear to optimally weight prior and likelihood information without 
learning the individual probability distributions.  
Maloney and Mamassian (2009) suggested that the two models may be 
distinguished by asking whether subjects are able to immediately transfer 
probabilistic information from one condition to another (hereafter known as Bayesian 
transfer). These transfer criteria are a strong test for use of Bayesian principles 
because they make very different predictions for how the observer will behave when 
presented with a new level of sensory noise halfway through the task. If people 
follow Bayesian principles, we would expect them to immediately adapt to the new 
sensory uncertainty, and integrate it with an already-learnt prior, without any need for 
feedback-driven learning. On the other hand, the reinforcement-learner would 
require a certain amount of exposure to the new likelihood and prior pairing (with 
feedback) in order to form a look-up table that could then lead to optimal 
performance.  
To our knowledge, only one study has tested Bayesian transfer in the context 
of sensorimotor learning. Sato and Kording (2014) tested the ability of participants to 
generalise a newly learnt prior to a previously learnt likelihood. In their task, Sato and 
Kording (2014) first trained participants to complete the task when only a single 
Gaussian prior was present (either narrow or wide) that could be paired with either a 
low or high uncertainty likelihood by giving feedback on every trial. After 400 trials, 
the prior switched to the other level of uncertainty (narrow to wide or wide to narrow) 
and for the following 200 trials, participants saw the new prior paired only with one of 
the likelihoods (either low or high) and continued to receive feedback. In the second 
part of the experiment, subjects still saw the second prior variability, but now with the 
first likelihood again, which they had so far only seen paired with the first prior. They 
did not provide any feedback in this part of the task to examine how subjects 
transferred their knowledge of the prior to the new likelihood. The weight placed on 
the likelihood in the newly-reintroduced likelihood condition was immediately different 
to the weight placed on the same likelihood before the change in the prior. In other 
words, participants’ behaviour in this likelihood condition changed dependent upon 
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prior uncertainty without any explicit training with this prior and likelihood pairing. 
This is evidence of Bayesian transfer and hence, that participants solved the task 
using Bayesian principles – representing probabilities – rather than a simpler 
strategy such as a look-up table learned by reinforcement. 
Whether the same will hold in more complex scenarios is unclear. Indeed, it 
has been repeatedly pointed out that exact Bayesian computations demand 
considerable computational resources (e.g., working memory, attention) such that 
the brain might not be able to perform these computations in more complex tasks 
and will instead resort to heuristics (Beck, Ma, Pitkow, Latham, & Pouget, 2012; 
Gardner, 2019). We have already seen that performance in more complex tasks is 
far from optimal (e.g., Bejjanki et al., 2016), suggesting that there are limits to 
humans’ ability to learn and optimally integrate prior distributions with sensory 
information when tasks become more complex. Establishing the limits of BDT as a 
model of human behaviour will inform models of information processing in the human 
brain. 
Here we ask whether people will show Bayesian transfer in a complex 
situation with multiple priors and likelihood variances, similar to Bejjanki et al. (2016). 
We report three experiments in which a target is sampled from one of two possible 
prior distributions (with different means and different variances) and then cued with 
one of three possible likelihood variances (with the variance itself also displayed). 
Likelihood and prior variances were identical to those used in Bejjanki et al. (2016) in 
terms of visual angle, in order to match the true (objective) reliabilities of the cue and 
prior across the studies. The first two experiments tested for Bayesian transfer by 
only introducing the high likelihood variance in blocks 4 and 5 of the task. The only 
difference was that in the second experiment, participants were explicitly told that the 
prior variances differed, to test whether this would promote closer-to-optimal 
performance. The last experiment was used to check whether removing the 
additional burden of transfer allows participants to learn the complex environment 
correctly by presenting all likelihood conditions from the start of the experiment – a 
replication of Bejjanki et al. (2016). 
To summarise, in the first experiment, we found that observers did not show 
evidence for Bayesian transfer. When a new high variance likelihood was introduced 
in blocks 4 and 5, they did not weight it less than the familiar medium variance 
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likelihood. This is at odds with the idea that observers perform full Bayesian 
inference, combining prior and likelihood based on relative variances, and thus does 
not provide evidence for Bayesian transfer. In the second experiment, observers did 
show evidence for transfer, weighting the newly-introduced high variance likelihood 
significantly less than the medium variance likelihood. However, in both experiments, 
the weights placed on the medium and high variance likelihoods were much higher 
than optimal. These weights remained sub-optimal in the final experiment where all 
likelihood variances were present from the start of the task. These results extend our 
knowledge of how potentially-Bayesian perceptual processes function in complex 
environments. 
 
2.2   Experiment 1: Testing Transfer to a New Level of Likelihood Variance 
In the first experiment, we tested whether Bayesian transfer would occur in a 
complex environment with two priors, similar to the one used by Bejjanki et al. 
(2016). We trained participants on a spatial localization task with two likelihood 
variances and two prior distributions (with different means and variances). In initial 
training, they were exposed to all four combinations (trials interleaved), with 
feedback. If, like participants in Bejjanki et al. (2016), they weighted the likelihood 
and the prior differently across conditions in line with their differing reliabilities, this 
would show that they had learned and were using the priors. However, such 
reliability-weighting could either be done via Bayesian inference – representing 
probabilities – or via a simpler strategy akin to learning a look-up table (Maloney & 
Mamassian, 2009). To distinguish these possibilities, after the training trials, we 
tested for “Bayesian transfer” by adding a new higher-variance likelihood distribution 
to the task. If participants deal with this newly-introduced likelihood in a Bayesian 
manner, they should immediately rely less on this new likelihood information than 
they did on the likelihoods in previously-trained conditions. Alternatively, if their initial 
learning is more rote in nature (i.e., more like a look-up table), participants would 
begin to place a different weight on the new likelihood only after extensive training 






2.2.1.1 Overview. Subjects performed a sensorimotor decision-making task 
on a computer monitor where they estimated the horizontal location of a hidden 
octopus. The true location was sampled from one of two distinct Gaussian 
distributions that differed in mean and variance (narrow or wide priors). On each trial, 
the relevant prior distribution was indicated by the colour of the likelihood information 
- eight dots that were described to the participant as the “tentacles” of the octopus. 
The horizontal locations of the eight dots were sampled from a Gaussian distribution 
centred on the true location that had either low, medium, or high variability (the 
likelihood). To estimate the octopus’ position, participants could use (although this 
was never explicitly mentioned) both the likelihood and prior information, with the 
subjects able to learn the latter via trial-to-trial feedback. Participants completed five 
blocks of trials. Crucially, in blocks one to three only the low and medium likelihood 
variances were paired with the narrow or wide priors. The high likelihood condition 
was only introduced in blocks four and five to test for evidence of Bayesian transfer.  
 
2.2.1.2 Participants. Participants were recruited from the Durham 
Psychology department participant pool, Durham University newsletter, and by word-
of-mouth. Twenty-six participants were recruited in total (13 female, mean age: 20.1, 
age range: 18-30 years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity, and no history of neurological or developmental disorders. Each participant 
received either course credits or a cash payment of £10 for their time.  
 
2.2.1.3. Ethics. Ethical approval was received from the Durham University 
Psychology Department Ethics Board. All participants gave written, informed consent 
prior to taking part in the study. 
 
2.2.1.4. Stimuli and Apparatus. Stimuli were displayed on a 22-inch iiyama 
monitor (1680 x 1050 pixels), viewed at a distance of 60cm, using the Psychophysics 
Toolbox for MATLAB (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). The stimuli 
were set against a blue background (to represent the sea).  
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The position of the octopus was sampled from one of two Gaussian 
distributions (priors): the narrow (standard deviation of 𝜎$% = 1% of screen width) or 
wide (standard deviation of 𝜎$& = 2.5% of screen width) priors. The side of the 
screen associated with each prior was counterbalanced across participants. One 
was always 35% of the way across the screen (from left to right), and the other 70%. 
When the narrow prior was centered on 35%, for example, the wide prior had a 
mean in the opposite side of the screen (i.e., to the right, centered on 70%). When 
the octopus appeared on the left-hand side (drawn from the prior centered on 35%) it 
was white, and when it appeared on the right (drawn from the prior centered on 70%) 
it was black.  
At the beginning of each trial, a cloud of eight dots (0.5% of screen width in 
diameter) appeared on the screen. The horizontal position of each dot was drawn 
from a Gaussian distribution centered on the true octopus location with either low 
(𝜎%% = 0.6% screen width), medium (𝜎%' = 3% screen width), or high (𝜎%& = 6% 
screen width) standard deviation (in the following referring to as low, medium and 
high variance likelihood conditions). The horizontal positions of the dots were scaled 
so that their standard deviation (SD) was equal to the true SD (𝜎%% , 	𝜎%'	𝑜𝑟	𝜎%&) on 
each trial while preserving the mean of the dots. We performed this correction so 
that participants would “see” the same variability across trials for each likelihood 
condition. This ensures that an observer who computes the reliability for the 
likelihood information trial by trial would always calculate the same value within 
likelihood trial types. The vertical positions of the dots were spaced at equal intervals 
from the vertical center of the screen, with half of the dots appearing above, and the 
other half, below the center. The vertical distance between each dot was fixed and 
equal to 1% screen width). Given that the vertical positions of the dots were fixed, 
only the horizontal position of the target was relevant. Participants estimated location 
only along the horizontal axis by moving a vertical green rectangle (measuring 1% of 
screen width in width and 3% of screen width in height) left or right, making this a 
one-dimensional estimation task. Participants received feedback in the form of a red 
dot (0.5% of screen width in diameter) that represented true target position.  
The combination of two priors and three likelihoods led to six trial types (all 
possible prior x likelihood pairings). The task was split into five blocks of trials with 
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300 trials per block. In the first three blocks of the task only four trial types were used 
(75 trials of each paring), with the high likelihood condition not shown in combination 
with either prior. The high likelihood condition was introduced in blocks four and five 
(50 trials per paring), in order to test for Bayesian transfer. Within each block, all trial 
types were interleaved. The trials were broken into runs of 20 trials. Within each run 
the trials for each prior type were arranged such that an ideal learner would have an 
exact estimate of the mean and variance of the prior distributions if evidence was 
accumulated over those 20 trials.  
We also included prior-only trials where subjects were told that a black/white 
octopus was hiding somewhere on the screen and instructed to find it. No sensory 
information was provided (no likelihood information). These trials were interleaved 
with the rest of the trials (one every 9 trials for each prior), and there were 83 trials in 
total, for each of the priors (narrow and wide).  
 
2.2.1.5. Procedure. Participants were instructed to estimate the position of a 
“hidden” octopus, indicating their estimate by adjusting the horizontal location of a 
“net” (green rectangle). Each trial started with the presentation of eight dots that 
remained on screen until the end of the trial (the likelihood information, described to 
the participants as the tentacles of the octopus) (Figure 2.1A). The eight dots could 
have one of three levels of uncertainty: low, medium, or high variance likelihood trials 
(Figure 2.1B). When the level of uncertainty was higher, the dots were more 
dispersed on the screen and, therefore, were a less reliable indicator of the true 
location of the octopus. Participants used the mouse to move the net to their 
guessed position, using a right click to confirm their choice (no time limit). Following 
a response, the true position of the octopus was shown as a red dot on the screen. 
Over the course of the experiment, the feedback served as a second cue to location 
since the true locations of the black and white octopi were drawn from different 
distributions. In other words, participants could learn a prior over each octopus’ 
location. We provided performance feedback on a trial-to-trial basis so that the priors 
could be learned. Specifically, subjects could potentially learn that the two sets of 
octopi (black/white) were drawn from separate Gaussian distributions centred at 
different locations on the screen and with differing levels of uncertainty (narrow and 






Figure 2.1. A) Illustration of the task. Participants were asked to estimate the position 
of a hidden target (the “octopus”, represented as the red dot) by horizontally moving 
a net (green vertical bar). At the beginning of each trial, participants were given noisy 
information about the location of the hidden target in the form of eight dots (the 
likelihood). Participants then moved the net to the estimated location and clicked to 
confirm their response, after which the actual target location was displayed. If the 
target was inside, or overlapped with, the net, a score was added to the participant’s 
score. B) The three likelihood variances. C) Illustration of a Bayes-optimal observer. 
A Bayesian observer would combine information about the prior uncertainty (learnt 
from the distribution of previous target locations) with the likelihood information on a 
given trial to optimally estimate the target location.  
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 To keep participants engaged, we incorporated an animation when the 
participant picked the right location of a cartoon octopus moving into a bucket 
centred at the bottom of the screen. In addition, participants would get one point 
added to their score if they “caught” the octopus. An octopus was caught if the true 
octopus position overlapped with the net placement by at least 50% of the red 
feedback dot’s size. The cumulative score was displayed at the end of each trial. 
Participants completed 5 blocks of 300 trials each for a total of 1500 trials. The five 
experimental blocks were performed in succession with a short break between each 
one. The experiment duration was approximately an hour and a half.  
 
2.2.1.6. Data Analysis. For each individual participant, we regressed 
estimated octopus position against the centroid (mean) of the cloud of dots 
(likelihood) on each trial. All regression analyses were done using a least squares 
procedure (the polyfit function in MATLAB). The slope of the fitted regression line 
quantifies the extent to which participants rely on the current sensory evidence 
(likelihood), as opposed to prior information. A slope of one suggests that 
participants only use likelihood information and a slope of zero suggests that 
participants rely only on their prior knowledge, ignoring the likelihood. A slope 
between zero and one suggests that both likelihood and prior information are taken 
into account, and the steeper the slope, the more participants rely on the likelihood 
and less on the prior information. Accordingly, we will refer to the fitted slope values 
as the weight placed on the likelihood.  
We also computed the weight that would be given to the likelihood in each 
condition by an ideal Bayesian observer with perfect knowledge of the prior and 
likelihood distributions (see Figure 2.1C for an illustration). The optimal weight on the 








where 𝜎%" is the variance of the likelihood, 𝑛 is the number of dots that indicate the 
likelihood (in this case, there were 8 dots), and 𝜎$" is the variance of the prior.  
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 To determine the proportion of the variance in responses that is accounted for 
by change in the estimate from the sensory cue, the coefficient of determination (𝑅") 
was calculated by linearly regressing participants’ responses against each estimate 
participants could have taken from the cue (i.e., arithmetic mean, robust average, 
median or mid-range). This was done for the combined data of all subjects in each 
experiment, across all blocks and trial types (prior and likelihood pairings). The 
estimate with the highest 𝑅" value was taken to be the estimate participants had 
most likely used. 
 Statistical differences were analysed using repeated-measures ANOVA with a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959) of the degrees of 
freedom in order to correct for violations of the sphericity assumption if 𝜖 ≤ 0.75 and 
a Huynh-Feldt correction otherwise.  
We discarded a trial from analysis if the absolute error for that trial was in the 
top 1% of all absolute errors, computed separately for each prior and likelihood 
pairing across all blocks and participants (this rule excluded at most 13 trials per 
pairing for an individual subject).  
 
2.2.2 Results and Discussion for Experiment 1 
We first checked whether subjects took the mean as an estimate from the 
sensory cue, and not a heuristic, such as the robust average. In tasks similar to ours 
(Bejjanki et al., 2016; Chambers et al., 2018; Vilares et al., 2012), authors assume 
that observers use the mean of the dots as their best estimate of true location from 
the likelihood information. However, we did not explicitly tell our participants how the 
eight dots that formed the likelihood were generated, or that the best estimate they 
could take from them was their mean position, leaving open the possibility that 
observes may have taken a different estimate from the cue than the mean (de 
Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011; Van Den Berg & Ma, 2012). The mean horizontal 
position was found to explain the most amount of variance in participants’ responses 
(𝑅" = 0.996), relative to the robust average (𝑅" = 0.995), median (𝑅" = 0.995) or the 
mid-range of the dots (𝑅" = 0.992). This suggests that the mean of the dots is the 
estimate that participants take from the sensory cue.  
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We then examined whether the weight participants placed on the likelihood, 
relative to the prior, varied with respect to trial type (prior/likelihood pairing) for all the 
trial types present from the beginning of the experiment. Without this basic result – a 
replication of the pattern found by Bejjanki et al. (2016) – we could not expect them 
to transfer knowledge of the learnt prior distributions to the new high variance 
likelihood in the later blocks. This was a qualified success: for these trial types (blue 
and green bars in Figure 2.2), participants showed the predicted pattern, but placed 
more weight on the likelihood than is optimal (compare bar heights to dashed lines in 
Figure 2.2), in line with previous research (Bejjanki et al., 2016; Tassinari et al., 
2006). We conducted a 2 (narrow versus wide variance prior) x 2 (low versus 
medium variance likelihood) x 5 (block) repeated measures ANOVA with the weight 
given to the likelihood (the displayed dots) as the dependent variable. These results 
are shown in Table 2.1 and summarised here. There was a main effect of prior 
variance, with less weight on the likelihood when the prior was narrower (𝑝 < .001).  
There was also a main effect of likelihood variance (𝑝 < .001), where participants 
relied less on the medium variance likelihood. However, there was also a significant 
interaction effect of likelihood and prior (𝑝 = .001). When the prior was narrow, the 
decrease in reliance on the likelihood was smaller as the likelihood variance 
increased (𝑡(25) = 3.57, 𝑝 = .001).  
We found a main effect of block (𝑝 < 	 .001) and an interaction between block 
and likelihood (𝑝 = .014), with the medium variance likelihood weighted significantly 
differently across blocks (simple main effect of block, 𝐹(4,100) = 5.84, 𝑝 <
	.001, 𝜂$+,)*+%" =	 .189, weights decrease with increasing exposure), but not the low 
variance likelihood (no simple main effect of block, 𝐹(4,100) = 1.64, 𝑝 =
.169, 𝜂$+,)*+%" =	 .063). This suggests that participants adjusted, through practice, their 
weights on the medium variance likelihood, getting closer to optimal.  
 60 
 
Figure 2.2. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information, separated by block and 
prior width in Experiment 1. Lower values represent a greater weight on the prior. 
Blue is low-variance likelihood (a tight array of dots), green is medium-variance 
likelihood (dots somewhat spread out), red is the later-introduced high-variance 
likelihood (highly spread out dots). Dashed lines show optimal-predicted values. 























































Results from a 2 (prior) x 2 (likelihood) x 5 (block) Repeated Measures ANOVA for 
the likelihood variances present from the beginning of the task (low and medium) in 
Experiment 1 
 
Examination of the prior-only trials shows successful learning of the priors. On 
average, subjects’ responses were not significantly different from the prior mean in 
the wide prior condition (𝑡(25) = −0.77, 𝑝 = .450). They were significantly different in 
the narrow prior condition (𝑡(25) = −2.78, 𝑝 = .010), although the bias was extremely 
small (95% CI: [0.06,0.41] percent of the screen width to the left). The median 
standard deviation of responses for all subjects was 1.4% (narrow prior) and 2.5% 
(wide prior): almost identical to the true prior SDs of 1.3% and 2.5%, respectively.  
Participants qualitatively followed the predicted optimal pattern of reweighting: 
like the dashed lines (predictions) in Figure 2.2, actual likelihood weights (bars) were 
higher for the wide prior (right) than the narrow prior (left), and higher for the low 
variance likelihood (blue) than the medium variance likelihood (green). However, 
comparing bar heights with dashed lines (predictions) shows that quantitatively, their 
weights were far from optimal. Participants systematically gave much more weight 
than is optimal to the likelihood when its variance was medium (Figure 2.2, green 
bars vs lines – 𝑝 < .001 in all blocks for the medium likelihood when paired with 
either prior). This over-reliance on the likelihood is in line with previous studies (e.g., 
Bejjanki et al., 2016), although stronger in the present study. Participants, therefore, 
accounted for changes in the probabilities involved in the task (e.g., weighted the 
 F df, dferror p Effect size (𝜂$") 
Likelihood 104.40 1, 25 <.001 .81 
Prior 28.08 1, 25 <.001 .53 
Block 7.72 4, 100 <.001 .24 
Likelihood x prior 12.77 1, 25 .001 .34 
Likelihood x block 3.32 4, 100 .01 .12 
Prior x block .51 4, 100 .21 .06 
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likelihood less when it was more variable), but did not perform exactly as predicted 
by the optimal strategy. 
Having found that participants’ performance was in line with the predicted 
patterns, we could then ask if they would generalise their knowledge to the new high 
likelihood trials added in blocks 4-5 (“Bayesian transfer”), as predicted for an 
observer following Bayesian principles. This should lead immediately to a lower 
weight for the new high variance likelihood than the familiar medium variance 
likelihood. By contrast, lack of a significant difference in weights between the 
medium and high likelihood trial types would suggest that the observer is employing 
an alternative strategy, such as simply learning a look-up table. To test this, we 
performed a 2 (prior) x 3 (likelihood) x 2 (block) repeated measures ANOVA 
(summarise only blocks 4 and 5 – those with all likelihoods present). These results 
are shown in Table 2.2 and summarised here. As above, we found a main effect of 
likelihood, participants placing less weight on the likelihood as it became more 
uncertain (𝑝 < .001). However, post-hoc analyses showed that the weight placed on 
the high likelihood was not significantly lower than the weight placed on the medium 
likelihood (𝑝 = 	 .103). Only the comparison of the weights placed on the likelihood in 
low and high variance trial types was significant (𝑝 < .001). Moreover, there was no 
main effect of block (𝑝 < .28), nor an interaction between block and likelihood (𝑝 =
.48), suggesting that the weight placed on the newly introduced likelihood variance 
did not decrease with increasing exposure.  
Finally, we compared mean weights in block 5 against the optimal Bayesian 
values for each prior and likelihood pairing. In the low variance likelihood trials we 
did not observe significant deviation from the Bayesian prediction, irrespective of 
prior (low variance likelihood, narrow prior: 𝑡(25) = 	 .784, 𝑝 = 	 .440); low variance 
likelihood, wide prior: 𝑡(25) = 	−1.12, 𝑝 = 	 .270). Subjects’ weights differed 
significantly from optimal in all other conditions (𝑝 < 	 .001 in all cases).  
Overall, our results do not exactly match the predictions of a Bayesian 
observer because we find only weak evidence of Bayesian transfer. Specifically, 
while we find a main effect of likelihood, the weight on the high variance likelihood is 
not significantly different to that placed on the medium variance likelihood (although 
the change is in the predicted direction). That said, our results are not simply more 
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consistent with a rote process, since the weight placed on the high likelihood does 
not decrease with increasing exposure (no interaction between likelihood and block). 
 
Table 2.2 
Results from a 2 (prior) x 3 (likelihood) x 2 (block) Repeated Measures ANOVA for 
all likelihood variances in Experiment 1  
 
Our results point mostly away from a simple variance weighted Bayesian 
model being a good model of human behaviour in this particular task. The correct 
pattern of weights was present, but evidence of transfer was weak. Participants were 
also significantly sub-optimal, overweighting the likelihood whenever its variance was 
medium or high. Previous studies have also found that observers give more weight 
to the sensory cue than is optimal (e.g., Bejjanki et al., 2016); even so, the level of 
sub-optimality that we observe here is still drastically higher, compared to previous 
reports. However, Sato and Kording (2014) found better, near-optimal performance 
in those participants who were told that the sensory information can have one of two 
levels of variance, and that the variance will sometimes change, compared to those 
who were not provided with this information. We therefore reasoned that if observers 
are given additional information about the structure and statistics of the task (e.g., 
that the variances of the prior distributions are different), the weight they give to the 
sensory cue may move closer to optimal. If we find weights closer to optimal, we 
may be better able to detect whether transfer had taken place because the effect 
size of a change in the likelihood would be bigger. In fact, we wonder whether the 
 F df, dferror p Effect size (𝜂$") 
Likelihood 50.08 2, 50 <.001 .67 
Prior 15.52 1, 25 .001 .38 
Block 1.21 1, 25 .28 .05 
Likelihood x prior 2.39 1.62, 40.41 .10 .09 
Likelihood x block .75 2, 50 .48 .03 
Prior x block 4.35 1, 25 .05 .15 
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size of this effect could be an important factor behind the lack of significant 
differences observed in Experiment 1, i.e., that the effect size of the change from 
medium to high likelihood was too small for our statistical analysis to reliably detect. 
In view of this, we set out to test whether additional instructions will lead to weighting 
of likelihood and prior information that is closer to optimal. 
 
2.3   Experiment 2: Additional instructions about prior variance 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except for a change in 
instructions. In this experiment, subjects were explicitly (albeit indirectly) informed of 
the different variances of the prior. We hypothesised that giving participants 
additional information about the model structure of the task will move weights closer 
to optimal and make any transfer effects more pronounced.  
 
2.3.1 Methods 
Twelve participants (8 female, mean age: 20.3, age range: 19-22 years) 
participated in Experiment 2.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
visual acuity, no history of neurological or developmental disorders and had not 
taken part in Experiment 1. Each participant received either course credits or cash 
compensation for their time.  
The experimental set had the same layout as the main experiment, with the 
following difference: in addition to the previously described instructions, subjects in 
this version of the task were told that “it is important to remember that one of the 
octopuses tends to stay in a particular area, whereas the other one moves quite a 
bit!” (i.e., they were indirectly informed that the variances of the priors were different). 
(see Appendix A for full instructions).  
 
2.3.2 Results and Discussion for Experiment 2 
Similarly to what we saw in Experiment 1, the mean and robust average of the 
dots explained the same amount of the variance in participants’ responses (𝑅" =
0.991 for both), followed by the median (𝑅" = 0.990) and the mid-range (𝑅" = 0.989). 
We, thus, proceed with the mean as the estimate from the likelihood.  
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Figure 2.3 shows that the pattern of results was qualitatively similar to those 
of Experiment 1 (see Figure 2.2). A 2 (prior) x 2 (likelihood) x 5 (block) repeated 
measures ANOVA (analysing only the low and medium likelihood trials) revealed that 
subjects placed less weight on the likelihood as its uncertainty increased (main effect 
of likelihood, 𝑝 < .001) and as the prior uncertainty decreased (main effect of prior, 
𝑝 = .002). However, unlike in Experiment 1, there was no significant interaction of 
these factors (𝑝 = .123) (see Table 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information in each block of 
Experiment 2. Blue is the low-variance likelihood, green is the medium-variance 
likelihood, red is the high-variance likelihood. Dashed lines show optimal values. 
Error bars are +/- 1 SEM.  The far right is the average over blocks. 
 
We found a main effect of block (𝑝 = .02) and an interaction between block 
and likelihood (𝑝 = .01), with participants weighting the likelihood significantly less 
with increasing task exposure (regardless of prior) when its variance was medium 
(𝐹(2.21,25.34) = 3.81, 𝑝 = 	 .03, 𝜂$" =	 .257, with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction), 
but not when it was low (𝐹(4,44) = 0.70, 𝑝 = .60, 𝜂$" =	 .060).  
Narrow prior











































Results from a 2 (prior) x 2 (likelihood) x 5 (block) Repeated Measures ANOVA for 
the likelihood variances present from the beginning (low and medium) in Experiment 
2 
 
As before, we analysed subjects’ responses in the prior-only trials, finding a 
good quantitative agreement with the true prior mean (narrow prior: 𝑡(11) =
	−0.002, 𝑝 = 	 .999;	wide prior: 𝑡(11) = 	0.35, 𝑝 = 	 .734). The median standard 
deviation (SD) of responses was also remarkably similar to the true prior SDs 
(narrow prior: 1.6% vs. 1.3% in screen units; wide prior: 2.5% for both). 
Again, subjects’ overall performance was suboptimal (as can be seen by 
comparing the height of the bars against the dashed lines – the optimal predictions – 
in Figure 3). Subjects’ placed more weight on both the medium and high variance 
likelihoods than is optimal (𝑝 < .001 in both cases, for both priors). However, it is 
worth noting that the weights placed on the medium and high likelihoods are closer 
to optimal than they were in Experiment 1 (compare bar heights in Figure 2.2 and 
2.3). 
Finally, we tested for transfer to the newly-introduced high likelihood in blocks 
4-5. We conducted a 2 (prior) x 3 (likelihood) x 2 (block) repeated measures ANOVA 
(analysing only blocks 4 and 5 with all likelihoods present). These results are shown 
in Table 2.4 and summarised here. There was a main effect of likelihood, with less 
 F df, dferror p Effect size (𝜂$") 
Likelihood 46.14 1, 11 <.001 .81 
Prior 17.28 1, 11 .002 .61 
Block 3.15 4, 44 .02 .22 
Likelihood x prior 2.80 1, 11 .12 .20 
Likelihood x block 3.73 4, 44 .01 .25 
Prior x block 1.32 2.07, 22.77 .29 .11 
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weight placed on the likelihood as it became more uncertain (𝑝 < .001). Unlike in 
Experiment 1, post-hoc analysis showed that the weight placed on the high likelihood 
was significantly lower than the weight placed on the medium likelihood (𝑝 = .034).  
The weights placed on the likelihood in the low variance trial type were significantly 
lower than those in the medium and high variance trial types (𝑝 < .001 for both). 
Moreover, there was no main effect of block (𝑝 < .64), or an interaction effect of 
block and likelihood (𝑝 < .15), meaning that the weight placed on the newly-added 
likelihood information did not vary with increasing exposure. 
Again, we find a significant difference between subjects’ weights (in block 5) 
and optimal predictions when the likelihood variance was medium or high (𝑝 < .001 
in both cases), but not when it was low, irrespective of prior variance (low likelihood, 
narrow prior: 𝑡(11) = 	 .120, 𝑝 = 	 .907); low likelihood, wide prior: 𝑡(11) = 	−1.29, 𝑝 =
	.163).  
 In line with our prediction of transfer, here we show that the observers put 
lower weight on the high variance likelihood than the medium variance likelihood 
they have experienced before. This is strengthened by the fact that participants’ 
weights did not change significantly with increasing exposure across blocks 4-5.  
 
Table 2.4 
Results from a 2 (prior) x 3 (likelihood) x 2 (block) Repeated Measures ANOVA for 
all likelihood variances in Experiment 2 
 
 F df, dferror p Effect size (𝜂$") 
Likelihood 37.98 2, 22 <.001 .78 
Prior 18.36 1, 11 .001 .63 
Block .23 1, 11 .64 .02 
Likelihood x prior 1.80 2, 22 .19 .14 
Likelihood x block 2.09 2, 22 .15 .16 
Prior x block .17 1, 11 .69 .02 
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To check more directly for differences due to experimental instructions, we 
compared subjects’ performance in the last 2 blocks across the two experiments. We 
ran a 2 (instructions) x 2 (prior) x 3 (likelihood) x 2 (block) mixed ANOVA. We found 
a main effect of instructions (𝐹(1,36) = 6.78, 𝑝 = .013, 𝜂$+,)*+%" = .159) with subjects 
weighting the likelihood significantly less with explicit instructions (Experiment 2), i.e. 
closer to the optimal weightings. We also found an interaction between instructions 
and likelihood (𝐹(1,36) = 4.79, 𝑝 = .011, 𝜂$+,)*+%" = .118), indicating that the main 
effect of instructions is due to a significant decrease in the weight placed on the high, 
relative to the medium likelihood in the explicit instructions (Experiment 2) task, but 
not the original task (Experiment 1).  
 These results show that adding extra instructions to the task that make the 
participant aware of a change in uncertainty between the two priors has an effect. 
The weights placed on the likelihood moved closer to optimal, and the transfer 
criterion was met, which suggests that, perhaps, observers are more likely to adopt a 
Bayes-optimal strategy when more explicit expectations about the correct model 
structure of the task are set.  However, even with the additional instructions, the 
weight given to the sensory cue was still systematically higher than the “optimal” 
weight. Arguably, expecting people to perform optimally is rather unrealistic, as it 
presumes that the observer perfectly knows the environmental statistics. However, 
Bejjanki et al. (2016) found performance much closer to optimal than what we have 
seen in either of our previous experiments. The major difference between their 
experiment and ours’ is the fact that Bejjanki et al. (2016) presented all likelihood 
variances from the start of the task. Therefore, unlike Experiments 1 and 2, which 
were designed in order to provide some evidence of transfer, Experiment 3 sought to 
test whether subjects’ weights would move closer to optimal if we present all 
likelihood variances from the beginning, in a more direct replication of Bejjanki et al. 
(2016). The likelihood and prior variance parameters were identical to those used in 
Bejjanki et al. (2016), and we used a similar number of trials per prior and likelihood 
pairing (250 vs. 200 trials in Bejjanki et al., 2016).  
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2.4. Experiment 3: All likelihoods from the beginning 
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 1 (lacking the extra instructions of 
Experiment 2) except that all likelihood variances were included from the beginning 
of the task. The participants experienced all six trial types in every block. 
 
2.4.1 Methods 
Twelve participants (10 female, mean age: 22.6, age range: 19-30 years) took 
part in Experiment 3. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, 
no history of neurological or developmental disorders and had not taken part in 
Experiment 1 and 2. Each participant received either course credits or cash 
compensation for their time.  
The stimuli and task were identical to those described for Experiment 1, 
except that all likelihood conditions (low, medium and high) were now present from 
the beginning (50 trials of each likelihood/ prior pairing interleaved in the same 
block).  
 
2.4.2 Results and Discussion of Experiment 3 
Again, the mean position of the dots explained the most amount of variance in 
participants’ responses (𝑅" = 0.990). The amount of variance explained decreased 
for the robust average (𝑅" = 0.989), median (𝑅" = 0.988) an the mid-range of the 
dots (𝑅" = 0.985). We, thus, proceed with the mean as the estimate from the 
likelihood.  
Figure 2.4 shows a similar pattern of results to Experiments 1 and 2. Again, a 
2 (prior) x 3 (likelihood) x 5 (block) repeated measures ANOVA shows that the 
likelihood information was weighted less as it became more unreliable (main effect of 
likelihood, 𝑝 < .001). Specifically, subjects placed significantly more weight on the 
low likelihood than on the medium (𝑝 = .001) or high likelihood (𝑝 < .001), and more 
weight on the medium likelihood than the high likelihood (𝑝 = .005). No other main 
effects or interactions were significant (see Table 2.5 for a summary of results).  
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Figure 2.4. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information in each block of 
Experiment 3. Blue is the low-variance likelihood, green is the medium-variance 
likelihood, red is the high-variance likelihood. Dashed lines show optimal values. 

























































Results from a 2 (prior) x 3 (likelihood) x 5 (block) Repeated Measures ANOVA for 
all likelihood variances in Experiment 3 
 
For the prior-only trials, subjects’ responses were, on average, statistically 
indistinguishable from the mean of the wide prior distribution (𝑡(11) = −1.14, 𝑝 =
.278), but were significantly different from the mean of the narrow prior (𝑡(11) =
−3.91, 𝑝 = .002) (although we note that the bias was small (95% CI: [0.24,0.87] 
percent of the screen width to the left). The median standard deviation (SD) of 
responses was 2.2% for the narrow prior condition and 2.6% for the wide prior 
condition; the SD of responses was, therefore, only close to the true variance of the 
wide prior (which was 2.5%). Together, these findings suggest that subjects had not 
learnt either the mean, or the variance of the narrow prior condition. This may 
explain the lack of difference in performance between the narrow and wide prior 
conditions in this task.  
A comparison of subjects’ weights on the likelihoods in block 5 against 
Bayesian predictions showed a significant difference for all likelihood and prior 
pairings (𝑝 < .001), with the exception of the wide prior/ low likelihood condition 
(𝑡(11) = −.362, 𝑝 = .724). 
To sum up, although the correct pattern of weights was present, subjects 
were still substantially sub-optimal, even after experiencing all likelihood variances 
from the start of the task. 
 F df, dferror p Effect size (𝜂$") 
Likelihood 29.90 2, 22 <.001 .73 
Prior 2.74 1, 11 .13 .20 
Block .28 4, 44 .89 .03 
Likelihood x prior 2.67 2, 22 .09 .19 
Likelihood x block .52 8, 88 .84 .05 
Prior x block .87 4, 44 .49 .07 
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Accounting for Suboptimality 
Even when we replicate Bejjanki et al. (2016) very closely with all likelihoods 
from the beginning, our participants are strikingly suboptimal. However, we note that 
in our initial calculations of optimal behaviour, we assumed that observers weight 
sensory and prior information according only to the variance of the dot distribution 
(i.e., external noise). However, many of the studies in the cue combination field that 
have found near-optimal performance used cues that only have internal noise, not 
external (Alais & Burr, 2006; Körding & Wolpert, 2006). It is, therefore, possible that 
our participants are sub-optimal because they fail to take account of external noise, 
only weighting the sensory and prior information by the internal variability (i.e., error 
intrinsic to them) of the sensory cue. Keeping this is mind, we considered the 
predicted weights of a model that only takes into account the internal variability 𝜎%! in 
using the sensory cue.  
We performed a separate control experiment to see how good participants 
were at finding the centroids of dot clouds in the absence of prior information (see 
Appendix B for more details). From this control data, we could calculate observers’ 
internal noise as their responses were not subject to bias from the prior. For each 
participant, their internal variability 𝜎%! was calculated by taking the standard 
deviation of their errors from the centroid of the dots (error = dot centroid - 
response). The predicted weight on the sensory cue was then calculated as 𝑤 =
	𝜎$" (⁄ 𝜎%!
" + 𝜎$"). This equation was the same as the full Bayesian model, the only 
difference being that the external SD of the likelihood (as defined by the 
experimenters) was substituted for the internal SD of the likelihood (measured in the 
control experiment). The variance of the prior was still included in the model. 
We compared subjects’ weights (block 5, Experiment 1) with those predicted 
when only weighting by internal noise and found that they were significantly different 
for all likelihood and prior pairings (𝑝 < .01). Indeed, Figure 2.5 shows that the 
internal noise model still predicts less weight on the sensory cue than we see in our 
data (compare bars and dotted lines). This could reflect participants downweighing 
the prior because it is, in fact, subject to additional internal noise, stemming from a 
need to remember and recall the correct prior from memory. Even so, empirical 
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weights were closer to the internal noise predictions, compared to those, predicted 
by the optimal strategy (with experimentally-controlled cue variance, dashed lines). 
 
Figure 2.5. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information in each block of 
Experiment 1. Blue is the low-variance likelihood, green is the medium-variance 
likelihood, red is the high-variance likelihood. Dashed lines show optimal values. 
Dotted lines show predicted weights when only weighting by internal noise. Error 
bars are +/- 1 SEM. 
 
 In addition, we examined the predictions for an observer model that weights 
sensory information, according to overall variability in the sensory cue. When 
calculating the optimal predicted weights initially, we assumed that the optimal 
observer knew how reliable the dots (i.e., the likelihood) were, and could average 
them perfectly. Since participants will not be perfect at averaging dots, they will be 
more variable in using the sensory cue than the optimal observer. Therefore, the 
truly optimal thing to do is for participants to weight the sensory cue, according to 
their overall variability by taking into account both the variance of the dot distribution 
and the internal variability in estimating the average of the dots. Since the sensory 


































cue is now less reliable (due to the added internal variability), we would expect 
participants to put less weight on it, and more weight on the prior. 
We calculated the overall variability in using the sensory cue as: 
𝜎%"
" =	𝜎%" 𝑛⁄ +	𝜎%!
" 
where 𝜎%" 𝑛⁄  is the external noise in the sensory cue, and 𝜎%!
" is the individual internal 
variability.  
As is expected, Figure 2.6 shows that the predicted weights in this case were 
lower than the optimal weights (compare dotted and dashed lines) as participants 
are worse than the optimal observer in averaging the dots. They placed less weight 
on the sensory cue and more weight on the prior than the optimal observer. We also 
compared these predicted weights to subjects’ weights in the final block (5) in 
Experiment 1, and found that they were still significantly different from the empirical 
data when the variance of the likelihood was medium or high (irrespective of prior 
variance) and when the likelihood variance was low and the prior variance was 
narrow (all 𝑝 < .001). No significant difference was observed when the likelihood 
variance was low, and the prior variance was wide (𝑝 = .79). This means that 
accounting for the added internal variability fails to explain our results as observers 




Figure 2.6. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information in each block of 
Experiment 1. Blue is the low-variance likelihood, green is the medium-variance 
likelihood, red is the high-variance likelihood. Dashed lines show optimal values. 
Dotted lines show predicted weights when overall variability in using the likelihood is 
taken into account. Error bars are +/- 1 SEM. 
 
We compared the mean squared error (MSE) for each of the three models we 
tested: a) the original optimal model (using the experimentally imposed likelihood 
variance); b) the model with only the internal noise; and c) the model with the overall 
variability (including both the experimentally imposed likelihood variance and the 
internal noise). The internal noise model had the lowest MSE, which confirms that 
this model provides a better explanation for subjects’ behaviour than other models 
(see Figure 2.7).  



































Figure 2.7. Average Mean Squared Error (MSE) for the external noise, internal noise 
and overall noise models. MSE calculations were based only on participants, for 
whom control data was available (N = 12; 6 had participated in Experiment 2 and 6 
had participated in Experiment 3). 
 
In summary, our data are best described by a model based on subjects’ 
internally generated noise, as opposed to either a model with the experimentally 
imposed likelihood variance, or a model that accounts for both the experimentally 
imposed likelihood variance and the internal noise.  
 
2.5 Discussion 
We set out to test more strictly than before for Bayes-like combination of prior 
knowledge with sensory information in the context of a sensorimotor decision making 
task (Beierholm et al., 2009b; Bejjanki et al., 2016; Berniker et al., 2010; Tassinari et 
al., 2006; Vilares et al., 2012) by adding transfer criteria to the task (Maloney & 
Mamassian, 2009). 



























In Experiment 1, we did this by investigating whether observers are able to 
learn the variances of two prior distributions, and instantly integrate this knowledge 
with a new level of sensory uncertainty added mid-way through a task. We found that 
observers placed more weight on the sensory cue (likelihood) when its variance was 
low and the variance of the prior was high; behaviour that is in broad agreement with 
the Bayesian prediction. However, we found only partial evidence of transfer. The 
weight placed on the high variance likelihood was not significantly lower than that 
placed on the medium variance likelihood, which is at odds with the prediction of 
transfer. Importantly, even though qualitatively, our participants behaved like 
Bayesian observers, their performance fell markedly short of optimal.  
In two further experiments we asked: (1) how behavior would be affected by 
additional instructions, which can clarify whether this suboptimality stems from using 
the incorrect model structure of the task; (2) whether experiencing the high likelihood 
variance condition from the start of the experiment would lead to closer-to-optimal 
weighting of the prior and likelihood information. In the first of these two further 
experiments, Experiment 2, we found that subjects’ performance moved closer to 
optimal when they were (indirectly) instructed that the prior variances were different 
– possibly why we were able to detect significant evidence of transfer in the task. 
However, they were still significantly sub-optimal in multiple experimental conditions. 
Participants remained significantly sub-optimal in the final experiment (Experiment 
3), when the need for transfer was removed (all trials types were present from the 
start of the task) and the experiment became a more direct replication of (Bejjanki et 
al., 2016). 
Suboptimal weighting of prior and likelihood information 
We show that observers take uncertainty into account, giving more weight to 
the sensory cue as its variance decreases, a result that is consistent across all three 
experiments. Equally, for a Bayes-like observer, we expect to find that the weight on 
the sensory cue is higher as the prior variance increases, but we found a main effect 
of prior in Experiments 1 and 2 only, and not in Experiment 3. Moreover, while our 
manipulation to the instructions in Experiment 2 moved the weights placed on the 
likelihood closer to optimal, they were still significantly different to the optimal 
predictions.  
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To examine to what extent additional sensory variability in estimating the 
centres of dot-clouds could have affected predictions and performance, we ran a 
separate, control experiment (see Appendix B). This shows that observers are less 
efficient in their use of the likelihood information than an ideal observer: the 
variability of their responses is significantly larger than the true variability of the 
sensory cue in both the low and medium variance likelihood conditions. However, 
this fails to account for suboptimal performance: ideal weights for the likelihood that 
are computed using the measured likelihood variabilities in the control task are still 
significantly lower than those in the empirical data.  
Suboptimal weighting of the prior and likelihood information may also be 
caused by incomplete or incorrect learning of the prior information. However, the 
prior-only trials suggest that the observers learn the means of the priors and 
distinguish between their variances at least in Experiments 1 and 2, if not 
Experiment 3 (under the assumption that standard deviations of subjects’ responses 
are related to the learnt prior variances). Suboptimal weighting of the prior could also 
be due to the use of an incorrect Bayesian generative model (causal structure) by 
subjects, e.g. if they believe that the prior will change over trials then they should 
apply a smaller weight to the prior (could be conceptualized as a meta-prior or 
hyperprior in Bayesian terms, Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2013). The fact that 
we found an effect of instructions imply that the causal structure assumed by 
subjects can indeed greatly influence behavior (Shams & Beierholm, 2010). 
Other research groups have performed similar experiments but using only a 
single prior distribution (Acerbi et al., 2014a; Berniker et al., 2010; Chambers et al., 
2018; Tassinari et al., 2006; Vilares et al., 2012). These studies also find deviations 
from the optimal predictions; however, the deviations can be accounted for by adding 
extra sources of inefficiency to the model that are due to motor errors, centroid 
calculation errors, and aim point (in reaching tasks) calculation errors (Tassinari et 
al., 2006). Moreover, when trials are blocked by prior condition, it has been shown 
that learning after a switch in the prior variance is slower when the prior variance 
decreases than when it increases, suggesting participants may perform optimally 
after further exposure to the task (Berniker et al., 2010). 
We considered elements of the experimental design that could have resulted 
in suboptimal behavior in a task similar to others in the literature where performance 
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was closer to optimal (e.g., Bejjanki et al., 2016). Firstly, describing the dots as the 
tentacles of an octopus may have caused participants to assume that another 
method of gaining an estimate from the dot colour, other than taking the mean 
horizontal position, was more appropriate in this task (de Gardelle & Summerfield, 
2011; Van Den Berg & Ma, 2012). However, our analysis shows that participant 
responses are not better predicted by the median, mid-range, or robust average, 
than they are by the mean. Secondly, our correction of the dot positions so that their 
SD on each trial was equal to the true likelihood SD may have influenced 
participant’s inferred reliability for the likelihood. However, an observer who 
computes the reliability for the likelihood trial by trial, by taking the dot cloud SD, 
would infer that the likelihood was less reliable ( !
-#
$) as a cue to true location than the 
centroid of the dots would be for an observer who could perfectly calculate the mean 
of the dots ( !
-#/&
$ ). This would lead to an observer placing less weight on the likelihood 
than the ideal observer. Participants in our experiment place more weight on the 
likelihood than the ideal observer, so this is not the source of suboptimality in our 
experiment.  
Finally, whilst the true likelihood and prior reliabilities used in our task were 
matched to those in Bejjanki et al. (2016) observers may have perceived the cue 
(dots) as more reliable than it actually was, which in turn would result in more weight 
placed on the cue than in previous studies (Bejjanki et al., 2016; Vilares & Kording, 
2011). 
It is possible that subjects did not experience enough trials of each prior and 
likelihood uncertainty to reach optimal performance, and indeed, we find evidence of 
decreasing weights on the likelihood with increasing task exposure in both 
Experiments 1 and 2 (main effect of block, although not the rise from block 4 to 5 in 
Experiment 2). Crucially, however, our participants experienced more trials per prior 
than in Bejjanki et al. (2016) (750, compared to 600) where weights were closer to 
optimal, ruling out the possibility that observers did not experience enough trials to 
learn the complex features of the distributions.  
The result that our participants’ performance was so different -in terms of level 
of sub-optimality- compared to Bejjanki et al. (2016) might be explained by a 
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difference in instructions. Specifically, their instructions have a social element that 
ours do not, i.e., in their task, participants were instructed to interpret the likelihood 
dots as “locations that other people have previously guessed the bucket is located 
at” (vs. tentacles of the octopus in ours). This means that in Bejjanki et al. (2016) 
participants would have to take into account how accurate they think other people’s 
guesses are. If we assume that people give lower weight to information that is 
allegedly based on other people’s guesses, this might explain why observers in 
Bejjanki et al. (2016) generally weighted the likelihood less than in our experiments 
(Martino et al., 2017). Another aspect about the instructions that is worth mentioning 
here is that, perhaps, our participants are more likely to assume that the body of an 
octopus is in the center of its tentacles, compared to previous guesses of other 
participants (Bejjanki et al., 2016) or splashes from a coin (Tassinari et al., 2006; 
Vilares et al., 2012). However, had this been the case, we would have expected 
participants’ responses to be better predicted by another estimate, such as the 
robust average, than the mean of the dots, and we found no evidence of this in the 
data.  
Another explanation is that observers were being “optimally lazy”; that is, they 
deviated from optimal performance in a way that had minimal effects on their 
expected reward (Acerbi, Vijayakumar, & Wolpert, 2017). In this case, we would 
expect obtained reward to match well with the predictions of the optimal Bayesian 
model; instead, the predicted reward resulting from optimally combing sensory and 
prior information was higher than that obtained by our observers - particularly when 
the variance of the prior was narrow (Appendix C). Therefore, we have no reason to 
believe that the suboptimal behaviour we observed in our task was due to our 
participants being “optimally lazy” (Acerbi et al., 2017). 
Nevertheless, we could show that the suboptimal behaviour in our task can be 
best explained by assuming that participants were weighting sensory information 
(relative to prior information) only according to the internal variability in using the cue, 
ignoring external noise. It is, thus, interesting to consider it as one potential 
explanation, on the computational level, for the deviations from optimal consistently 
reported in similar studies on combination of sensory and prior information (Bejjanki 
et al., 2016; Berniker et al., 2010; Sato & Kording, 2014; Tassinari et al., 2006; 
Vilares et al., 2012). However, we note that attending to internal noise may be easily 
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mistaken for underweighting the total noise; future work could investigate the extent 
to which suboptimal behaviour is specifically linked to the use of internal variability, 
and not simply a general under-estimation of the total noise in the stimuli.  
Note that the observer model, based on the internally generated noise, can 
still be considered “subjectively” optimal (fully Bayesian), in the sense that observers 
take into account and act according to their internal noise variability (Acerbi et al., 
2014a). This strategy looks sensible but is arguably not Bayes-optimal as an ideal 
observer has to take into account external sources of noise in addition to his or her 
own sensory uncertainty (Kersten et al., 2004; Knill & Richards, 1996).  
Evidence for Bayesian transfer 
We found only partial evidence for transfer in Experiment 1, as there was no 
significant change in the weight placed on the likelihood between the medium and 
high likelihood conditions. In fact, subjects seemed to treat the high variance 
likelihood the same as the medium variance likelihood (that they had experience 
with), suggesting that observers did not adopt a statistically optimal Bayesian 
strategy. Nonetheless, performance did not improve with more trials, suggesting that 
subjects were not implementing a look-up table decision rule, either (Maloney & 
Mamassian, 2009). However, we note that in our data, observers placed much more 
weight on the medium and high likelihoods than is optimal. This means that the 
effect size of a change in likelihood is much less than was expected; thus, the 
observed lack of significant differences might simply be due to lack of statistical 
power in our analysis to detect such small effect sizes. 
Why do we see more convincing evidence of transfer in the instructions task? 
Bayes-like computations demand considerable computational resources (e.g., 
working memory load, attentional focus); it is, therefore, reasonable to expect that if 
a task is sufficiently complex, and there is a lot to learn, subjects will start behaving 
sub-optimally. The impact of additional instructions in Experiment 2 may be to free 
up cognitive resources by providing subjects with (indirect) information about the 
variances of the two prior distributions at the start of the task (Ma, 2012; Ma & 
Huang, 2009). 
Our findings do not allow us to clearly distinguish between the reinforcement-
learning and Bayesian interpretations. We found that when we introduced a new 
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level of (known) uncertainty to the likelihood, observers immediately changed how 
they used this new information in a way that is largely consistent with optimal 
predictions; this effect was significant in the second experiment, but not in the first. 
Thus, we note that this effect is not particularly robust as it depends on the 
experimental procedure used to measure it. Indeed, our findings demonstrate that 
whether this effect is observed in the first place is greatly affected by small changes 
in experimental layout (e.g., instructions, number of trials). The fact that we observe 
no learning during Experiment 3 (no main effect of block), coupled with the 
observation that the weight on the likelihood in the 4th block of Experiment 3 were 
remarkably similar to those in the 4th block of Experiments 1 and 2 makes a weak 
suggestion of a Bayesian interpretation. However, a stronger test of transfer would 
be if participants had received no feedback for the new level of uncertainty. We 
provided trial-by-trial feedback (true target position) to ensure that participants were 
able to learn and recall the correct prior distributions. Therefore, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that our participants used the feedback to directly learn a mapping 
between the high variance likelihood and each prior, instead of the distribution of 
locations.  
Sato and Kording (2014) showed that subjects behave in a Bayes-optimal 
fashion in a sensorimotor estimation task, where they transferred their knowledge 
from the ‘learning phase’ to the prior in the testing phase in the absence of trial-to-
trial feedback, suggesting that people did not learn a simple likelihood-prior mapping. 
This means that the features of our experiments set an approximate upper bound on 
learning; in other words, we can generally expect subjects’ performance to be less 
accurate when performance feedback is not provided.  
Nevertheless, in order to meaningfully test whether observers can transfer 
probabilistic information across different conditions, an experiment where trial-by-trial 
feedback is limited, or excluded altogether, is needed. Hudson, Maloney, and Landy 
(2008) argued that providing only blocked performance feedback, for example, would 
prevent participants from using a “hill-climbing” strategy in the high variance 
likelihood condition (i.e., updating their estimates, based on the feedback from trial to 
trial). Alternatively, Acerbi, Vijayakumar, and Wolpert (2014) found that partial 
feedback (where participants are told whether they “hit” or “missed” the target, but 
the actual target position is not displayed) is sufficient to maintain participant 
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engagement; however, no meaningful information can be extracted from the 
feedback, preventing participants from using it to better their performance. Future 
work could investigate how the removal of full performance feedback would affect 
behaviour in more complex scenarios.  
What are observers if not Bayesian? 
 Some studies suggest that BDT is generally a good descriptive model of 
people’s perceptual and motor performance, but quantitative comparison shows 
divergence from Bayes-optimal behaviour (Bejjanki et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2018), 
not unlike what we report in this study. These deviations from optimality may have 
arisen because rather than performing the complex computations that a typical 
Bayesian observer would do, observers draw on simpler non-Bayesian, perhaps 
even non-probabilistic, heuristics (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Zhou et al., 
2018). Laquitaine and Gardner (2018) developed a model that switched between the 
prior and sensory information, instead of combining the two, which was found to 
explain the data better than standard Bayesian models. The authors concluded that 
people can approximate an optimal Bayesian observer by using a switching heuristic 
that forgoes multiplying prior and sensory likelihood. In another study, Norton, 
Acerbi, Ma, and Landy (2018) compared subjects’ behaviour to the ‘optimal’ strategy, 
and well as several other heuristic models. The model fit showed that participants 
consistently computed the probability of a stimulus as belonging to one of two 
categories as a weighted average of the previous category types, giving more weight 
to those seen more recently; subjects’ responses also showed a bias towards seeing 
each prior category equally often (i.e., with equal probability). We note that a 
Reinforcement-Learning (RL) model was also tested, where participants could simply 
update the decision criterion after making an error with no assumptions about 
probability; no participant was best fit by the RL model. This suggests that observers 
are, in fact, probabilistic, i.e., take into account probabilities, though not necessarily 
in the optimal way; instead, they seem to resort to heuristic strategies. However, 
future work should explore which, if any, of these models can capture the behaviour 
on this type of complex localisation task. 
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2.6 Moving from Limits on Using Information Efficiently in Adulthood to 
Childhood 
The question of whether humans making decisions under uncertainty approach 
optimal decision makers has led to much debate (Rahnev & Denison, 2018). One 
way to resolve it is to learn more about the exact circumstances in which observers 
do and do not behave like ideal decision makers. Here we show that the capability of 
adults to rapidly and flexibly perform Bayesian inference is limited in situations of 
greater complexity (see also Rahnev & Denison, 2018). Evidence for this can be 
seen from the fact that 1) performance was very far from optimal values, and 2) there 
was only weak evidence of generalisation to an untrained cue reliability (Experiment 
1, Chapter 2). We have therefore concluded that increasing cognitive complexity is a 
key limiting factor for the implementation of Bayesian inference in adults.  
What about children? We know that although children can extract information 
from environmental statistics within the first few months of life (Fiser & Aslin, 2002; 
Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et al., 1996), they do not begin to use them efficiently 
until 8-10-years of age (Bejjanki et al., 2019; Chambers et al., 2018). However, the 
factors that contribute to whether or not children use information efficiently (i.e., in a 
Bayesian, statistically optimal way) have received relatively little attention. Across 
three experiments in Chapter 3, we probe how different factors contribute to the less-

















A fundamental problem for human perception is processing the often 
uncertain and ambiguous information available to our senses. Luckily, our 
environment is highly structured in both space and time. For instance, the world 
tends to be stable over short time scales, and stimuli that have occurred recently are 
likely to reoccur (de Lange et al., 2018). Consequently, we can leverage information 
from the recent past to interpret incoming sensory signals (Beierholm, Rohe et al., 
2020; Fritsche et al., 2017; Summerfield & De Lange, 2014).  
 Human adults can integrate their recent experience of the underlying structure 
of a new environment (prior experience, or priors), with current sensory inputs in a 
statistically (near-)optimal fashion, that is, weighting these information sources by 
their relative reliabilities (Bejjanki et al., 2016; Berniker et al., 2010; Vilares et al., 
2012; Wolpert et al., 2011). However, little is known about development of abilities to 
use novel statistical regularities in this way. We know that infants already show a 
remarkable sensitivity to statistical regularities from an early age (Fiser & Aslin, 
2002; Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et al., 1996) – for example, rapidly learning novel 
statistical regularities in spoken speech at 8 months (Saffran et al., 1996) and in 
visual patterns at 9 months (Fiser & Aslin, 2002). Being sensitive to novel statistics is 
crucial, but how effectively are these used to improve perception and decision-
making? Studies comparing children’s performance with adults and ideal observer 
models find that children apparently do not make adult-like use of new statistical 
regularities until age 9 years or later. A crucial test is whether participants shift their 
reliance (weighting) for prior vs. current sensory information as these change in their 
relative reliabilities. For example, when the prior becomes less reliable, the ideal 
observer would give more weight to the current sensory input. To test whether 
children weight a prior by its reliability, Chambers et al. (2018) varied the reliability of 
a visual cue and a prior provided to adults and 6- to 11-year-old children localising 
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visual targets. The ‘prior’ here defines the distribution from which the target locations 
are sampled, and could be learned through experience with past target locations. 
Measuring weights given to each information source, Chambers et al. (2018) found 
that reliability-weighting increased with age: older children (> 9 years) adapted to 
changes in sensory uncertainty, as well as the uncertainty in the prior. By contrast, 
younger children were relatively insensitive to changes to the prior.  
 It therefore seems that although humans already detect and learn novel 
statistical regularities in infancy, it may not be until late childhood that they use these 
efficiently during perceptual tasks. What factors might underlie the long development 
of this critical perceptual skill? Another aspect of efficient information integration – 
reliability-weighted cue combination - also does not develop until the age of around 9 
years (Dekker et al., 2015; Gori et al., 2008; Nardini et al., 2008, 2010), which 
suggests that there could be in part a central issue with representing and / or 
computing with probabilities. However, where learning and use of different statistical 
distributions is concerned, there may be additional, even more basic, task demands 
related to working memory and other executive functions, which develop markedly 
and over long time scales throughout childhood (Best & Miller, 2010; Diamond, 2013; 
Gur et al., 2012). One recent study suggests that, indeed, abilities to overcome such 
central cognitive demands may play a crucial role in development of abilities to make 
efficient use of novel task statistics (Bejjanki et al., 2019). However, research in this 
area is so limited at present that even the central issue of how children’s adaptation 
to task statistics may differ from adults’ is not yet clear. 
In the present studies, we adopt a detailed approach to this problem. Building 
on previous studies which averaged performance over the experiment as a whole 
(Bejjanki et al., 2019; Chambers et al., 2018), we trace for the first time the time 
course of how children and adults adapt to novel, changing task statistics, as they 
are experiencing them. Considering the time-course of adaptation to task statistics 
lets us compare the learning rates and the end-points reached as a function of age, 
and to measure how groups adapt to changes in the prior distribution and other 
experimental manipulations. 
In Experiment 1, we studied the time course of how children and adults adapt 
to underlying task statistics in a target-localisation task with a noisy sensory cue and 
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a prior distribution that can be learned over the course of the experiment. In two 
follow-up experiments we probe two potential sources of slower tuning of children’s 
behaviour to task statistics: i) limited working memory for representing the prior 
(previous locations) and ii) limited executive function abilities for learning and 
implementing multiple weighting rules simultaneously. 
 
3.2  Experiment 1 
 
We tested 6-8 year olds, 9-11-year-olds and adults on a spatial localisation 
task that reveals the time course of adaptation to task regularities (Berniker et al., 
2010). Subjects were asked to estimate the hiding place of a target object by 
integrating information from a noisy visual cue and, potentially, prior knowledge (i.e., 
the distribution of previous target locations). The reliability of the prior was reduced 
halfway through the experiment in order to test whether this change in the prior 
would lead to re-weighting of the prior information, as in Berniker et al. (2010). We 
compared the relative weighting of prior knowledge and sensory input in adults and 
children aged 6 to 11 years. The age range was in accordance with previous studies 
looking at how children combine prior expectations and current sensory information 
(Bejjanki et al., 2019; Chambers et al., 2018), or multiple sensory cues (Gori et al., 
2008; Nardini et al., 2010; Negen et al., 2019).  
An ideal observer would assign more weight to a prior when it is more reliable 
(relative to a sensory cue), and less when it is less reliable. We would also expect 
observers to learn to use a prior with increasing experience. We asked whether 
adults assigned lower weights to less reliable priors overall (H1) and whether they 
changed their weight for each prior with increasing experience (H2). These initial 
tests serve as a baseline and a check that we replicated the expected results in 
adults. We next asked whether there were age differences in overall weights 
assigned to priors (H3), and in the degree of reweighting with increasing experience 
(H4). Finally, we asked whether either child or adult groups’ weights for each prior 






3.2.1.1 Overview. We adapted Berniker et al.'s (2010) task into a child-
friendly, ‘octopus-catching’ game (Figure 3.1a). On each trial of the task, the true 
location of an octopus was sampled from a Gaussian distribution centred in the 
middle of the screen and with a narrow (first half of trials) or wide (second half of 
trials) variance. To accurately predict the location of the octopus, subjects could 
combine their prior expectations of where the octopus was likely to appear (that they 
could learn via trial-to-trial feedback) with a noisy sensory cue that changed from trial 
to trial. The cue was a single dot sampled from a Gaussian distribution centred on 
the true location with a fixed variance. To respond, participants moved a green 
vertical bar (i.e., the fishing net) horizontally to try to point as close as they could to 
where the octopus was hiding. 
 
3.2.1.2 Participants. We tested adults (mean age = 21.82 years, age range 
18-33 years of age; n = 19) and two age groups of children (6-8-year-olds: mean age 
= 7.71 years, SD = 0.89 years; n = 15; 9- 11-year-olds: mean age = 10.21 
years, SD = 0.96 years; n = 17). All adult participants across Experiments 1-3 were 
recruited from the undergraduate psychology pool at Durham University and 
received course credit in return for study participation. Similarly, child participants in 
all three experiments were recruited through a database of local families who had 
agreed to be contacted for research studies and received a small toy as a thank you 
gift. In addition, stickers were used to incentivise actual performance in both adult 
and child groups. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
 
3.2.1.3 Ethics. The study was approved by the University Ethics Committee, 
in accordance with GDPR regulations, and carried out according to the principles laid 
down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. All participants (or their caregivers, as 
appropriate) gave informed consent in writing prior to taking part in the study. 
 
3.2.1.4 Stimuli and Apparatus. Stimuli were displayed on a 15-inch Dell 
laptop (1920 x 1080 pixels), viewed at a distance of approximately 60 cm, using the 
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Psychophysics Toolbox for MATLAB (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 
1997). The background was set to blue, like the sea surface.  
 We define all stimuli in terms of screen units, where the left edge of the 
screen is mapped to 0 and the right edge is mapped to 1. In these units, the position 
of the octopus was sampled from a Gaussian distribution, centered on the middle of 
the screen (𝜇$ = 0.5) with either a narrow (standard deviation (SD) of 𝜎$. = 0.05) or 
wide (SD of 𝜎$/ = 0.2) variance; see Figure 3.1c. These parameters were identical 
to those used in Berniker et al. (2010). All participants experienced the narrow prior 
distribution first, followed by the wide prior distribution. This order was chosen 
because participants in Berniker et al. (2010) displayed a faster rate of learning when 
transitioning from narrow to wide. We therefore chose to focus solely on the narrow-
to-wide change in variance as any developmental changes were more likely to be 
picked up in this order of presentation.  
At the beginning of each trial, a single dot (diameter 0.05) appeared on the 
screen. The horizontal position of the dot was drawn from a Gaussian distribution 
centred on the true octopus’ location with SD 𝜎% = 0.1). The likelihood SD remained 
fixed for the whole duration of the experiment. To respond, participants set the 
position of a vertical green bar (width 0.05, height 3% of screen height) on the 
horizontal axis. Feedback was given in the form of a red dot (diameter 0.05) that 
represented the octopus’ true hiding place.  
To allow us to determine whether adults in our study showed similar pattern of 
cue weights and learning rates to those in Experiment 2 in Berniker et al. (2010), the 
experiment included the same number of trials as those presented by Berniker et al. 
(2010). The experiment consistent of 500 trials, 250 trials for each prior variance 
condition: narrow, wide. 
The experiment took, on average, 50 minutes to complete.  
 
3.2.1.5 Procedure. Participants were told that there were octopuses hiding 
under the sea surface and their job was to estimate their location (Figure 3.1a). On 
each trial they saw a noisy visual cue, a ‘bubble’, after which they used the mouse to 
move a vertical green bar (i.e., a “fishing net”) horizontally to try to click as close as 
they could to where the octopus was hiding. The visual cue remained on the screen 
until participants responded. Feedback, indicating the true location, was given on 
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each trial along a score. Feedback is crucial in order for participants to learn the 
reliability of the prior and to detect when its reliability changes in the second half of 
the experiment. The maximum score was 20 points for a perfect “hit” and decreased 
as a participant’s response became further from the target. For a perfect “hit”, the net 
and the target needed to overlap by at least 50% of the red dot’s width (Figure 3.1b). 
When the participant picked the right location, we also incorporated an animation of 
a cartoon octopus smiling, with “+20” shown above it. If the target was within 70 
pixels of where the participant responded, the participant received 5 points (“+5” was 
shown on the screen). If the target was further than 70 pixels away, the participant 
received no points, and a sad cartoon octopus was shown. Additionally, participants 
“levelled-up” every 100 points, after which they were shown a congratulatory screen 
and offered a sticker for completing the level. To ensure that both children and adults 
were interested in the stickers, each participant was asked to choose their favourite 
kind of sticker among three options. Participants were allowed to keep any stickers 
that they earned during the experiment. Progress towards the next level was always 
shown at the top of the screen, via a progress bar. The cumulative score was 




Figure 3.1. (a) An example of an experimental trial sequence. Each trial began with 
the presentation of a noisy visual cue to the target’s current location, a single white 
dot described to participants as a “bubble” the octopus has blown on that trial. A net 
(vertical green bar) was presented at a random place on the screen at the same 
time. Participants estimated the hiding place of the octopus by adjusting the 
horizontal position of the net and pressing the mouse button to confirm their choice. 
Afterwards, feedback was given. Feedback consisted in a visual display of the true 
position of the target and a score that was maximal (20 points) for a perfect ‘hit’ and 
decreased away from the target (to five points for close but non-overlapping 
responses and no points for responses too far away from the target). (b) Reward 
structure: overlap between response and target location, resulting in 20 points (left 
panel); response within 70 pixels of target location, resulting in 5 points (middle 
panel); response further away from 70 pixels from target location, resulting in no 
reward (right panel). (c) SD of the prior. The true octopus’ location (red dot) was 
drawn at random from a Gaussian distribution, centered on the middle of the screen 
and whose SD was ‘narrow’ in the first half of the experiment and ‘wide’ in the 
second half of the experiment. (d) Ideal observer prediction. According to BDT, a 
Bayesian ideal observer combines the prior distribution (the pink distribution) with the 




Calculation of weights 
 To allow us to test our hypotheses about weights given to the prior vs. 
sensory cue, an initial analysis was performed to calculate the weight assigned to 
the cue vs. the prior on each trial. To track how prior weighting may change over with 
time, for each participant, each consecutive twenty-five trials were binned together. 
This binned data was then used to perform linear regression of the estimated 
location (response) as a function of cue location. All regression analyses were done 
using a least squares procedure (the polyfit function in MATLAB). The slope of the 
regression fit is a measure of the weighting subjects placed on the cue, relative to 
the prior’s mean, when estimating the target octopus’ location. Slopes close to zero 
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represent high reliance on the average prior target location, while slopes close to 
one represent high reliance on the sensory cue (i.e., low reliance on the prior). 
Hereinafter, we will refer to the fitted slope values as the weight placed on the 
sensory cue. 
 
Flexibly integrating prior knowledge and the sensory cue 
To test the hypotheses that adults assign lower weights to less reliable priors 
overall (H1) and change their weight for each prior with increasing experience (H2), 
we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with the weight on the cue (adults only) 
as the dependent variable and prior variance and bin as the within-participants 
factors. To test hypotheses about age differences in overall weights assigned to 
priors (H3), and in the degree of reweighting with increasing experience (H4), we 
conducted a mixed ANOVA on cue weights, with prior variance and bin as within-
participants factors and age group as a between-participants factor.  
  
Ideal observer predictions 
To test whether any group’s weights for each prior were significantly different 
from optimal by the end of their experience with it (H5; Figure 3.1d), we compared 
participant weights in the final bin of each prior to the weight predicted by the ideal, 
reliability-weighted averaging model for each age group separately using one-









where 𝜔0 is the ideal weighting of the likelihood, and  𝜎%" and 𝜎$" are the variances of 
the likelihood and the prior, respectively. In the current study, the variance of the 
likelihood was 𝜎% = 0.1 and the variance of the prior was 𝜎$ = 0.05 (narrow variance) 
or 0.2 (wide variance). Substituting the reliabilities of the prior and likelihood into eqn. 











= 0.2 (2) 
 
 
The ideal weight to give to the cue changed from 0.2 to 0.8 when the variance 
of the prior became wider.  
 
3.2.2 Results 
 Figure 3.2 shows the weight assigned to the prior during the experiment (solid 
lines; see Calculation of weights). Participants were analysed in three age groups (6-
8 years: upper panel, 9-11 years: middle panel, adults: bottom panel), consistent 
with previous studies that have reported group comparisons (Chambers et al., 2018). 
Also shown in Figure 3.2 is the weight that would be predicted for an ideal Bayesian 
observer (dashed lines). In summary, as described below, all age groups placed 
increasingly more weight on prior information when the prior was narrow (compare 
blue and yellow solid lines in all panels, Figure 3.2). However, the age groups 
differed in the extent to which they weighted the prior information: particularly when 
the prior was narrow, younger participants placed, on average, less weight on the 
prior than older children and adults as they performed more trials (see solid blue 
lines across all panels, Figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 also shows that 6-8-year-olds and 9-
11-year-olds have shallower slopes than adults, suggesting that they adapted slower 




Figure 3.2. Mean weight placed on the cue during Experiment 1, separated by bin 
and prior variance (blue: narrow variance, yellow: wide variance) for each age group 
(6-8-year-olds: upper panel, 9-11-year-olds: middle panel, adults: lower panel). 














































In all panels, each circle is a participant, and error bars are standard errors of the 
mean (s.e.m). The dashed lines indicate optimal predictions (all panels).  
 
 We turn to the analyses addressing our hypotheses, beginning with those 
about the adult participants (Figure 3.2, bottom panel), for whom there is an 
expected pattern of performance based on the earlier Berniker et al. (2010) study 
using a similar method.  
 
Adults assigned less weight to the less reliable prior overall. 
 To test whether adults would assign lower weights to the less reliable prior 
overall (H1), we entered adults’ cue weights shown in Figure 3.2 (bottom panel) into 
2 (prior variance: narrow vs. wide) x 10 (bin) repeated-measures ANOVA. Consistent 
with H1, we found a main effect of prior, 𝐹(1,18) = 	59.35, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .76, with 
less weight assigned to the less reliable (wide) prior overall.  
 
Adults weighted the narrow prior more with increased experience. 
 This ANOVA also tested whether adults change their weight for each prior 
more with increasing experience (H2). There was a significant effect of bin, 
𝐹(9,162) = 	5.09, 𝑝 = .001, 𝜂$" =	 .22 and a significant interaction between prior and 
bin, 𝐹(9,162) = 	8.84, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .32. Figure 3.2 indicates that this interaction 
corresponds to a decreasing weight on the cue (i.e., more weight on the prior) while 
participants learned to use the narrow prior (blue points), but an increasing weight on 
the cue as participants changed their behaviour when the new wide prior was 
introduced (yellow points). Thus, adults showed different directions of adaptation in 
the two blocks (interaction), and a significant weighting change was also detected 
individually in the narrow prior block (Figure 3.2, blue), where weighting gradually 
moved towards the optimum (dashed lines). In the wide prior block (Figure 3.2, 
yellow), adults rapidly tended towards a ceiling effect, approaching the optimum 
(dashed lines). That is, they rapidly learned to mostly disregard (assign a low weight 
to) the new wide prior. The speed of this re-weighting from one prior to the next is 
considered further below.  
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Six- to eight-year-olds and 9-11-year-olds assigned less weight to the less 
reliable prior overall. 
To test for age differences in overall weights assigned to priors (H3), we 
conducted a mixed ANOVA on cue weights, with age group (3 levels: 6-8-year-olds, 
9-11-year-olds, and adults) as the between-subjects factor and prior variance (2 
levels: narrow and wide) and bin (10) as the within-subject factors. We found a 
significant main effect of age (𝐹(2,48) = 	7.37, 𝑝 = 	 .002, 𝜂$" =	 .23) and a significant 
age x prior interaction (𝐹(2,48) = 	5.72, 𝑝 = 	 .006, 𝜂$" =	 .19). Simple effects analyses 
showed that the narrow prior was weighted more than the wide at all ages [6-8 
years, 𝑝 = .01; 9-11 years, 𝑝 < .001; adults, 𝑝 < .001]. This indicates that all age 
groups, even the youngest, changed their reliance (weighting) on the prior when its 
reliability changed, in line with efficient (Bayesian) decision-making that takes 
differing reliabilities of prior statistical distributions into account.  
 How rapidly did this re-weighting occur? To assess the timing of this effect, 
we compared the bin of 25 trials before and after the switch in prior variance using 
paired t-tests for each age separately (Figure 3.2, last blue vs first yellow data 
points). We found the wide prior weights to be significantly greater than the narrow 
prior weights in 9-11-year-olds (𝑡(16) = −3.24, 𝑝 = .005) and adults (𝑡(18) =
−5.85, 𝑝 < .001), but not 6-8-year-olds (𝑡(13) = −1.13, 𝑝 = .27). These results 
indicate that 9-11-year-olds and adults adjust very rapidly to a change in prior 
reliability, while for 6-8-year-olds there is no evidence for such an immediate 
adjustment.  
 
Children adapted more slowly to task statistics than adults. 
 This ANOVA also tested for age differences in the degree of reweighting with 
increasing experience (H4). We found an interaction between bin and age group 
(𝐹(13.215,432) = 	1.760, 𝑝 = 	 .047, 𝜂$" =	 .068), indicating that the rates at which 
participants adapted to task statistics changed with age. Because adaptation for the 
two priors is in opposite directions (see Figure 3.2), this overall effect is difficult to 
interpret. To assess where adaptation was present, we ran a repeated-measures 
ANOVA on binned weights for each prior and age group separately. When the prior 
was narrow (Figure 3.2, blue points), there were no significant changes in weights 
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across bins in 6-8-year-olds (𝐹(9,126) = .52, 𝑝 = .85, 𝜂$" =	 .03), but there were in 9-
11-year-olds (𝐹(9,144) = 2.31, 𝑝 = .02, 𝜂$" =	 .12) and adults (𝐹(9,162) = 7.42, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝜂$" =	 .29). When the prior was wide (Figure 3.2, yellow points), participants of 
all ages increased weighting of sensory information over time [effect of bin for wide 
prior; 6-8-year-olds: 𝐹(9,126) = 3.00, 𝑝 = .003, 𝜂$" =	 .17; 9-11-year-olds: 𝐹(9,144) =
2.07, 𝑝 = .03, 𝜂$" =	 .011; adults: 𝐹(9,162) = 5.27, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .22. However, Figure 
3.2 shows that while adults increased their weights until they reached optimal values 
and remained there, 6-8-year-olds’ and 9-11-year-olds’ weights (top and middle 
panels, yellow dots) steadily rose beyond the optimal line and reached an endpoint 
close to a weight of 1, where there is complete reliance on sensory information.  
 
Weighting for the cue vs. the prior is suboptimal at all ages. 
 Finally, we tested whether either child or adult group’s weights for each prior 
were significantly different from optimal by the end of their experience with it (H5). 
Using one-sample t-tests, we compared each group’s mean weight in the final bin of 
each prior to the optimal weight; see Figure 3.2, last blue and yellow point at each 
age vs. its corresponding dashed (optimum) line. As described in Table 3.1 and seen 
in Figure 3.2, by the end of their experience with the narrow (blue) prior, all age 
groups still placed significantly more weight on the cue than was optimal - i.e., they 
underweighted the prior. When the prior was wide, the weights of 9-11-year-olds and 
adults, but not of 6-8-year-olds, were not statistically distinguishable from optimal. 
Figure 3.2 indicates (last yellow points) that while adults rapidly converged on a 
near-optimal weight, the younger groups progressively gave (even) less weight to 
the prior over time, leading to a sub-optimality that, as with the narrow (blue) prior, 
corresponds to under-weighting of the prior – significant at 6-8 years and 










Results of one-sample t-tests on difference from optimal for each age group and 
prior.  
 
Age group Prior variance t-statistic df p value 
6-8 years 
Narrow 5.76 14 <. 001 
Wide 7.75 14 < .001 
9-11 years 
Narrow 4.77 16 < .001 
Wide 1.91 16 .07 
Adults 
Narrow 4.05 18 < .001 
Wide -1.10 18 .28 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
In previous studies, 6-8-year-olds did not change how they weighted prior 
information when it changed in reliability (Chambers et al., 2018). This result was not 
replicated in the 6-8-year-olds in Experiment 1: children were sensitive to changes in 
the underlying statistical distribution. However, we found little to no effect of 
experience on prior weighting in 6-8-year-olds. Overall, 6–8-year-olds learned 
enough about the priors to treat them differently, but this learning was so slow or 
slight that, unlike in 9–11-year-olds and adults, it did not show measurable changes 
across blocks within a prior. Nine- to eleven-year-olds learned to adapt to task 
statistics with experience, but did so more slowly than adults. At the end of the 
narrow prior block, no group reached the optimum (Figure 3.2), but the 6–8-year-old 
group were furthest away. At the end of the wide prior block, this group were also the 
only one significantly different from optimal, again under-using the prior. The 6–8-
year-olds were also the only group not to show a weight change from the final bin of 
one prior to the first bin of the next.  
Why were 6–8-year-old children particularly slow to adapt to the prior? One 
possibility is that younger children have fundamental difficulties combining 
probabilistic information in a Bayesian manner because the basic mechanism 
required for reliability-weighted averaging is not yet developed (Chambers et al., 
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2018). However, children could have more basic difficulties with accurately learning 
the underlying statistics of the task. In our task, the ideal observer would estimate 
the probability distribution from all previous target locations. Working memory is 
needed to remember and store all target locations to successfully perform the task. 
However, the capacity of working memory to represent all the targets’ spatial 
information accurately is likely to be limited – even in adults, but especially in 
children (Best & Miller, 2010; Diamond, 2013; Gur et al., 2012). Such limitations in 
capacity may mean that locations are remembered imprecisely, or that some 
locations, likely those seen earlier on, are forgotten with time. Experiment 2 tested 
the effects of working memory by asking whether children’s abilities to adapt to task 
statistics would more closely approach those of adults if we removed the need to 
remember the locations of previous targets by displaying them on-screen. 
 
3.3. Experiment 2 
 To test the effects of removing working memory demands, in Experiment 2, 
we explicitly displayed all the target locations participants had previously seen. If 
development of working memory is a major factor in performance, then young 
children in particular should show gains in adapting to task statistics as compared 
with Experiment 1. 
We asked whether, within Experiment 2 alone, there still remained any age 
differences in adaptation to the task statistics (i.e., main effect or interactions 
including age) (H6). We next asked whether, comparing Experiment 2 to Experiment 
1, how closely cue weights approach optimal would differ - overall, and crucially, by 
age group (H7). The display of all previous points in Experiment 2 is likely to be an 
advantage during the first (narrow) prior but could be a disadvantage for the second 
(wide), where the earlier (narrow prior) points no longer describe the current 
statistics. Therefore, we anticipated potentially different patterns of gain by prior (as 
well as by age), assessed in an experiment*age*prior interaction. Lastly, we asked 
whether, in this experiment, each group’s performance by the end of each prior was 








3.3.1.1 Participants. Fifty new subjects - 19 adults (mean age = 22.68 years, 
SD = 3.01), 17 6-8-year-old children (mean age = 7.51 years, SD = 0.92) and 14 9-
11-year-old children (mean age = 10.52 years, SD = 0.89) - participated in 
Experiment 2. Three children, aged 7, 8 and 9 years, respectively were excluded 
from our analyses due to incomplete data. These exclusions resulted in 19 adults, 15 
6-8-year-olds and 13 9-11-year-olds in the final dataset.  
 
3.3.1.2 Task Description. The same stimuli and procedure from Experiment 
1 were used in Experiment 2. However, in Experiment 2, after each trial, participants 
saw the target dot (feedback) for this trial (in bright red colour) as well as all target 
locations which participants had seen on preceding trials in transparent red colour 
(Figure 3.3b). These target locations remained on the screen for 1 second. 
Participants were told that the feedback summarized all the places the octopus had 
been previously. This information removed the need to memorize all the target 









Figure 3.3. (a) Experimental design. The task was the same as in Experiment 1, 
except that as well as the feedback from the immediately preceding trial (in bright red 
colour), at the end of each trial, participants also saw all the feedback they had 
previously seen (in transparent red colour). (b) Timeline showing how the prior 
distribution unfolded over the course of the experiment, i.e., after only a few trials, 
nearly halfway thorough and around three-quarters of the way through, after the prior 
variance had been changed. For illustrative purposes, the display of all target 
locations (feedback) is shown with the prior distributions superimposed; participants 
did not see the distributions in the experiment.  
 
3.3.2 Results 
 In Figure 3.4, we show cue weights replotted from Experiment 1 (solid lines) 
and with working memory demands reduced (Experiment 2, dotted lines). Figure 3.4 
suggests that both child groups weighted the prior in a similar way to adults when 
demands on working memory were lower (compare square symbols across age 
groups), moving closer to optimal values than the children in Experiment 1 (square 





Figure 3.4. The weight given to the cue across all 20 trial bins (bin size = 25 trials) for 
each prior variance (blue: narrow variance, yellow: wide variance) and experiment 
(solid: Experiment 1, dotted: Experiment 2) for each age group (6-8-year-olds: upper 
panel, 9-11-year-olds: middle panel, adults: lower panel). Lower values represent a 
greater weight on the prior. The dashed lines indicate optimal predictions. Error bars 
are standard errors of the mean (s.e.m).  
 













































Adult-like adaptation to task statistics at 6-8 years after a reduction in working 
memory demands. 
 We first asked whether, when working memory demands reduced, there were 
still any age differences in adaptation to the task statistics (H6). To test this, we 
performed a mixed ANOVA on cue weights with prior (narrow, wide) and bins as 
within-subject factors and age group (6-8-year-olds, 9-11-year-olds, adults) as 
between-subject factors. We found a main effect of prior (𝐹(1,44) = 	142.43, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝜂$" =	 .76), no main effect of bin (𝐹(9,396) = 	1.52, 𝑝 = 	 .13, 𝜂$" =	 .03) and an 
interaction of prior*bin (𝐹(9,396) = 	19.19, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .30), with the weight that 
participants placed on the narrow prior increasing as they experienced more narrow-
prior trials (Figure 3.4, dotted blue lines). Critically, there was no main effect of age 
(𝐹(2,44) = 	 .51, 𝑝 = 	 .60, 𝜂$" =	 .02) and no interaction between age and other factors 
(all 𝑝 > .21). This result reflects the similarity between the dotted (Experiment 2) lines 
across age groups in Figure 3.4: when working memory demands were reduced, 
children as young as 6-8-years adapted their weights using environment statistics to 
a similar extent as older children and adults. The absence of an age*bin*prior 
interaction also suggests that the rate at which weights were adapted over the 
course of the session was similar across age groups.  
 
Reduction in working memory demands affects ‘distance to optimal’ indices at 
all ages.  
We asked whether how closely cue weights approach optimal differed in 
Experiment 2 vs. Experiment 1 (H7). To test this, we computed ‘distance from 
optimal’ indices by taking the absolute distance between the optimal value for each 
prior (0.2 for narrow and 0.8 for wide prior) and each subject’s average weight in the 
last bin of that prior (bin 10 for narrow and bin 20 for wide prior); see Table 3.2. We 
then compared these indices in Experiment 2 with those in Experiment 1. A 2 
(Experiment 1 or Experiment 2) x 3 (age group: 6-8 years, 9-11 years, adults) x 2 
(prior: narrow or wide) mixed ANOVA on absolute distance to optimal revealed no 
interaction between experiment, prior and age, 𝐹(1,92) = 1.001, 𝑝 = .37, 𝜂$" =	 .02. 
However, we found a significant effect of prior, 𝐹(1,92) = 39.35, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .30, 
and a significant interaction between experiment and prior, 𝐹(1,92) = 24.68, 𝑝 <
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.001, 𝜂$" =	 .21, where absolute distance from optimal was smaller in Experiment 2 
(relative to Experiment 1) when the prior was narrow (𝑝 < .001) but not wide (𝑝 =
.79). We also found a significant effect of experiment, 𝐹(1,92) = 23.93, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =
	.20, significant effect of age, 𝐹(2,92) = 9.24, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .16, and an interaction 
between experiment and age, 𝐹(2,92) = 3.25, 𝑝 = .04, 𝜂$" =	 .06. Simple effect 
analyses showed that 6- to- 8-year-olds (𝑝 < .001) and 9- to- 11-year-olds (𝑝 <
.001), but not adults (𝑝 = .37), were significantly closer to optimal in Experiment 2 
than in Experiment 1. Our results, therefore, showed that children showed greater 




Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of absolute distance-from-optimal 
scores displayed for each age group, split by prior variance (narrow, wide) and 
experiment (1, 2). 
 
Prior Experiment Age group 
































Integration of sensory and prior information is optimal in adults but sub-
optimal in children.  
To test whether or not each group still differed from optimal weighting by the 
end of each prior (H8), we compared mean weights in the final bin of each prior to 
those predicted for an ideal observer (Figure 3.4, last blue and yellow points vs. 
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dashed lines). Unlike in Experiment 1, adults’ weights did not differ significantly from 
the optimal prediction when the prior variance was narrow (𝑡(18) = 	 .66, 𝑝 = 	 .51) or 
wide (𝑡(18) = 	−1.97, 𝑝 = 	 .06) – although the latter approached significance. In both 
child groups, weights were substantially greater than the optimal predictions when 
the prior variance was narrow [6-8 years: 𝑡(14) = 	2.64, 𝑝 = 	 .01; 9-11 years: 𝑡(12) =
	3.89, 𝑝 = 	 .002]. However, when the prior variance was wide, performance was 
indistinguishable from optimal for both 6-8-year-olds (𝑡(14) = 	−.63, 𝑝 = 	 .53) and 9-
11-year-olds (𝑡(12) = 	 .55, 𝑝 = 	 .59). 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Six- to eight-year-olds in Experiment 1 distinguished between the two priors, 
but were slow to adapt to each distribution, not showing weighting changes across 
bins, and remaining far from optimal. Strikingly, the rate and extent of their 
adaptation became adult-like when we made all previous trial outcomes explicitly 
available in Experiment 2. Together, these results suggest that younger children are 
capable of adapting to task statistics in an adult-like manner when those statistics 
need not be represented in working memory. Therefore, memory limitations are likely 
to be a major factor contributing to young children’s slower adaptation to task 
statistics. 
Having identified memory as a challenge for young children’s perceptual 
decision-making in novel environments, we turn to another: the need, potentially, to 
deal with multiple uncertainty levels of either prior or sensory (likelihood) information. 
While 6-8-year-olds in Experiment 1 were able to distinguish the two levels of prior 
uncertainty, 6-8-year-olds in Chambers et al.'s (2018) study could not. However, 
Chambers et al. (2018) had three levels of sensory uncertainty that changed from 
trial to trial, whereas the sensory uncertainty in Experiment 1 was constant 
throughout the experiment. Could it be that 6-8-year-olds in Experiment 1 had an 
easier time differentiating between the prior variances because they did not have to 
learn and apply multiple weighting rules simultaneously? Application of multiple rules 
and switching between them from trial-to-trial, places greater demands on executive 
function and cognitive flexibility, developing substantially throughout childhood 
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(Carlson et al., 2013). We test the effects of increasing these demands in 
Experiment 3.  
 
3.4 Experiment 3 
We asked how children’s abilities to differentiate between prior variances are 
affected by adding a second level of sensory uncertainty. We looked for differences 
in weights given to different priors and likelihoods, and age differences in these, with 
a specific interest in whether each age group would still differentiate between the 
prior variances, giving less weight to the less reliable prior (H9). We also asked 
whether, given the same number of trials per prior, but having to deal with multiple 




3.4.1.1 Participants. Eighteen adults (mean age = 20.27, age range 18-25 
years of age), 15 6-8-year-old children (mean age = mean age = 7.61, SD = 0.99) 
and 17 9-11-year-old children (mean age = 10.44, SD = 1.11) took part.  
 
3.4.1.2 Experimental Procedure. The basic task parameters were otherwise 
similar to those of Experiment 1, except that we included an additional level of 
sensory uncertainty. As in Experiment 1, the horizontal position of the target was 
sampled from a narrow Gaussian distribution in the first half of trials (trial 1-250) and 
a broad distribution in later trials (trial 251-500). We used the same variance of the 
likelihood (𝜎1	 = 0.1)  as in Experiment 1 but also added a second, low-noise, 
likelihood variance (𝜎1% = 0.02). In each trial, we pseudo-randomly chose one of the 
two variances of the likelihood while ensuring an equal number of trials for each 
likelihood and drew the cue dot by sampling from a normal distribution with the 
chosen variance. We therefore tested four conditions in Experiment 3: low-noise and 
high-noise likelihood paired with narrow and wide prior variances. Subjects 
completed one 1-hr session and experienced 250 trials per prior variance (500 trials 
overall), as before, except that they were split between likelihood variances. 
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3.4.1.3 Data Analysis. To more directly compare prior weightings across 
Experiments 1 and 3 (where there were the same number of prior trials, but these 
were split between two likelihood variances), for every participant, we extracted the 
trials separately for each prior variance. We binned the data for each prior into 10 
bins (bin size = 25 trials); the same as Experiment 1. In each bin, we looked at trials 
with each likelihood variance separately. The number of trials for a given likelihood 
variance assigned to each bin differed – there were at least 11-16 trials of each 
likelihood variance assigned to each bin. As described in Experiment 1, we 
computed the relative cue weights for each of the 20 bins (10 for each prior variance) 
by regressing each participant’s response against the location of the sensory cue.  
 
3.4.2 Results 
Cue weights replotted from Experiment 1 (solid lines) and Experiment 3 
(dotted lines) are shown in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.5 suggests that in Experiment 3, 
child and adult groups performed similarly (compare square symbols across groups), 
with adults weighting the prior less than in Experiment 1 (compare same colour 





Figure 3.5.  Cue weights across 20 trial bins for each prior and likelihood pairing 
(blue: narrow prior, high likelihood (N/P_H/L), red: narrow prior, low likelihood 
(N/P_L/L), yellow: wide prior, high likelihood (W/P_H/L), green: wide prior, low 
likelihood (W/P_L/L) and age group (top: 6-8 years, middle: 9-11 years, bottom: 
adults) for Experiment 3 (filled squares, dotted lines). The data for the prior/ 
likelihood pairings which were the same in Experiment 1 are also replotted (filled 



















































prior. The horizontal dashed lines indicate optimal predictions. Error bars are 
standard errors of the mean (s.e.m).  
 
Six- to- eight-year-olds do not distinguish between levels of prior uncertainty 
when multiple interleaved levels of sensory uncertainty were introduced. 
 A mixed ANOVA with within-subjects factors prior variance (narrow, wide), 
likelihood variance (low, high) and bin, and between-subjects factor age group (6-8 
years, 9-11 years, adults) revealed a main effect of prior (𝐹(1,47) = 23.39, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝜂$" =	 .33), with weights being significantly lower for narrow variance relative to 
wider variance (Figure 3.5, dotted lines). There was no interaction between prior and 
age (𝐹(2,47) = .55, 𝑝 = .58, 𝜂$" =	 .02), suggesting that the degree of reweighting 
across priors did not vary as a function of age. We also found a main effect of 
likelihood (𝐹(1,47) = 99.86, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .68) but no interaction between likelihood 
and age (𝐹(2,47) = .70, 𝑝 = .93, 𝜂$" =	 .003), indicating that younger children use 
sensory information to a similar extent as older children and adults. There were no 
other significant interactions involving the factor age, and no main effect of age (all 
𝑝 > .13). Thus, in contrast to Experiment 1 (Figure 3.5, solid lines), which showed 
strong age differences, in Experiment 3 (Figure 3.5, dotted lines), performance 
across age groups was similar. Overall, participants were sensitive to the new 
addition – trial-to-trial changes in the likelihood, but there were no age changes in 
this sensitivity. 
  Simple effects analyses tested whether each age group differentiated 
between the two priors (H9). These revealed that when there were multiple 
interleaved levels of sensory uncertainty, 9-11-year-olds and adults successfully 
differentiated more reliable from less reliable priors (𝑝 = .004 and 𝑝 = .01, 
respectively); 6-8-year-olds, however, did not (𝑝 = .07), suggesting that younger 
children struggle to re-adjust to changes in the environment when they had to learn 
multiple weighting rules at the same time.  
 
Participants were not less optimal when dealing with multiple likelihoods. 
 As in Experiment 2, we examined whether performance in Experiment 3 
would be more or less optimal than performance in Experiment 1. Specifically, we 
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tested whether, given the same number of trials per prior, but having to deal with 
multiple likelihoods, subjects would be less optimal (H10). As in Experiment 2, for 
each prior variance separately, we calculated the absolute distance between 
subjects’ average weights in the last bin of the prior and the optimal value for that 
prior (Table 3.3). We analysed only the trials in Experiment 3 with the high-noise 
likelihood that is the same across experiments 1 and 3. The resulting values were 
then submitted to a 2 (prior: narrow, wide) x 2 (experiment: Experiment 1, 
Experiment 3) x 3 (age group: 6-8-years, 9-11-years, adults) ANOVA. We observed 
a main effect of prior (𝐹(1,95) = 139.14, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .59), a main effect of age 
(𝐹(2,95) = 8.72, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .15), but no main effect of experiment (𝐹(1,95) =
.04, 𝑝 = .83, 𝜂$" < .001). There was also no significant age * experiment interaction 
(𝐹(2,95) = 1.78, 𝑝 = .17, 𝜂$" = .03), suggesting that none of the age groups moved 
further from optimal values when they had to alternate between two likelihoods 




Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of absolute distance-from-optimal 
scores displayed for each age group, split by prior variance (narrow, wide) and 
experiment (1, 3). 
 
Prior Experiment Age group 


































3.5 General Discussion 
 The present experiments asked why young children might adapt to novel task 
statistics less efficiently than older children and adults. Using a spatial localisation 
task, Experiment 1 found that children aged 6-8 years were sensitive to underlying 
task statistics, differentiating between two statistical prior distributions. However, 
they adapted to these more slowly and less completely than adults did. Nine- to 
eleven-year-olds adapted with experience but more slowly than adults. We next 
probed two potential developmental factors limiting young children’s efficient use of 
task statistics: (i) working memory limits (Experiment 2), and (ii) cognitive flexibility; 
specifically, difficulty in managing multiple rules (Experiment 3). We will discuss each 
in turn.  
Removing the need to learn task statistics and represent these in memory (by 
making previous target locations explicitly available) in Experiment 2 brought 6-8-
year-olds’ weights close to those of older children and adults. Strikingly, with the 
memory demands removed, there were no significant differences in performance 
across age groups, although children’s weighting at the end of the first prior still 
differed significantly from optimal. Our finding of greater, much more adult-like, 
adaptation to statistics in 6-8-year-olds when the demands on memory were reduced 
is in line with marked improvements in working memory during childhood (Zelazo et 
al., 2008). This result goes against the idea that children cannot optimally combine 
before the age of 9 mainly because mechanisms for weighted information integration 
are undeveloped (Chambers et al., 2018; Ernst, 2008). Instead, our data appear to 
be more consistent with the emerging idea that children are fundamentally limited by 
‘resource constraints’, which can arise from limited cognitive functions, such as 
working memory - a conclusion compatible with the ‘resource rational’ account 
recently proposed by Lieder and Griffiths (2019). It is possible that the reason why 
the 6-8-year-olds in Experiment 1 did not adapt to task statistics over time was 
because their working memory capacity did not allow them to retain accurately the 
preceding target locations needed to correctly infer the underlying structure of the 
task.  
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 Interestingly, our results suggest that central cognitive resources also limit 
adult performance, albeit less drastically: reducing working memory demands 
improved performance across all age groups, including adults. When the need to 
remember previous target locations was removed in Experiment 2, adult 
performance was indistinguishable from optimal, unlike in Experiment 1. Sub-optimal 
use of prior information in some previous studies with adults (e.g., Bejjanki et al., 
2016; Vilares et al., 2012) may be explained in part by limitations in even adults’ 
abilities to remember and represent all previous trial outcomes. We note that 
learning the prior distribution could be accomplished equivalently by storing all trials 
in memory, or (computationally less demandingly) by updating summary statistics for 
a distribution based on appropriately weighted new samples. These processes can 
be difficult to distinguish (Hansmann-Roth et al., 2021; Spicer et al., 2020; Sun et al., 
2019), but both require accurate representation and updating in working memory. 
 We further showed that while 6-8-year-old children distinguished between two 
differently reliable priors when they had to learn only one weighting ‘rule’ for each 
(Experiment 1), they were no longer able to do so when they had to learn multiple 
weighting rules simultaneously, to deal with two different levels of sensory noise 
(Experiment 3). This result is consistent with Chambers et al. (2018), who also found 
this lack of prior weighting in a situation with multiple sensory likelihoods. These 
results are in line with extended development of cognitive flexibility: young children 
have shown difficulty in managing multiple rules (Anderson et al., 2011; Harada et 
al., 2018; Huizinga & Van Der Molen, 2007; Zelazo et al., 1996, 2008). Some studies 
which have a multiple-rules paradigm showed age-related improvements in 
performance between the ages of 5 and 8, with adult-like performance in children 
older than 8 years of age (Irwin-Chase & Burns, 2000). In two recent experiments 
closely related to the present question, Bejjanki et al. (2019) showed that 6-7-year-
old children changed their weightings when only the sensory uncertainty changed 
(i.e., single ‘rule), but not when both sensory and prior uncertainty changed in an 
interleaved fashion (multiple ‘rules’ at the same time). These findings support the 
idea that having to store and manage several weighting ‘rules’ may have made 6-8-
year-olds less sensitive to changes in the underlying distributions. Interestingly, this 
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manipulation, too, had a major impact on adults’ performance. Adult performance 
now became so ‘child-like’ that there were no longer any significant age differences.  
 Taken together, our results suggest that although children are sensitive to 
statistical regularities in their environment from an early age, their abilities to use 
these to make effective perceptual decisions depend on development of later-
developing central cognitive abilities, including working memory and cognitive 
flexibility. The suggested memory limitations would imply that when children or 
infants have been shown to detect statistical patterns, the fidelity with which these 
have been learned may improve markedly with age. Actually determining what has 
been learned remains a challenge for either studies with infants (where just 
measuring sensitivity vs chance does not provide this information), or older children 
(where, as here, measuring behavioural choices does not separately measure what 
was learned vs how it was acted upon). New approaches to inferring the statistics 
that are represented – using proxy measures such as responses to unexpected 
stimuli from pupillometry or EEG – may be important future developments in this 
field. Other important directions include testing the degree to which either individual 
differences in, or direct manipulations to, these core cognitive skills, can predict 
efficient use of statistics in children or adults. 
We conclude that accounting for cognitive limitations during development is 
essential for understanding the mechanisms underlying children’s – and adults’ - 
abilities to perceive and act efficiently when faced with novel environments. In the 
real world, such learning is needed in new visuo-motor tasks, new real-world spaces, 
and potentially more abstractly, in new social or educational settings. Future 
research to optimise abilities to learn, accounting for developmental cognitive 
limitations, has potential applications to atypical development, disorders, and optimal 
approaches to education and training in childhood and beyond. 
 
3.6 From Experimental Manipulations to Individual Differences  
Across three experiments, we explored several lines of evidence for which 
factors may affect the learning and efficient use of novel task statistics during 
development. We found that removing the need to learn the statistics and represent 
these in memory (by making previous target locations explicitly available) in 
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Experiment 2 brought 6-8-year-olds’ weights close to those of older children and 
adults, although they still remained far from optimal. Conversely, when they had to 
learn multiple weighting rules simultaneously (increased cognitive effort) in 
Experiment 3, younger children’s abilities to distinguish between the priors broke 
down. Given the seemingly critical role of working memory capacity and cognitive 
flexibility in the efficient adaptation to task statistics, and the considerable individual 
differences we observed, it is possible that individual differences in these factors 
may also predict performance in adults. In Chapter 4, we focus on individual 

























Individual differences in working memory capacity do 
not predict efficient adaptation to novel statistics 
 
4.1   Introduction  
 Working memory has a central role in our ability to uncover statistical 
regularities in our environment (Baddeley, 2003, 2007; Bianco et al., 2020). As was 
argued by Bianco et al. (2020), detecting these regularities requires each event that 
is part of this sequence (in our case corresponding to the history of all previous 
target locations) to be retained in memory for long enough for the observer to figure 
out how they fit together. Although Bayesian models assume that behaviour is 
equally affected by all previous events (Geisler, 2011; Kersten & Yuille, 2003), it is 
already well known that while we can probably remember what happened on the 
immediately preceding trial with relative ease, we may not be able to remember what 
happened ten or twenty trials ago; certainly not with the same quality of 
representation as one trial back (Cashdollar et al., 2017; Luck & Vogel, 2013; Ma et 
al., 2014). In keeping with this notion, several studies have shown that their data are 
well explained by fitting an exponential function that weights more recent trials more 
than trials experienced earlier on (Bornstein & Daw, 2012; Harrison et al., 2011). It 
follows that if our participants are not able to retain in memory all the feedback they 
received so far or can only recall up to several trials into the past, they will not be 
able to infer the correct underlying statistical regularities in their environment. Given 
the limits on the capacity of working memory, we expected that higher working 
memory capacity, permitting the storage of more information, would be associated 
with more efficient adaptation to novel task statistics (i.e., be closer to optimal 
values). Indeed, when we made all past target locations explicit in Experiment 2, 
Chapter 3, freeing up memory capacity, both children and adults moved closer to 
optimal values, with adult performance indistinguishable from optimal when the prior 
was narrow. Higher working memory capacity has also been linked to better 
discrimination and faster responsiveness in alternative forced-choice tasks (Ester et 
al., 2014) and better implicit learning of sequences (Frensch & Miner, 1994; Usher & 
McClelland, 2001; Virag et al., 2015). Shared neural underpinnings between the 
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storage capacity of working memory and decision making have also been reported 
(Morcos & Harvey, 2016; Romo et al., 1999; Schott et al., 2019; Shadlen & 
Newsome, 2001). 
To this end, we were interested in exploring whether differences in working 
memory capacity explain inter-individual variations in how close adult participants 
are to optimal. We used the same task that was used in Chapter 3, in which 
participants had to localise unseen targets using a noisy sensory cue and a prior 
distribution that can be learned over the course of the experiment. We decided on 
distance-to-optimal score as our outcome of interest because we were interested in 
whether higher working memory capacity is associated with more efficient adaptation 
to the underlying task statistics. 
Due to the spatial nature of our task, in the present study, we focussed on the 
spatial component of working memory (Baddeley, 2003). Only one test, Corsi block 
task, directly assesses the capability to remember spatial positions and the 
sequence in which they occur (Corsi, 1972; Della Sala et al., 1999; Kessels et al., 
2000). Here, two blocks light up one after the other, and participants have to tap the 
blocks in the same order, with the number of blocks increasing until performance 
breaks down (Corsi, 1972; Kessels et al., 2000). We had decided on the Corsi block 
test because efficient adaptation to statistics of spatial sequences depends on 
abilities of spatial memory and sequential structure. Spatial memory is crucial 
because inferring the probability distribution over target locations (i.e., the prior) 
would require remembering all previous target locations. Holding the sequence of 
trial outcomes in memory – how far back in time a given location appeared (e.g., 
previous trial vs. ten trials in the past) – is important because in the environment that 
change, more recent experiences might signal changes in the environment and 
should therefore be favoured over earlier experiences. As a consequence, it is 
necessary to test whether observers remember spatial sequences. For this reason, 
our study included tasks in which subjects had to recall spatial positions and 
sequences.   
Alternatively, we considered the possibility that observers use different 
strategies to better remember these positions. For example, one observer may 
visualize the spatial environment, while another may internally verbalize and 
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rehearse the spatial locations they were seeing (e.g., ‘the target appeared slightly to 
the right of the centre of the screen’). We reasoned that if verbal memory plays a role 
in the acquisition of statistical regularities, we should find a negative correlation 
between verbal working memory ability and distance-from-optimal score from the 
localisation task. For this purpose, we make use of the backwards digit task (Waters 
& Caplan, 2003; Wilde et al., 2004), which is one of the most established verbal 
working memory span tasks (Conway et al., 2005). In addition, to avoid a confound 
of general cognitive ability, we included a measure of vocabulary knowledge 
measured by the vocabulary sub-test from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of 
Intelligence - 2nd edition (WASI-II) (Wechsler, 2011) as a predictor.  
To explore the extent to which efficient use of task statistics in adults depends 
on working memory, a multiple linear regression was conducted. If we find that 
visuospatial, and perhaps verbal working memory significantly predict distance from 
optimal, we can conclude that individual differences in working memory explain a 
significant amount of variance in how efficiently different adults use task statistics, 
above and beyond general cognitive ability. On the other hand, if we find that neither 
of the working memory measures makes a significant contribution, we can conclude 
that working memory is not a major source of variation. We were primarily interested 
in the role of visuospatial working memory – therefore, we conducted a hierarchical 
regression analysis which allowed us to determine whether visuospatial working 
memory contributed unique, independent variance beyond that explained by 
vocabulary knowledge (added in Step 1) and verbal working memory (added to 
vocabulary score in Step 2).  
 
4.2    Materials and methods 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-three adults ranging in age between 18 and 35 years with normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity participated in the experiment voluntarily. One 
participant was excluded from these analyses due to incomplete data. The remaining 
62 participants (mean = 20.93; SD = 1.96) were included in our analyses.  
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The sample size of 𝑁 = 64 was selected so that in the multiple regression 
analysis containing three predictors the power to detect a moderate deviation of a 
single linear regression coefficient from 0 (partial 𝑅" = .15) was 1 – 𝛽 = 0.8 (two-
tailed test), with 𝛼 set to 0.05. According to G*Power, the required minimum sample 
size is 64.  
Participants were recruited from the university’s subject pool and received 
course credit or were paid £15 for their participation. The experiment was conducted 
according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. All adults 
participated voluntarily after providing informed written consent. The study was 
approved by the ethics committee of the Department of Psychology, Durham 
University.  
 
4.2.2 Measures  
 
4.2.2.1 Experimental Task. The apparatus, stimuli and task were the same 
as described in Experiment 1, Chapter 3. Participants completed a spatial 
localisation task, where the target was more likely to be in the middle of the screen, 
either clustered closely (narrow variance) or spread out over a larger region (i.e., 
wide variance). A single dot stimulus drawn from a Gaussian distribution gave 
participants noisy information about the current location of the target, and 
participants were asked to estimate its location. The performance measure was a 
distance-from-optimal score.  
 
4.2.2.2 Measures of Working Memory. The Psychology Experiment Building 
Language program (PEBL; Mueller & Piper, 2014) was used to run the working 
memory tasks. The Corsi Test (visuospatial working memory) and Backwards Digit 
span (verbal working memory) were the measures of working memory, and these 
have been validated in adults (Kessels et al., 2000).  
 
Corsi Test 
The Corsi Test (Corsi, 1972) provided a measure of spatial working memory. For 
this test, participants saw a display of nine blue blocks on the screen. The blocks lit 
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up (changed colour to yellow) in a particular order, and the participant used the 
mouse to click on the blocks in the correct order. Feedback was provided as to 
whether the participant was correct or incorrect. First, the participant did 3 practice 
trials of three blocks. They then started with 2 blocks to remember and had 2 trials at 
that level. If they got at least one right, the sequence that must be remembered 
increased by one. If they missed both trials at the same sequence length, the 
program stopped. Memory span was computed as the smallest number of blocks (2) 
plus the total number correct and divided by the number of blocks at each sequence 
length. 
 
Backwards Digit Span 
 This task provided a measure of verbal working memory. Participants were 
shown a string of digits (e.g., 376) in the middle of the screen. The digits were 
presented sequentially for 1.5 seconds per digit. Following presentation of the string 
of digits in random order, participants were instructed to use the numbers on the 
keyboard to type the digits in reverse order (in this case, 673). Feedback of “correct” 
or “incorrect” was provided, as well as the correct answer. The string increased by 
one digit every two trials, from a two-digit string to a maximum of nine digits. The 
task was stopped after two successive incorrect responses on the same digit string. 
Digit span was computed as the maximum number of digits participants could repeat 
in reverse order on at least one trial.  
 
Vocabulary 
The Vocabulary subtest from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI-II) was used to assess participants’ vocabulary knowledge. In this test, the 
experimenter read out a series of words from the WASI II booklet and the participant 
was asked to describe what they mean. The experimenter then wrote down the 
response in the answer booklet. The responses were manually scored using the 
WASI-II manual after the testing session. There were 31 words in total (3 picture and 
28 verbal), with a maximum score of 59. Testing was terminated after 3 consecutive 
scores of 0. The total correct was calculated by summing the total correct responses 
(2 = correct, 1 = partially correct, 0 = incorrect).  
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4.2.3 General Procedure 
The task order was pseudo-randomised across participants. A list of all 24 
possible sequences was created, and each new participant was assigned the next 
available sequence down the list. After all the sequences were completed once, the 
same sequences were assigned again. The entire testing lasted approximately 1.5 
hours. 
 
4.2.4 Data Analysis 
Data processing, analysis and ideal observer calculations are the same as 
those described in Chapter 3 (details on pages 92-93).  
Individual differences were analysed via a multiple linear regression. Our 
outcome measure, distance-from-optimal score, was computed by subtracting the 
optimal values (0.2 for narrow prior; 0.8 for wide prior) from each subject’s weight 
averaged across the last 25 trials of each prior (details in Chapter 3). We included 
three predictors: (1) the memory span in the Corsi-blocks task that indexes 
visuospatial working memory capacity, (2) the digit span in the Backwards Digit span 
task that indexes verbal working memory capacity, and (3) the number of correctly 
described words in the vocabulary subtest from the WASI-II, which was included as 
a measure of vocabulary knowledge (for a description of how these measures were 
calculated, see Materials and methods).  
We used hierarchical regression to assess the relative contributions of the 
different predictor measures to distance-from-optimal indices. We used F ratio 
statistics to determine the amount that the explained variance changed from one 
model to the next.  
 
4.3    Results 
 We begin by repeating the same analysis used to analyse the data from the 
adult participants in Chapter 3 (rm-ANOVA on cue weights with prior (narrow, wide) 
and bin as factors) to ensure that we could replicate their pattern of performance in 
this new sample of adult participants.  
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Adults assigned less weight to the less reliable prior overall. 
 We conducted a 2 (prior variance: narrow vs. wide) x 10 (bin) repeated-
measures ANOVA on the cue weights. We found, similarly to our findings in Chapter 
3, a main effect of prior, 𝐹(1,62) = 	117.86, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =	 .65, with less weight 
assigned to the less reliable (wide) prior overall.  
 
Adults weighted the narrow prior more with increased experience. 
 This ANOVA also showed, similarly to our findings in Chapter 3, that there 
was a significant effect of bin, 𝐹(6.38, 395.83) = 	3.19, 𝑝 = .004, 𝜂$" =	 .04, and a 
significant interaction between prior and bin, 𝐹(5.74, 356.37) = 	13.993, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂$" =
	.18. Figure 4.1 (blue solid line) and simple effects analyses show that the weight 
given to the cue decreased over time when the prior was narrow; the first significant 
drop in cue weight was in bin 2 (𝑝 = .001), and the weight dropped even further in 
bins 8-10 (all 𝑝 < .01). In the wide prior block, the weight placed on the cue 
increased significantly from bin 11 until reaching a plateau around bin 12 (𝑝 < .001), 
Figure 4.1 – compare yellow solid and dashed lines. 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean weight placed on the cue, separated by bin and prior variance 
















values represent a greater weight on the prior. Each circle is a participant, and error 
bars are standard errors of the mean (s.e.m). The dashed lines indicate optimal 
predictions.  
 
 Altogether, we found a similar pattern of results as those reported in Chapter 
3. Here, it is important to highlight that, similarly to the adults in Experiment 1, 
Chapter 3, adults in our current study rapidly approached the optimum when the 
prior was wide (compare solid yellow line vs. dashed yellow (optimal) line, Figure 
4.1). By contrast, although observers moved gradually towards the optimum, they 
were still far from it by the end of the narrow prior trials (solid blue line vs. dashed 
blue (optimal) line, Figure 4.1), showing that adult observers, overall, did deviate 
from optimal. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, there was also a spread in these deviations 
from optimal between individuals (compare light blue and yellow dots vs. their 




 We used three measures as predictors: 1) Corsi memory span – calculated by 
adding the smallest number of blocks that needed to be remembered in the correct 
sequence and the total number correctly remembered, and then dividing that by the 
number of blocks at each sequence length; 2) Backwards digit span – computed as 
the number of digits correctly repeated in reverse order on at least one trial, and 3) 
vocabulary score: total number correct. Frequency distributions for all three 
measures are shown in Figure 4.2 (A: Corsi, B: Backwards digit, C: vocabulary). The 
skewness for the distributions is small and clustered around the mean (red line) as 
expected for normal distributions. From these histograms we conclude that the 
predictors are approximately normally distributed, with the mean (red vertical line) 




Figure 4.2. Histograms showing the distribution of scores for the Corsi blocks test 
(A), Backwards digit span (B) and vocabulary (C). Red vertical lines represent the 
mean.  
 
 However, our outcome variable (distance-to-optimal scores) followed a right-
skewed distribution both when the prior was narrow (Figure 4.3A) and wide (Figure 
4.3B), and more importantly, these distributions were significantly different (𝐷 =
.41, 𝑝 < .001, two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). Given that the two priors 
(narrow, wide) showed differences in variability, this would have violated the 
homogeneity of variance assumption for the regression analysis reported below. 
Such a violation is known to result in a higher Type I error rate. Therefore, the 








































Figure 4.3. Histograms showing the distribution of (absolute) distance-to-optimal 
indices when the prior was narrow (A) and wide (B). Red vertical lines represent the 
median.  
 
 Critically, we observed considerable variability in performance across 
individuals in our outcome and each of our predictor measures (Figures 4.2 and 4.3 
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Shown are the means and standard deviations (SD; in brackets) and range for both 
outcome measures (distance-from-optimal for narrow and wide prior) and predictor 
measures (vocabulary, Backwards digit span, Corsi blocks) 
 
Measure Mean (SD) Range 
Distance-from-optimal 
(narrow prior) 
0.28 (0.23) 0.0-0.8 
Distance-from-optimal 
(wide prior) 
0.11 (0.07) 0.01-0.35 
Corsi blocks (/9) 5.90 (0.93) 4-8 
Backwards digit span (/10) 6.75 (1.79) 3-10 
Vocabulary (/59) 36.24 (5.00) 23-48 
 
None of the predictors made unique contributions to variability in distance-to-
optimal scores.  
We next sought to determine whether each of our predictor measures 
(vocabulary score, backwards digit span, Corsi memory span) explain unique 
variance in distance-to-optimal indices by using a hierarchical regression (see Table 
4.2 for regression parameters). The residuals were not normally distributed. 
Therefore, we transformed the data by taking the square root of the distance-to-
optimal scores and fitted the models once again. By comparing nested linear 
models, we found that compared to a model with vocabulary alone (adjusted 𝑅" =
−.01), adding backwards digit span did not explain significant additional variance in 
distance-to-optimal scores (model comparison: narrow prior: 𝐹(2,59) = .19, 𝑝 = .82, 
adjusted 𝑅" = −.02; wide prior: 𝐹(2,59) = .30, 𝑝 = .73, adjusted 𝑅" = −.02. 
Moreover, addition of Corsi memory span explained a further 2.6% variance in 
performance when the prior was narrow and 0.6% when the prior was wide, but this 
was not significant for either prior (model comparison: narrow prior: 𝐹(3,58) =





Shown are the unstandardized regression coefficients (β), standard errors (SE), R2, 
adjusted R2 and p values from the hierarchical regression predicting distance to 
optimal scores for narrow and wide priors using vocabulary knowledge, verbal 
(Backwards digit span; BD) and visuospatial working memory (Corsi memory span). 
 
 





Step 1 Vocabulary .002 .005 .720 .002 -.014 
Step 2 Vocabulary .001 .006 .862 .006 -.027 
 BD -.009 .017 .611   
Step 3 Vocabulary  .001 .006 .917 .032 -.017 
 BD -.011 .017 .516   
 Corsi .040 .032 .217   
Wide 
prior 
Step 1 Vocabulary .001 .003 .534 .006 -.010 
Step 2 Vocabulary .002 .003 .462 .010 -.023 
 BD .004 .009 .636   
Step 3 Vocabulary  .001 .003 .584 .016 -.034 
 BD .003 .009 .691   
 Corsi .010 .017 .544   
 
None of the predictors were correlated with distance-to-optimal scores.  
 Having established that none of the predictors uniquely contributed to 
explaining the variability in distance-to-optimal scores, we next sought to determine 
whether each of these predictors is at all correlated with how close to optimal an 
observer is across the two priors. We computed the Pearson correlation between 
each predictor separately for the narrow (Figure 4.4) and wide prior (Figure 4.5).  
Distance-to-optimal scores were not significantly associated with visuospatial 
working memory capacity when the prior was narrow or wide (see Figures 4.4A and 
4.5A, respectively). Also, no significant relationship was found for either of the prior 
variances between distance-to-optimal and verbal working memory capacity (Figures 
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4.4B and 4.5B) and distance-to-optimal and vocabulary knowledge (see Figure 4.4C 




Figure 4.4. Correlations between distance-to-optimal scores (narrow prior) and 
visuospatial working memory as measured by the Corsi blocks test (A), verbal 







































































































Figure 4.5. Correlations between distance-to-optimal scores (wide prior) and 
visuospatial working memory as measured by the Corsi blocks test (A), verbal 




In this study we set out to ascertain whether visuospatial working memory 
explained unique variance, beyond that explained by verbal working memory and 
vocabulary knowledge (as a proxy for general IQ) in how close to optimal observers 
were in a localisation task we used before (Chapter 3). We replicated our previous 
finding of adults changing their reliance on the prior 1) dependent on its reliability, 
and 2) over time (Experiment 1, Chapter 3). However, individual differences in any of 
the measures, visuospatial working memory, verbal working memory or vocabulary 
knowledge - did not explain significant variance in distance-to-optimal indices for 


































































































As mentioned above, we duplicated our previous finding of adults 1) weighted 
the prior according to its relative reliability, assigning less weight to the less reliable 
prior overall, and 2) increased their reliance on the prior as they experienced more 
trials. We replicated this effect in a sample size more than twice that of typical 
psychophysics experiments (roughly 𝑁 = 30, some with as low as seven 
participants, Berniker et al., 2010). These data support the conclusion that adults 
take reliability into account (as ideal observers would) but generally, do not do so 
optimally. 
Combining psychophysics together with cognitive measures allowed us to test 
whether individual differences in working memory and general IQ (with vocabulary 
knowledge used as a proxy) explain variance in how close to optimal individual 
observers are. However, visuospatial working memory capacity, as measured by the 
Corsi memory span, did not uniquely contribute, beyond verbal working memory or 
general cognitive ability. A series of studies demonstrate that parietal regions take 
part in decision making, especially for decisions that require accumulation of 
evidence (Morcos & Harvey, 2016; Schott et al., 2019). Since the parietal cortex has 
also been shown to contribute to the storage of working memory information (Romo 
et al., 1999; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001), we expected a relationship between 
working memory and perceptual decision-making. In fact, a positive correlation of 
working memory and incidental learning of probabilistic sequences (Cashdollar et al., 
2017; Park et al., 2020) and the rate of evidence accumulation (Ester et al., 2014; 
Schmiedek et al., 2007) has also been reported. So why did we not find a 
relationship between working memory and efficient decision-making, when so many 
links have been reported previously?  
The storage capacity of working memory should play a central role in allowing 
information encountered further back in the past to be maintained in memory. In 
doing so, memory capacity may be critical for building the overall prior distribution 
(i.e., learning the prior), but should not be needed to learn how to use the prior 
efficiently. This raises the possibility that adult observers had learned the prior 
distribution equally well (which would explain why there was no effect of working 
memory), but what they are variable in is how good they are at assigning appropriate 
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weights to the prior, relative to the sensory information (which would explain why we 
still observed considerable variation in how close to optimal observers were).   
 
Distance from optimal as a measure of efficient use of novel statistics 
 Another possibility is our choice of outcome variable. We used distance from 
optimal as a proxy for efficient use of novel task statistics. We hypothesised that 
higher working memory capacity, particularly visuospatial, would increase the 
amount of past information that could be stored or processed efficiently, steadily 
shortening the distance from optimal predictions. Distance from optimal thus allowed 
us to determine how efficiently observers use the novel statistics. 
 Nevertheless, there is the possibility that there was actually a relationship 
between distance from optimal and working memory, but our outcome variable might 
not have been sensitive enough to detect such a relationship. In fact, previous 
studies that did report a positive correlation have used more sensitive measures, 
such as reaction times or computational modelling (Ester et al., 2014; Schmiedek et 
al., 2007). Using computational modelling, for example, Ester et al. (2014) was able 
to determine that working memory is linked to drift rates, i.e., the rate at which 
evidence is accumulated over time, but not response threshold (i.e., amount of 
sensory evidence needed to reach a decision). It is therefore possible that our 
outcome measure was useful but provided relatively little information about what 
aspects of the decision-making working memory plays a role in. Future studies could 
use more sensitive measures to clarify the contribution of working memory to 
different parts of the decision-making process.  
 
Corsi blocks as a measure of visuospatial working memory 
 Lastly, it is possible that that the Corsi blocks task was not a sensitive enough 
measure to detect individual differences in distance-from-optimal scores. Corsi 
blocks involves remembering a number of discrete locations in a sequence. In 
contrast, in the localisation task, the targets were at different locations, drawn from a 
continuous spatial distribution. Thus, it is possible that because the Corsi-blocks task 
involves a more discrete form of spatial memory (remembering up to nine distinct 
locations in a sequence), it was not sensitive enough to detect inter-individual 
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variations where the distribution of locations was continuous across space. Future 
studies will need to use measures which provide a more sensitive means for 
capturing individual differences in a continuous localisation task like ours, such as 
delayed estimation (Wilken & Ma, 2004) which also uses a continuous response 
scale.  
 
Does our task require verbal working memory? 
Verbal working memory also had no impact of how close adult observers were 
to optimal, which is what we would expect if verbal working memory was not required 
for the localisation task. It appeared possible that observers may have internally 
verbalised the spatial order of the targets (e.g., where the next target would likely 
appear, relative to the one they have just seen) - a process which would, indeed, rely 
on verbal working memory. However, it is unlikely that such verbal strategies were 
used over the entire experiment. This may explain the lack of a relationship between 
verbal working memory and distance-from-optimal indices in our study. Nonetheless, 
further studies would be required to completely rule out the possibility that verbal 
working memory is involved in learning the task statistics.  
 
The role of general cognitive ability 
 Although we observed considerable variability in our general cognitive 
measure (vocabulary knowledge; WASI-II), we did not find that this variability 
explained differences in how close to optimal different individuals were. This result is 
not surprising given that all of our participants were university students, and as a 
consequence, were potentially quite homogenous in terms of education, 
socioeconomic status and general cognitive capacities. We acknowledge that based 
on our results, we cannot confirm whether this result would hold for the general 
population, but this could be addressed in future work.  
 
Violation of key assumptions  
We checked the data for violations of key regression assumptions, such as 
residual normality and homoscedacity (homogeneity of variance). The residuals were 
not normalised: this is why a square root transformation was applied for the distance-
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from-optimal scores (Bishara & Hittner, 2012). An alternative would be to use a non-
parametric test (Miller, 1986) or generalised linear models where the distribution of 
error can be changed from normal to other error distributions, e.g., Poisson or 
binomial (O’Hara, 2009). However, we believe that the latter, in particular, is more 
problematic than transforming the data because certain models (e.g., Poisson) are 
very sensitive to violations of their normality assumptions, increasing the risk of Type 
I error (Ives, 2015; Warton et al., 2016) (as was argued in Knief and Forstmeier, 
2021).  
 
To summarise our results, we did not find that visuospatial working memory 
predicted individual differences in how close to optimal observers were, beyond what 
is already explained by verbal working memory and general cognitive abilities, and 
regardless of whether the prior was narrow or wide. Future work using computational 
modelling and more sensitive measures will confirm with a greater deal of certainty if 






















5.1   Introduction 
In this thesis, we sought to investigate how observers learn and use novel 
priors efficiently, what the limits of these abilities are, how they change with age and 
what factors that may underlie these abilities. Across three experiments in Chapter 2, 
we examined whether adults’ ability to generalise learned priors to untrained cue 
reliabilities is limited by task complexity. Across three experiments in Chapter 3, we 
then looked at how adults and children adapted to novel statistics and probed some 
of the factors that may affect the extent and rate of this adaptation. These 
experiments were supplemented with an individual differences approach, examining 
whether individual variation in working memory capacity relate to how close to 
optimal adults are (Chapter 4).  
Firstly, we will summarise the central findings of this thesis (Section 5.2). We 
will then explain how these findings build and expand on findings in the existing 
literature (Section 5.3). Then, we will outline the potential implications of our findings 
(Section 5.4), their limitations and possible avenues for future research (Section 5.5). 
 
5.2   Summary of main findings 
 
5.2.1 Chapter 2 
 The existing literature does not currently tell us whether observers can 
immediately transfer probabilistic information in situations that more closely resemble 
the complex and dynamic environments in which humans operate – i.e., where 
statistics can change suddenly. Therefore, across three experiments in Chapter 2, 
we used a task which was made more complex than previously used (Sato & 
Kording, 2014) by interleaving multiple prior and sensory variances. We asked 
whether adults would immediately generalise already learned priors to a new level of 
sensory uncertainty (demonstrated by instant change in cue weighting; "Bayesian 
transfer" (Maloney & Mamassian, 2009) ), which would be consistent with Bayesian 
inference, or whether they would take longer to adapt to the untrained sensory 
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reliability (suggestive of a mechanism similar to reinforcement learning). In 
Experiment 1, we found only weak evidence of transfer, with no differences in 
weights when sensory uncertainty jumped from medium to high. In Experiment 2, 
where participants were explicitly told of the different prior variances, we found 
evidence of transfer, with significantly less weight assigned to the high, relative to the 
medium, sensory uncertainty. In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, performance 
was suboptimal. This was also the case in Experiment 3, where all prior and sensory 
variances were included from the beginning (no transfer). We also found that a 
model that weights sensory information by taking into account only its internal noise 
provided a better account of the data than a model that accounted for the external 
noise only and a model that accounted for both internal and external noise in the 
sensory cue. This is the first study (so far as we are aware) to examine abilities to 
transfer in dynamic and complex environments.  
 
5.2.2 Chapter 3 
Despite overwhelming evidence that humans detect and learn novel statistical 
regularities as early as a few months after birth, recent studies have shown that 
children do not begin to use these efficiently until much later (around 9-10 years of 
age; Bejjanki et al., 2019; Chambers et al., 2018). However, the factors underlying 
the long development of this critical perceptual skill have not been explored. Across 
three experiments in Chapter 3, we probed several factors which likely affect the 
ability to efficiently use the statistics. In Experiment 1, we traced the detailed time 
course of how children and adults adapted to novel changing task statistics. We 
found that 6- to 8-year-olds learned enough about the two priors to weight them 
differently, but this learning was so slow that, unlike in 9–11-year-olds and adults, it 
did not show measurable changes over time. In Experiment 2, where all previous 
trial outcomes were explicitly available, 6- to 8-year-olds learned to use the statistics 
faster and more efficiently (i.e., became adult-like, moving closer to optimal), and 
adults’ performance became indistinguishable from optimal values. Experiments 1 
and 2 are the first to directly compare adults and children’s weightings when the prior 
was directly observable and, therefore, did not need to be learned (Experiment 2), as 
opposed to having to be inferred from past events (Experiment 1). Additionally, our 
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results from Experiment 3 have shown for the first time that when several weighting 
‘rules’ had to be stored and managed at the same time, 6- to 8-year-old children’s 
abilities to distinguish between statistical distributions tended to break down, and 
adults’ judgments became more child-like. Overall, these findings show that children 
are sensitive to novel task statistics from a young age but making efficient use of 
these for perceptual decision-making under uncertainty depends on development of 
central cognitive abilities, including working memory and cognitive flexibility. Our 
results suggest how early sensitivity to task statistics may be reconciled with much 
later development of abilities to use these statistics efficiently during perceptual 
decision-making. 
 
5.2.3 Chapter 4 
 Having observed that adults’ performance became indistinguishable from 
optimal when working memory demands were relaxed (Experiment 2, Chapter 3) but 
not otherwise (Chapter 2; Experiment 1, Chapter 3), we intended to deepen our 
understanding of this result. In Chapter 4, we took a different approach by examining 
whether inter-individual differences in working memory capacity are related to how 
close adults are to optimal. We focused on visuospatial working memory due to the 
spatial nature of our task. We also included a measure of verbal working memory 
and vocabulary knowledge as control measures. Using a sample size more than 
three times higher than that used in our previous experiments (63 adults vs. 19 in 
each experiment in Chapter 3), we replicated our findings of adult observers 
changing their reliance on prior, according to its reliability, and over time (Experiment 
1, Chapter 3). However, individual differences in visuospatial working memory, 
verbal working memory or vocabulary did not explain significant variance in distance-
from-optimal indices for either of the prior variances. As far as we are aware, no 
studies to date have examined the relationship between distance-to-optimal indices 
and working memory capacity.   
 
5.3   Contributions to the literature 
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5.3.1 Limited by complexity 
 A strong finding emerging from Chapters 2 and 3 is that the ability to rapidly 
and flexibly perform Bayesian inference is limited in more complex, changing 
environments. Abilities to generalise to untrained reliabilities is a powerful test of 
Bayesian inference ("Bayesian transfer"; Maloney & Mamassian, 2009). Using this 
approach in a more complex task than has been used previously (e.g., Sato & 
Kording, 2014), in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2), we were able to show that adult 
observers did not generalise learned priors of stimulus locations to a new cue 
reliability level (Maloney & Mamassian, 2009). This contrasts with Sato and Kording 
(2014), who used a far simpler visual estimation task and showed that adult 
observers immediately transferred what they had learned about likelihood variances 
to a new prior. The fact that in our study, observers did not generalise and remained 
far from optimal - despite receiving feedback - suggests that complexity poses a 
fundamental constraint on performing Bayesian inference. This conclusion makes 
sense because we know that performing accurate inference is computationally costly 
(e.g., time, memory); therefore, more complex tasks that draw to a much larger 
extent from memory and other resources may render performing optimal inference 
difficult or unfeasible (Beck et al., 2012; Ma, 2012).  
 Importantly, in this thesis, we also show that complexity similarly poses a 
constraint on children’s performance. We showed that 6- to 8-year-old children can 
differentiate between the prior variances, but only when there was a single level of 
sensory uncertainty, making the task much simpler and easier (Experiment 1, 
Chapter 3). However, when this task was made more complex by interleaving two 
levels of sensory uncertainty (in addition to changing prior uncertainty halfway 
through the task), children of the same age did not differentiate between the narrow 
and the wide prior (Experiment 3, Chapter 3). Our results corroborate earlier work by 
Bejjanki et al. (2019), who showed that 6-7-year-old children changed their 
weightings when only the sensory uncertainty changed, but not when both sensory 
and prior uncertainty changed in an interleaved fashion (multiple ‘rules’ at the same 
time, making the task more complex). Similarly, Chambers et al. (2018) found that 
children aged between 6 and 8 years were less sensitive to changes in prior 
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uncertainty than older children and adults when both prior and sensory uncertainty 
changed.  
 Together, our findings speak directly to a long-standing question in the field of 
what the limits of Bayesian inference are. Quite consistent with the role of complexity 
in limiting optimal inference, both adults and children’s performance became worse 
in more complex tasks. 
 
What does this tell us about real-life decisions? 
 Exploring whether people make the best, most efficient use of newly learned 
information in more natural and complex tasks is crucial to understand how people 
handle real-life situations, where the reliability of sensory inputs changes at 
unexpectable times. In simple, stable environments, you could find the optimal 
solution by learning simple rules, such as reinforcement learning. However, these 
would not generalise if the environment changes. By contrast, efficient, Bayesian 
inference allows for flexible behaviour in changing environments. Studies using more 
natural and complex tasks and stimuli therefore provide a crucial test of what people 
learn when they learn to make efficient perceptual inferences. Given the ubiquity of 
the non-stationarity of our environments, our results highlight the need for developing 
interventions that are aimed at helping observers to better detect when the 
environment changes, and to adjust their decisions accordingly.  
 
5.3.2 Adult-like integration of evidence from various sources after 8 years, but 
earlier if you know more about the underlying structure 
Although some basic abilities, such as extracting statistical regularities from 
sensory input, exist in infants (Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et 
al., 1996), the ability to make efficient use of novel statistical regularities does not 
become adult-like until late childhood. We showed this in Chapter 3, Experiment 1;  
6- to 8-year-olds changed their reliance (weighting) on the prior when its reliability 
changed but the extent and the rate of their adaptation to the task statistics was far 
from adult-like. Chambers et al. (2018) also found a lack of adult-like weighting in the 
same age group. By tracing the time course of adaptation in adults and children 
between the ages of 6 and 11 years, we can now add that although the youngest 
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children learned enough about the priors to treat them differently, this learning was 
so slow that, unlike in 9–11-year-olds and adults, it did not show measurable 
changes over time. And indeed, previous reports of lack of reliability-dependent 
changes in prior weighting in young children (Chambers et al., 2018) could result 
from such slow learning. This slowness contradicts the idea that young children 
cannot use novel statistics in an efficient, adult-like way, and instead aligns more 
closely with the idea that children are extremely slow (much more than adults) to 
learn to make efficient use of these statistics. This conclusion is supported by studies 
from Manning et al. (2020) and Ratcliff et al. (2012) who used computational 
modelling to show that young children accumulate evidence at a slower rate than 
adults.  
 Our results also show that the ability to make more efficient, adult-like use of 
novel statistics can emerge already by the age of 6, provided the underlying task 
structures are made explicit. We show this in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3), where we 
made all previous trial outcomes (aka the prior) explicitly available and found that 6- 
to 8-year-olds’ adapted to the statistics in similar ways to adults, when they had not 
before (Experiment 1, Chapter 3). The difference in performance of 6- to 8-year-olds 
between Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that the 6- to -8-year-olds in Experiment 1 
may not have adapted to novel statistics in a similar way to adults because they 
were uncertain about what those statistics are. We see a parallel to the literature on 
the development of cue combination. In Section 1.3.6.3, we discussed findings of 
children younger than 8 years of age not combining multiple sensory cues in an 
efficient, adult-like way, possibly because they are unsure about whether the cues 
are from the same or different objects (Dekker & Lisi, 2020; Rohlf et al., 2020). This 
idea – that young children may be unsure about the underlying causal structure - 
also gains support from a recent study by Negen et al. (2019); seven-, eight-, nine-, 
and ten-year-old children were presented with an auditory and a visual cue, and told 
that both of these cues indicated the location of an unseen target. The cues were 
from the same location and the correct response was shown at the end of each trial. 
Rohlf et al. (2020), on the other hand, asked participants to localise sounds without 
feedback; also, there was a spatial separation between the visual and auditory 
signals. So, while there is no doubt of what the causal structure was in Negen et al. 
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(2019) (visual and auditory cues originate from the same source), the causal 
structure in Rohlf et al. (2020) was not certain.  
Coming back to our own developmental work, we reiterate that in Experiment 
1 (Chapter 3), the underlying task structure was unknown, and had to be learned 
from feedback; 6-8-year-olds adapted extremely slowly. In Experiment 2 (Chapter 3), 
we showed the participants how the targets were distributed, and thus, reducing the 
ambiguity in the underlying structure of the task and found adult-like adaptation in 
children as young as 6 years. Taken together, these findings provide strong 
evidence that the real bottleneck to children combining optimally is not so much in 
them being incapable of doing so, potentially because of immature neural 
mechanisms, but in uncertainty about the statistical structure of the environment.  
We want to point out that knowing more about the statistics and structure of 
the task also improved adults’ performance. Presenting the prior distribution explicitly 
brought adults’ performance closer to the optimal values in Experiment 2 (compared 
to Experiment 1, Chapter 3), such that it was now indistinguishable from optimal. 
Also, in Chapter 2 we found that adult observers (1) moved closer to optimal, and (2) 
generalised to the untrained likelihood variance when we explicitly told them that 
there were two prior variances, one more reliable than the other (Experiment 2); no 
evidence of transfer was found when this information was not communicated to 
participants (Experiment 1). Similarly, Acerbi et al. (2014) reported that adults could 
compute with complex priors that change on every trial when they were explicit but 
not when the prior distribution(s) had to be learned (Acerbi et al., 2012; Körding & 
Wolpert, 2004). These results reinforce the notion that knowledge of the underlying 
statistics is essential in performing Bayesian inference, to the point that without this 
knowledge, adults struggle to generalise across contexts, and children take longer to 
learn to use information in an efficient, statistically optimal way.  
 
5.3.3 Limited resources 
 As well as incomplete knowledge about the statistical structure, our findings of 
(1) optimal use of novel statistics in adults, and (2) greater, much more adult-like 
adaptation to these statistics in young children (Experiment 2, Chapter 3), can be 
explained equally well by resource-rational theories (Bejjanki & Aslin, 2020; Lieder & 
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Griffiths, 2019). According to this account, there is a fixed amount of resources (e.g., 
storage capacity of working memory) that could be used to learn and efficiently adapt 
to novel statistical priors, especially in children, when working memory and other 
executive functions are still developing (Best & Miller, 2010). In showing all previous 
trial outcomes on-screen, we made the prior distribution known while at the same 
time relaxing demands on working memory, freeing up cognitive resources. This may 
be why the 6- to 8-year-olds in Experiment 2 were adult-like in how they adapted, 
whereas the children in Experiment 1 were not; it is possible that their working 
memory capacity did not allow them to retain accurately the preceding target 
locations needed to correctly infer the underlying structure of the task (Chapter 3). 
These findings are also consistent with parallel improvements in working memory 
during childhood (Zelazo et al., 2008). Interestingly, adults’ performance also 
became indistinguishable from optimal (Experiment 2, Chapter 3). That being said, 
we know that working memory is a limited resource even in adults (Bays & Husain, 
2008) regardless of whether observers 1) remember each individual location, or 2) 
instead maintain a summary representation of what the distribution looks like and 
update that with new samples to more efficiently do the task. These processes can 
be difficult to distinguish (Hansmann-Roth et al., 2021; Spicer et al., 2020; Sun et al., 
2019), but both require accurate representation and updating in working memory. 
Our results from Experiment 3 are also consistent with the resource-rational 
explanation: when multiple interleaved levels of sensory uncertainty were introduced, 
increasing demands upon cognitive resources, the youngest children’s abilities to 
distinguish between statistical distributions broke down, and adults’ judgments also 
became more child-like (Chapter 3). This result is consistent with Chambers et al. 
(2018), who also found this lack of reliability-weighting of the prior in a situation with 
multiple sensory likelihoods. Also, Bejjanki et al. (2019) showed that 6-7-year-old 
children changed their weightings when only the sensory uncertainty changed (i.e., 
single ‘rule), but not when both sensory and prior uncertainty changed in an 
interleaved fashion (multiple ‘rules’ at the same time). Also in line with our findings is 
evidence that cognitive flexibility improves at older ages. Irwin-Chase and Burns 
(2000) found that the ability to manage and switch between different rules improves 
between the ages of 5 and 8 and becomes adult-like after 8 years of age. Other 
 141 
studies have also shown that young children find multiple rules extremely difficult to 
manage (Anderson et al., 2011; Harada et al., 2018; Huizinga & Van Der Molen, 
2007; Zelazo et al., 1996, 2008).  
Altogether, our developmental results support the notion of a resource-rational 
strategy where people economise on the limited cognitive resources they have 
available to learn about the statistics of the environment. Our conclusion - that 
understanding decision making in humans, particularly as they grow older, requires 
that we account for limitations – is in keeping with a long-standing tradition of 
understanding development in terms of cognitive limitations, such as attention and 
working memory (Klahr, 1992; Klahr & Macwhinney, 1996). 
 
We note that the two different explanations – incomplete knowledge of the 
underlying statistics and resource rationality – are not mutually exclusive. In fact, 
finite resource could explain why young children may be more uncertain about the 
same environments that adults are certain about. If children’s abilities to learn about 
and represent the novel statistics are more limited – presumably because they have 
less resource available (e.g., lower memory capacity) – they may be still learning 
what the underlying statistics of the environment are.   
 
5.3.4 Neural explanations 
 Although our data are compatible with many perspectives, the possibility we 
may potentially be able to rule out is that there is an in-principle inability of younger 
children to combine the relevant information in a way that is weighted by reliability. 
Such an inability might be expected if there were a central immaturity in the brain’s 
implementation of weighted averaging. For example, it has been suggested that 
there is a reduction in the amount of inhibition that occurs through divisive 
normalisation and as a consequence, neurons have a smaller impact on the activity 
of nearby singe neurons (Carandini & Heeger, 2013): if true, this would result in 
underweighting of priors, which has been well documented in adults with autism. If 
we assume, in line with this explanation, that children younger than 9 years of age 
have reduced divisive normalisation, children in this group should systematically 
underuse priors, compared to adults. After this age, children should be able to learn 
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and make efficient use of novel statistics in a similar way to adults. While the 
experiments reported in this thesis were not designed to test this theory, the 
experiments in Chapter 3 seem to contradict it, with adult-like adaptation to novel 
task statistics at the age of 6 years as the demands on memory capacity are reduced 
(Experiment 2, Chapter 3). Similarly, when there were multiple ‘weighting’ rules, 6-8-
year-olds became less sensitive to changes in the reliability of the prior. Therefore, 
reduced divisive normalisation does not do a good job of accounting for the less 
weighting of the prior in younger age groups.  
 
 In sum, we believe we have made several novel contributions to the literature 
on the development of perceptual priors. Firstly, similarly to previous studies 
(Bejjanki et al., 2019; Chambers et al., 2018) we did not find evidence for adult-like 
use of novel statistics before 9 years of age in Experiment 1 (Chapter 3). These 
results are also consistent with what has been found in the vast majority of cue 
combination studies in children (Gori et al., 2008; Nardini et al., 2008, 2010): children 
younger than 8 years do not combine multiple sensory cues in a way that gives less 
weight to the less reliable cue. However, more recently, we and others (cue 
combination; Rohlf et al., 2020) have shown that the ability to combine across cues 
and with prior knowledge emerges in young children from the age of 5, provided the 
environmental structure is known, thereby freeing up resources and capacity for 
learning how to combine information optimally. This is a shift away from theories, 
suggesting that the basic mechanism needed to combine information optimally does 
not develop until 9 years of age (Chambers et al., 2018).  
 Secondly, the fact that when we made the prior explicit, and thus removing 
the need to learn it, the performance of 6- to 8-year-old children reached adult-levels 
and moved closer to optimal, provides compelling evidence that previous reports of 
young children’s failures to weight the prior efficiently and in an adult-like way 
(Chambers et al., 2018) are more likely a result of difficulties with learning the prior, 
as opposed to learning how to use it. Although this seems to go against the long-
held belief that children learn novel statistics from a young age (Fiser & Aslin, 2002; 
Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et al., 1996), it is worth noting that the infancy studies 
held as evidence that infants are already good at learning new statistical distributions 
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only show whether children can discriminate between familiar and novel stimuli 
above chance; these studies do not tell us how accurately these distributions are 
learned, compared to older children and adults. Incidentally, accuracy of learning 
would be hard to assess with those incidental looking-time methods, as there is no 
explicit task pushing people to be as accurate as possible.  
 
5.4   Implications 
 
5.4.1 Shared underpinnings with cue combination 
 While cue combination and prior and sensory combination are both key 
aspects of Bayesian inference, it is not known whether they are linked and are 
underpinned by a common mechanism. Our findings mark an important step in 
linking the development of cue combination and perceptual priors. Evidence for 
efficient, adult-like adaptation to novel prior statistics (Experiment 1, Chapter 3; 
Bejjanki et al., 2019; Chambers et al., 2018) seems to emerge around the same age 
when children start to combine multiple sensory cues efficiently (Gori et al., 2008; 
Nardini et al., 2008, 2010). This observation has led many to believe that there is a 
common neural mechanism underlying both cue combination and integration of 
priors, perhaps to do with representing and / or computing with probabilities (Ma, 
2012), or the neural mechanism needed to integrate cues (and prior knowledge) in a 
reliability-weighted way (Ohshiro et al., 2011). Our own studies and others (Rohlf et 
al., 2020) now move away from such neural explanations, instead suggesting a 
common problem with uncertainty about the underlying structures, or a much more 
basic, more priors-specific problem of coping with excess demand on immature 
executive functions (Best & Miller, 2010; Diamond, 2013; Gur et al., 2012). More 
studies are now needed to determine to tease apart these alternatives.   
 
5.5   Future Directions and Limitations 
 
5.5.1 The importance of testing beyond 11 years 
Studies that extend beyond 11 years into adolescence would help determine 
the specific age at which integration of prior knowledge becomes adult-like. In 
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Experiment 1, Chapter 3, we found less weighting of priors in children, compared to 
adults, with no significant differences between the 6-8-year-olds and 9-11-year-olds. 
This means that learning and/ or the efficient use of novel priors is not adult-like even 
by the age of 11 years, suggesting that these abilities continue to mature into 
adolescence. However, to our knowledge, research on integrating and weighting 
information by its reliability in adolescence is limited (Haller et al., 2018). 
Adolescence is also a time when working memory (Experiment 2, Chapter 3) and 
other executive functions that efficient prior integration may depend on, e.g., storing 
and switching between multiple ‘rules’ (Experiment 3, Chapter 3) also improve (Best 
& Miller, 2010; Gur et al., 2012). Clearly, given the ties between the delays in 
efficient use of novel statistics and the late maturation of executive functions and the 
brain regions they rely on (Baum et al., 2017; Gu et al., 2015; Hagmann et al., 2010; 
Huang et al., 2015), future studies should examine longitudinal changes over time 
between early childhood, through early teens and into adulthood.  
 
5.5.2 The importance of using computational models 
 Across the three experiments in Chapter 3, we demonstrated differences in 
the learning and efficient use of novel statistics between adults and children aged 6 
to 11 years. However, we did not investigate the mechanisms underlying these 
abilities, or the decision strategies adults vs. children use when performing 
perceptual decision-making tasks. Computational modelling lends itself well to these 
challenges. In the cue combination literature, this approach – of fitting models to 
experimental data – has resulted in a number of insights into the mechanisms and 
algorithms underlying behaviour (Nardini et al., 2008; Rohlf et al., 2020). Using this 
approach, Nardini et al. (2008) showed that adults’ behaviour was most consistent 
with an integration process that computes a reliability-weighted average; by contrast, 
the behaviour of 4- to 5-year-olds and 7- to 8-year-olds was better explained by a 
process that switches between the cues. More recently, model comparison 
demonstrated that a model which accounted for ‘causal uncertainty’, i.e., the 
uncertainty about whether the cues come from one object or different objects fits 
both adult and children’s data better than a model that always integrates or a model 
that always kept the cues separate (Rohlf et al., 2020). Also, by varying the 
parameters of the model, Rohlf et al. (2020) demonstrated that young children are 
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less likely to assume a common source. In sum, by using computational modelling, 
Rohlf et al. (2020) was able to demonstrate that young children can combine cues 
but are generally uncertain about whether the cues come from the same source. And 
indeed, we could also use computational modelling to better understand why young 
children in our studies tend to underweight the prior. For example, it has been 
suggested that adults with autism, who similarly to typical young children also 
underuse priors, do so because they overestimate the volatility in a changing 
environment (Lawson et al., 2017). Behrens et al. (2007) makes sense of this 
observation by saying that when the environment is believed to change very often, 
information from the past (i.e., priors) is not the most informative, and will therefore 
be weighted less. It is therefore possible that much like the lower prior expectations 
of a common source shown by Rohlf et al. (2020), young children could also have 
lower prior expectations that the environment will remain stable. By looking at how 
different model parameters, such as the a priori expectation of environmental 
stability, vary with age, we could better understand the reasons behind the under-
use of priors in young children. All of that being said, distinguishing reliably between 
models and parameters can be very challenging with developmental data (Scarfe & 
Glennerster, 2018)  that is generally more prone to response biases and noise 
(Jones & Dekker, 2017; Manning et al., 2018). 
 Computational modelling approaches have also been applied to model the 
learning process itself (Wilson & Collins, 2019). This is because each trial depends 
on the preceding trial(s); therefore, the ‘classic’ analysis of averaging across trials 
and conditions may not be as informative. In fact, we could apply computational 
models to our behavioural data to find out whether young children adapt more slowly 
to the prior (1) but will eventually reach the same asymptote as adults, or (2) would 
plateau before reaching the adult / optimal asymptote. The number of trials in the 
experiments in Chapter 3 was not sufficient to determine whether 6-8-year-olds, 9-
11-year-olds and adults would all converge to a common asymptote with enough 
exposure; however, in the future, probabilistic learning tasks could be modelled with 
a simple exponential rule with parameters for the learning rate, asymptote and the 
initial weight given to the prior. Observing how the parameters of the specific 
components of the model (e.g., learning rate) vary with age would help us to better 
understand which elements of the model are still developing in children.  
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We could also use computational modelling to quantify how working memory 
contributes to learning. Although simple behavioural analyses could explain the 
broad qualitative patterns we saw in Experiment 2, Chapter 3, it could not tell us 
which mechanisms are more likely to underlie these patterns. Limitations in working 
memory capacity could result in remembering previous locations imprecisely or 
forgetting locations with time (i.e., recency effects). Models that make precise, 
quantifiable predictions would help us better understand and quantify the effects of 
working memory limitations, particularly in the context of learning and decision 
making. 
 
5.5.3 Neural mechanisms that might underlie attenuated priors and the 
importance of eye-tracking methods 
 In Chapter 3, we reported less weighting of the prior in relation to sensory 
input in 6- to 8-year-olds. However, we did not explore the neural mechanism(s) that 
may be underlying the underuse of priors in this age group. Reduced inhibition that 
occurs through divisive normalisation is believed to lead to priors being 
underweighted in adults with autism (Rosenberg et al., 2015). Divisive normalisation 
has further been implicated in the modulatory effects of attention and multisensory 
integration on neural responses (Ohshiro et al., 2011; Reynolds & Heeger, 2009). 
These findings are consistent with the idea that there may be a link between neural 
mechanisms, specifically involving divisive normalisation, and underweighting of 
priors in young children. This should be a major consideration for future studies of 
the development of novel priors. 
 As well as MRI measures which could be used to uncover underlying neural 
mechanisms like reduced divisive normalisation, we could also use eye-tracking 
methods to better understand and interpret our results. Studies have employed eye-
tracking to take pupil diameter measures, shown to encode the trial-by-trial level of 
surprise at the time that feedback was provided (Lavín et al., 2014; Preuschoff et al., 
2011). These pupil measures can, for example, help elucidate whether young 
children in Experiment 1 (Chapter 3) took longer to change their reliance on the prior 
when it changed in reliability because they did not notice relevant feedback, or 
because they did not learn from it. Eye-tracking could also be used to probe what is 
it that people had actually learned about novel statistics. Behavioural measures 
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alone cannot tease apart suboptimality due to not representing the correct 
distribution, or not combining it correctly with current sensory input. One way to do 
this is to occasionally show stimuli that are outliers (e.g., show a target in a location 
that falls outside the range of the distribution, so it is unexpected). If people struggle 
with representing the distribution, we might expect to see increases in pupil size from 
surprise signals generated by such outlying observations. Future studies should 
attempt to repeat our findings but using eye-tracking methods.  
 
5.5.4 Individual differences 
 In Chapter 4, we found that distance-to-optimal indices in adults cannot be 
predicted by individual differences in visuospatial working memory capacity; and 
neither by verbal working memory capacity or vocabulary knowledge. This is despite 
evidence from work by us (Experiment 2, Chapter 3) and others (Bagneux et al., 
2013; Cui et al., 2015; Duncan et al., 2012; Pereg & Meiran, 2019) that working 
memory is crucial for learning new task rules and making decisions under 
uncertainty. Broadly, we concluded that is it possible that unlike in development, in 
adults, there are no longer important differences in working memory capacity that 
limit performance on our localisation task. This suggests that adults have learned the 
novel statistics similarly well, but are variable in other factors, e.g., how good they 
are at assigning appropriate weights to the prior and sensory information. 
Alternatively, it is possible that in order to capture individual differences in working 
memory capacity, we need to use a more sensitive measure. As our measure of 
visuospatial working memory, we used the Corsi blocks task (Corsi, 1972), which is 
one of the most widely used paradigms in visuospatial working memory research. In 
this task, the participant must hold a sequence of up to nine discrete locations in 
memory and then recall the sequence of locations in the correct order. By contrast, 
our task involves remembering locations which are continuously distributed. Could it 
be that the Corsi blocks test was not sensitive enough to detect inter-individual 
variations where the distribution of locations was continuous across space? An 
example of a sensitive measure of visual working memory is the delayed estimation 
task (Ma et al., 2014), which uses a continuous response space, rather than discrete 
‘locations’. Future studies should establish whether using more sensitive measures, 
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like the delayed estimation task, can detect differences in working memory capacity 
and predict individual differences in how close to optimal an observer is. 
 Another consideration in individual differences research is the homogeneity of 
the sample. Our participants were similar in education, socioeconomic position, and 
very likely, in general cognitive ability. Therefore, in the future, studies should 
explore individual differences in the general population. 
 
5.6   Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to gain a better understanding of how people learn 
and make efficient, statistically optimal use of novel statistical distributions. We have 
shown that increasing environmental complexity complicates performing Bayesian 
inference. We have also shown that making the environmental structure more 
explicit has a key role in our ability to use novel statistics efficiently in both children 
and adults, with children’s performance reaching adult-like levels and adults’ 
performance matching that of optimal decision makers. Lastly, potentially ruling out 
individual variation in working memory capacity as a source of variation of adults’ 
distance from optimal opens up avenues to 1) replicate our finding but with more 
sensitive measures, and 2) investigate other factors which may impact how close to 













6.1 Appendix A – Instructions for Experiments 1 and 2 (Chapter 2) 
 
Instructions in Experiment 1: 
“We will ask you to play an “octopus” game! 
Imagine that you are on a boat and there are 2 octopuses you are trying to find: one 
is white, and the other one is black. The white octopus has square tentacles and the 
black octopus has circular tentacles. The 2 octopuses live in different parts of the 
sea. Sometimes the octopuses will show their tentacles and at other times they will 
hide at the bottom of the sea.  
Your job is to try and figure out where the octopus is! 
Once you decide on a location, you can click on the green square (your fishing net), 
at which point you will see a red dot, which shows you the true location of the 
octopus on that trial. If the red dot is inside the net, then you correctly guessed the 
location of the octopus and you get a point!” 
 
Instructions in Experiment 2: 
“We will ask you to play an ”octopus” game! 
Imagine that you are on a boat and there are 2 octopuses you are trying to find: one 
is white, and the other one is black. The white octopus has square tentacles and the 
black octopus has circular tentacles. The 2 octopuses live in different parts of the 
sea. Sometimes the octopuses will show their tentacles and at other times they will 
hide at the bottom of the sea.  
[It is important to remember that one of the octopuses tends to stay in a 
particular area, whereas the other one moves quite a bit!] 
Your job is to try and figure out where the octopus is! 
Once you decide on a location, you can click on the green square (your fishing net), 
at which point you will see a red dot, which shows you the true location of the 
octopus on that trial. If the red dot is inside the net, then you correctly guessed the 
location of the octopus and you get a point!” 
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6.2 Appendix B – Control Experiment: Likelihood-only task (Chapter 2) 
Participants consistently performed sub-optimally across all of our 
experiments. However, when we calculated the optimal weight on the likelihood, we 
did so under the assumption that people know the true values of the reliability of the 
sensory cue (i.e., the likelihood). As Sato and Kording (2014) point out, this is clearly 
not always the case: in fact, in order to perform optimally on our tasks, observers 
may need to learn about their likelihood variability, as well as prior variability. We, 
therefore, separately assessed any sensory noise that participants may have had in 
judging the centroid of the set of dots. If we find that subjects’ estimates of the 
reliability of the likelihood differ from the true values, this would mean that subjects 
were using incorrect parameters for the task, which may have led to suboptimal 
performance. We then recomputed the optimal weights based on errors in observers’ 
estimates of centroid location; we could, therefore, test whether subjects were, in 
fact, near-optimal, when their own sensory variability was taken into account.  
Methods 
Subjects (N = 26; 6 had participated in Experiment 2, 6 had participated in 
Experiment 3, and the rest had not completed any of the above tasks) were 
instructed to estimate the centroid of eight dots for different likelihood widths. True 
locations were drawn from a uniform distribution across the screen (no prior). There 
were 90 trials overall, with 30 trials of each likelihood width interleaved in a random 
order. No feedback was given.  
For each participant, their error on each trial was calculated by taking the 
difference between the response and true location for that trial (error = response – 
true). Their variable error for each likelihood condition was calculated as the 
standard deviation of the errors. Outliers were excluded prior to calculating the 
variable error in the same way as described previously.  
Results and Discussion of Control Experiment 
Participants were significantly worse than ideal (variable error was greater 
than the true standard deviation of the likelihoods) in the low (𝑡(25) = 7.45, 𝑝 < .001) 
and medium (𝑡(25) = 3.80, 𝑝 < .001), but not the high (𝑡(25) = 1.48, 𝑝 = .151) 
variance likelihood conditions (Figure 6.8).  
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Figure 6.8. Variable error for each likelihood condition in the likelihood-only task. The 
dashed lines show the true standard deviations of the likelihood in each case (ceiling 
performance). 
 
This suggests that our optimal predictions place too much weight on the 
likelihood, as they were calculated based only on the external variability of the 
sensory cue and failed to also incorporate the added variability from observer’s 
inability to perfectly calculate the dot centroids. We, therefore, recomputed the ideal 
weight for the likelihood, this time using the measured likelihood variances in the 
control experiment; we reasoned that this calculation would give us an optimal 
prediction that better matches our subjects’ performance. Our estimates of the 
likelihood variance increased by 16.66% for the low, 2.96% for the medium and 
5.26% for the high likelihood. With such large differences between the true and 
estimated likelihood variances, we expected that the re-calculated optimal 
predictions (based on subjects’ estimates) will be closer to the observers’ data, 
compared to those based on the true likelihood parameters. We compared these 
optimal values to subjects’ weights in the final block (5) in Experiment 1, and found 
that they were still significantly different from the empirical data when the variance of 
the likelihood was high or medium, irrespective of prior variance (all p < .001) (see 
Figure 6.9). No significant differences were observed when the prior variance was 




Figure 6.9. Mean weight placed on the likelihood information in each block of 
Experiment 1. Blue is low variance likelihood, green is medium variance likelihood, 
red is high variance likelihood. Dashed lines show optimal values. Dotted lines show 
optimal values, computed using measured likelihood variances in the control 
experiment. Error bars are +/- 1 SEM. 
 
This pattern of results was surprisingly similar to the one we found when using 
the predictions of the optimal Bayesian observer, so this analysis did not affect our 
conclusions on the observers’ suboptimal behaviour. In particular, sensory noise in 
determining the centroid of the “likelihood dots” does not play a major role in 






































6.3 Appendix C (Chapter 2) 
The observed lack of statistically significant difference in cue weights does not 
necessarily imply a lack of substantial difference in terms of performance (points), as 
previous studies have shown that participants can be “optimally lazy” by deviating 
from optimal performance in a way that has minimal impact on overall expected 
score in a task (Acerbi et al., 2017). First off, we computed the optimal response 





Since we are interested in the performance of the model in terms of reward, we then 
calculated expected gains by first computing the probability of catching an octopus 
on a given trial as 
𝑝 = 𝑃 P−
𝑤
2 ≤ 𝑋 ≤
𝑤
2R 
where 𝑝 is the probability that a random draw 𝑋 from a Gaussian distribution with 
mean 𝜇 (fixed at zero) and standard deviation 𝜎3" will fall within the “hit” distance from 
the true location, and that distance is half the width of the net /
"
. The probability of 
catching the octopus 𝑝 is then multiplied by the number of trials (per trial type in a 
block) to calculate the expected number of points. 
We then compared expected reward to the average reward earned by those 
participants who took part in the control experiment and either Experiment 2 or 
Experiment 3 (N = 12; in block 5 only), and found that optimal integration of the 
sensory cue and prior knowledge (according to participants’ overall noise in using 
the cue) resulted in an expected reward that was higher than what our participants 
achieved, but only when the variance of the prior was narrow; when the prior 
variance was wide, they matched quite well; see Figure 6.10. This result is 
particularly challenging for the notion that people may be “optimally lazy”, as this 
case would result in predicted and obtained reward values being equal. It can be 
seen that contrary to these predictions, our observers were clearly worse than the 
optimal observer, and could earn more points when the variance of the prior was 
narrow; it is, therefore, unlikely that their suboptimal performance could be explained 
by them being “optimally lazy” (Acerbi et al., 2017). 
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Figure 6.10. Mean number of points earned in Block 5 for participants who took part 
in Experiment 2 or Experiment 3 and the control task (N = 12). Blue is low variance 
likelihood, green is medium variance likelihood, red is high variance likelihood. Dot-
dashed lines show optimal reward values, taking into account participants’ overall 
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